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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In essence, insider trading is the trading of securities by corporate insiders such as owners, managers 
and directors. As insiders often possess securities within their companies in exchange for their 
contributed capital or as part of their remuneration package, trading by insiders is common practice 
and happens on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, insider trading and more specifically the profitability 
of insider trading is one of the most heavily debated topics among economists, legal scholars and 
financial market regulators. On the one hand, insiders may just have a better understanding of their 
firm’s economics which may also give them an informational benefit over other investors. Their 
in-depth knowledge of, for example, internal company processes, management practices and the 
industry in which their company operates, may help them to recognize mispricing by the market and 
improve the timing of their trades. However, on the other hand, insiders may also abuse their position 
within a company to get access to price-sensitive information, unknown to other investors. 
Accordingly, if insiders would trade on this superior prior knowledge, this would lead to unfair 
enrichment at the expense of other investors. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of 
insider trading and insider trading profitability by exploring a unique database on the trading activity 
of insiders from Belgian listed companies.  
The first dissertation paper studies whether the profitability of insider trading was affected by the 
occurrence of the recent financial crisis. Such a financial crisis creates a chaotic financial environment 
in which investors react more nervously to news and experience more difficulties in ascertaining the 
fundamental value of companies. An interesting question is whether this uncertain and turbulent 
investment environment enlarged the opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational benefit. 
Our research results show that, while Belgian insiders were generally able to earn excess returns, the 
magnitude of their trading profits was substantially higher during the years of the financial crisis.  
The second dissertation paper studies how the dissemination of higher-quality information by 
companies affects the informational benefit of insiders and in turn the profitability of their trades. If 
XIV 
companies are more timely, precise and transparent in their communication, this should improve the 
quality and quantity of information available to other investors. As a consequence, lower trading 
profits are earned by insiders in companies with higher-quality communication. Our results 
furthermore indicate that different forms of communication also differently affect the informational 
benefit of insiders. Comparing the relative effectiveness of disclosures through annual reports, press 
releases, websites and investor relation activities, our results show that investor relation activities, 
which are used to communicate timely and forward-looking information directly to the investor 
community, appear to be most effective in diminishing the informational benefit of insiders.  
The third dissertation paper focuses on corporate insider trading policies. These policies are 
restrictions on insider trading imposed by the issuing companies themselves and fall within the scope 
of corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, we investigate whether the strictness of the 
policies differs across companies and which firm characteristics explain these differences. Results 
show that restrictions are more stringent in companies with more growth opportunities and that 
stringency also seems to depend on a company’s board structure. In the second part of this study, we 
analyze the effectiveness of the company-specific trading policies by investigating their impact on the 
profitability of insiders’ trades. Interestingly, results show that trading profits are not significantly 
lower in companies with more stringent insider trading restrictions.  
 
  
XV 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
In essentie is “insider trading” het handelen in aandelen en andere financiële instrumenten van de 
eigen onderneming door o.a. eigenaars, managers en bedrijfsleiders. Dit zijn de zogenoemde insiders. 
Dit verhandelen van aandelen van de eigen onderneming is veelvoorkomend aangezien insiders vaak 
aandelen verkrijgen in ruil voor hun kapitaalbijdrage of als onderdeel van hun verloningspakket. Toch 
is “insider trading” en de winstgevendheid hiervan één van de meest besproken onderwerpen onder 
economisten, juristen en toezichthouders van financiële markten. Aan de ene kant is het mogelijk dat 
insiders hun onderneming gewoon beter aanvoelen dan anderen waardoor ze een soort 
informatievoordeel verkrijgen. Ze zijn bijvoorbeeld beter vertrouwd met interne processen, met de 
organisatie van het management en met de industrie waartoe hun onderneming behoort. Als gevolg 
hiervan herkennen ze vaak sneller de over- of onderwaardering van de aandelen van hun onderneming 
door financiële markten en hebben ze vaak een nauwkeurigere timing wat betreft het uitvoeren van 
hun transacties. Hierdoor kunnen ze hun winsten te maximaliseren. Langs de andere kant is het echter 
ook mogelijk dat insiders van hun positie binnen de onderneming misbruik maken om zogenaamde 
voorkennis te verkrijgen. Dit is prijsgevoelige informatie die niet gekend is door andere 
marktdeelnemers. Bijgevolg, wanneer insiders transacties uitvoeren op basis van deze informatie, 
kunnen ze zich verrijken ten koste van andere marktdeelnemers. In dit doctoraat dragen we bij tot het 
beter begrijpen van “insider trading” en van de mechanismen die aan de grondslag liggen van de 
winsten behaald door insiders. We doen dit op basis van een unieke database die alle gerapporteerde 
transacties van insiders van Belgische beursgenoteerde ondernemingen bevat. 
In de eerste doctoraatstudie bestuderen we of de winstgevendheid van “insider trading” beïnvloed 
werd door de recente financiële crisis. Een dergelijke crisis zorgt voor een turbulente financiële markt 
waarbij investeerders meer nerveus reageren op nieuwe informatie en waarbij ze meer moeilijkheden 
ondervinden in het bepalen van de juiste waarde van een onderneming. Een belangrijke vraag die zich 
hierbij stelt is of insiders voordeel kunnen halen uit dit onzeker en turbulent investeringsklimaat en of 
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ze in tijden van financiële crisis nog meer mogelijkheden hebben om winst te halen uit hun 
informatievoordeel. Onze resultaten tonen dat Belgische insiders over het algemeen reeds grotere 
winsten behaalden uit hun transacties dan andere investeerders maar dat dit voordeel zelfs nog meer 
uitgesproken was tijdens de financiële crisis.  
In de tweede doctoraatstudie bekijken we hoe het verspreiden van betere informatie door de 
onderneming het informatievoordeel van insiders beïnvloed en bijgevolg de winstgevendheid van hun 
transacties. Wanneer ondernemingen preciezere informatie tijdig verspreiden en transparanter zijn in 
hun communicatie dan zou dit de kwaliteit en kwantiteit van de informatie die beschikbaar is voor 
marktdeelnemers moeten verbeteren. Als gevolg hiervan zijn de winsten behaald door insiders van 
ondernemingen die betere informatie verspreiden lager dan in andere ondernemingen. Bovendien 
tonen onze resultaten dat verschillende vormen van communicatie ook een verschillend effect hebben 
op de informatieasymmetrie tussen insiders en andere investeerders. Meerbepaald, wanneer de 
effectiviteit van communicatie met behulp van jaarverslagen, persberichten, websites en investor 
relations met elkaar vergeleken wordt, dan blijkt dat investor relations het meest effectief zijn in het 
reduceren van het informatievoordeel van insiders. Deze vorm van communicatie wordt voornamelijk 
gebruikt om rechtstreeks met geïnteresseerde investeerders te communiceren en bevat dan ook vaak 
informatie die betrekking heeft op de toekomstperspectieven van een onderneming.  
De derde doctoraatstudie focust zich op zogenaamde “insider trading policies”. Dit zijn regels en 
beperkingen die door de onderneming zelf worden opgelegd en maken deel uit van hun corporate 
governance beleid. We onderzoeken in deze studie meerbepaald hoe de strengheid van de regels 
verschilt tussen ondernemingen en waarom. Uit onze resultaten blijkt dat ondernemingen met meer 
groeiopportuniteiten doorgaans strengere regels opleggen en dat ook de samenstelling van de raad van 
bestuur een invloed heeft op de strengheid. In een tweede onderdeel van de studie bekijken we hoe 
effectief de regels zijn en of ze wel een invloed hebben op de winstgevendheid van “insider trading”. 
Onze resultaten tonen echter dat de grootte van de winsten behaald door insiders onafhankelijk is van 
de strengheid van de opgelegde regels en beperkingen. 
   
  
1 
CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In essence, insider trading is the trading of securities by corporate insiders such as owners, managers 
and directors. As insiders often possess securities within their companies in exchange for their 
contributed capital or as part of their remuneration package, trading by insiders is common practice 
and happens on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, insider trading and more specifically the profitability 
of insider trading is one of the most heavily debated topics among economists, legal scholars and 
financial market regulators. On the one hand, insiders may just have a better understanding of their 
firm’s economics which may also give them an informational benefit over other investors. Their 
in-depth knowledge of, for example, internal company processes, management practices and the 
industry in which their company operates, may help them to recognize mispricing by the market and 
improve the timing of their trades. However, on the other hand, insiders may also abuse their position 
within a company to get access to price-sensitive information, unknown to other investors. 
Accordingly, if insiders would trade on this superior prior knowledge, this would lead to unfair 
enrichment at the expense of other investors. Regulators have suppressed this illegal form of insider 
trading for many decades (Bris, 2005).1 However, in recent years, the further development and 
increasing internationalization of financial markets has compelled regulators to even intensify the 
combat against illicit insider trading (Economist, 2011). For example, responding to the 
internationalization of financial markets, regulators of emerging stock markets, like Brazil, are getting 
tougher on insider trading to make their markets more attractive to foreign investors (Economist, 
2011). Also in Europe, regulatory reforms have been initiated to harmonize criminal sanctions across 
member states and prevent insiders from further abusing differences in legislation (European 
Commission, 2011a, b). Furthermore, in response to insiders’ increasing use of new trading platforms 
and financial instruments, regulators have broadened their field of activity. Instead of mainly focusing 
                                                     
1
 An overview of when insider trading legislations were enforced in different countries is provided by Bris (2005).  
2 
on transactions in shares on regulated markets, regulators are now also monitoring transactions 
involving, for example, exchange-traded funds, credit-default swaps and trades on multilateral trading 
facilities (MTF), organized trading facilities (OTF) and over-the-counter transactions (OTC) 
(Economist, 2011; European Commission, 2011a).  
Further adding to the attention paid by regulators to insider trading was the recent financial crisis. In 
particular, this financial crisis has revealed several shortcomings in financial supervision and has 
shown that markets were not as robust as they were presumed to be. A more vigorous approach 
towards white collar crimes such as illicit trading by insiders has become one of the keystones in 
restoring investor confidence and securing the integrity of financial markets (Strasburg and Albergotti, 
2012). Accordingly, supervisory authorities have refined the definition of “inside information” such 
that is also applies to information that is not precise enough to fall under the obligation of disclosure 
but that could have a substantial impact on stock prices (European Commission, 2011a). In addition, 
they have not only strengthened the supervision of financial markets but they are also increasingly 
using more sophisticated techniques such as the screening of telephone and data traffic in the detection 
of insider trading (European Commission, 2011a; Economist, 2011). To further enhance the chances 
of detecting and prosecuting insider trading, regulators are also pleading to ameliorate the cooperation 
between judicial and supervisory authorities following the U.S. example (Scannell, 2012; De Morgen, 
2012). At the level of the European Union, a new European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
was established in 2011 to help coordinate the supervision of financial markets across member states 
(European Commission, 2009).2 In addition, to enhance the effectiveness of EU legislation on insider 
trading, minimum standards on administrative sanctions are being formulated and will have to be 
implemented by member states (European Commission, 2011a). In Belgium, the Financial Services 
and Markets Authority (FSMA) has already altered their procedure for the imposition of 
administrative fines in order to increase the efficiency of this procedure and enlarged the dissuasive 
effect of administrative sanctions (FSMA, 2012).  
                                                     
2
 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has officially been established by European Regulation No 
1095/2010 and is operative since 1 January 2011.   
3 
This large and even expanding attention of market regulators towards insider trading illustrates the 
gravity of the potential deteriorating effect of insider trading on financial market integrity. Obviously, 
the scope of this impact is directly related to the magnitude of the gains earned by insiders at the 
expense of other investors. As such, an important stream of academic insider trading literature has 
focuses improving the understanding of regulators and market participants into the mechanisms 
underlying insider trading gains by analyzing if and when insider trading is profitable. In particular, 
the profitability of insider trading has been examined in various countries including the U.S. (e.g. 
Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), Spain (Del Brio et 
al., 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005) and the U.K. (Gregory et al., 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 
2006). Furthermore, evidence has been provided, for example, on the profitability of insider trading 
around earnings announcements (e.g. Ke et al., 2003; Cheng and Leung, 2008), on the effectiveness of 
regulatory reforms (e.g. Garfinkel, 1997; Brochet, 2010) and on the impact of institutional differences 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2011). In this dissertation, I further contribute to the understanding of insider trading 
by examining the profitability of transactions by Belgian insiders. In the first dissertation paper I study 
whether the profitability of insider trading was affected by the occurrence of the recent financial crisis. 
Such a financial crisis creates a chaotic financial environment in which investors react more nervously 
to news and experience more difficulties in ascertaining the fundamental value of companies. During 
the period 2008-2009, the peak of the financial crisis in Belgium, a considerable higher number of 
market interventions by the FSMA were necessary to calm the market and restore investor confidence. 
These interventions included, among other things, trading suspensions, putting financial instruments 
under supervision and even enforcing temporary restrictions on short selling (FSMA, 2009; FSMA, 
2010). An interesting question is whether this uncertain and turbulent investment environment 
enlarged the opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational benefits or whether the current 
legislation was able to prevent this.  
In the second dissertation paper I study the effectiveness of efforts from companies and regulators to 
address the underlying cause of insider trading profitability, i.e. information asymmetry. From a 
regulator’s point of view, it is important to suppress the information asymmetry between company 
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insiders and outside investors as this harms investor confidence. Investors become more careful and 
may even abstain from trading if the risk of trading against an informed counterparty is higher. This 
undermines the functioning of financial markets and decreases their liquidity. Also companies may 
benefit from minimizing the information asymmetry with their stakeholders for several reasons. 
Providers of equity and debt capital for example, expect a return premium to compensate for the 
higher level of uncertainty in the presence of information asymmetry. Accordingly, this raises the cost 
of equity and debt capital. One of the most commonly used resources to reduce information 
asymmetry is the enforcement of a high standard of quality on information disclosures (Bushman and 
Smith, 2001; Mallin, 2002; OECD, 2004). Information is regarded as high-quality if it is precise, 
transparent, timely and relevant (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). As the minimization of information 
asymmetry is important to regulators as well as to companies, I not only investigate how insiders’ 
trading profits are affected by the quality of mandatory disclosures but also look at the effect of 
voluntary disclosures through press releases, company websites and investor relation activities.  
In the third dissertation paper I study the effectiveness of trading restrictions imposed by companies 
themselves.3 For companies, allowing insider trading may have both advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, it has been argued that attributing shares to insiders and allowing them to trade is an 
effective form of executive compensation when aligning the interests of insiders and shareholders 
(Manne, 1966). In addition, trading by insiders may provide a useful additional signaling channel to 
communicate complex news in a credible way as trades by insiders in line with this news enhance the 
credibility of the announcement and at the same time decrease disclosure costs (Engelen and Van 
Liedekerke, 2007). On the other hand, due to the fact that insiders are allowed to trade, providers of 
equity capital will take into account a higher risk premium to compensate for the risk of trading 
against informed counterparties. Consequently, this increases the cost of capital and lowers the 
liquidity of the company’s stock (Leland, 1992). Furthermore, insider trading may also increase 
agency costs by adversely affecting the divergence between the interests of insiders and shareholders 
and the consequent need for shareholders to monitor insiders. For example, the prospect of high short-
                                                     
3
 Examples of such restrictions are: restrictions on trading by insiders around the announcements of financial results, the 
prohibition to involve in speculative trading and the obligation to obtain ex ante approval of transactions by a compliance 
officer. 
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term returns may give insiders the incentive to invest in high-risk projects instead of projects aimed at 
long term maximization of shareholder value. In order to suppress these potential negative effects for 
companies and shareholders, companies may enforce their own restrictions on insider trading in 
addition to legal requirements. In addition, knowledge on whether or not restrictions outside the 
current legislation contribute to the mitigation of insiders’ trading profits may be useful for regulators 
in future discussions on regulatory changes.  
 
1.1. Insider trading in Belgium 
1.1.1. Legal framework on insider trading in Belgium 
Historical background  
The Belgian legislation on insider trading has ensued from legal initiatives taken at the level of the 
European Union. A first European directive on insider trading was formulated in 1989, i.e. Directive 
89/592/EEC. This directive was converted into Belgian legislation by the articles 181 until 189 of the 
Law of 4 December 1990 on financial transactions and financial markets. The main goal of the 
European directive was to harmonize the legislation of member states with regard to insider trading. 
Before the 1989 Directive came into effect, some member states did not have any regulation on insider 
trading, while the regulation operative in other member states was very divergent. The directive 
provided a uniform definition of “inside information” and formulated several prohibitions on the use 
of this information.  
In 2003, in response to changes in financial markets and Community legislation since the release of 
the 1989 Directive, the European Union issued a new directive, i.e. Directive 2003/6/EC. This 
directive formulated new legislations on both insider trading and market manipulation, jointly referred 
to as “market abuse”. This 2003 Directive is the foundation of the current Belgian legislation on 
insider trading. The most important novelty introduced by the 2003 Directive was the emphasis on the 
prevention of market abuse and the active involvement of market participants in this prevention. The 
preventive measures introduced with regard to insider trading are threefold: first, the directive states 
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that issuers of financial instruments should draw up a list of persons who have access to inside 
information. Second, the directive introduces the enforcement of a notification duty upon insiders. 
This measure requires insiders to report their transactions to a competent authority that in turn makes 
these transactions public. Finally, the directive posits that persons who professionally arrange 
transactions in financial instruments and who have a suspicion of illegal insider trading should be 
obliged to report this to a competent authority.  
As previously mentioned, new legal initiatives are currently being taken at the level of the European 
Union in response to the recent financial crisis and the further development of financial markets 
(European Commission, 2011a, b). The aim of these initiatives is to replace and extend the existing 
legal framework incorporated in the 2003 Directive. On the one hand, a new directive is being 
developed which will introduce minimum standards on criminal sanctions for insider trading. 
Accordingly, the directive intends to harmonize the enforced criminal penalties in different member 
states and prevent that insiders take further advantage of differences in legislation by speculating on 
where it would be most advantageous to commit certain crimes. On the other hand, a European 
regulation4 is being formulated which should provide a response to the increasing opportunities for 
market abuse due to the globalization of financial markets and the development of new trading 
platforms and technologies. The most important adjustment compared to the 2003 Directive will be 
the extension of the scope of application. In particular, the new regulation will not only be applicable 
to financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market but, also to financial instruments 
trading on a multilateral trading facility (MTF) or an organized trading facility (OTF) as well as to 
financial instruments traded over-the-counter (OTC). Furthermore, given that regulations prescribed 
by the European Union are directly applicable in member states and no translation into national 
legislation is needed as with European directives, the European Commission also hopes to increase the 
effectiveness of the market abuse legislation (European Commission, 2011a). In particular, an 
evaluation of the 2003 Directive by the European Commission has indicated that the numerous options 
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 The difference between a directive and a regulation issued by the European Union is that a regulation is directly and entirely 
applicable to member states. Accordingly, member states are not given the freedom to interpret the formulated regulation in a 
different way. Directives on the other hand, are only binding with regard to the result that should be achieved. Member states 
are given the choice of form and method and may adjust the legal text to national peculiarities. 
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offered to member states have led to an incoherent approach towards market abuse and the 
undermining of the effectiveness of the current directive.  
 
Summary of the Belgian legislation  
As a member of the European Union, Belgium has founded its current legislation on insider trading on 
the 2003 European Directive on insider trading and market manipulation (Directive 2003/6/EC). 
Legislation on insider trading is based on the central concept of “inside information”. Information is 
regarded as “inside information” when several criteria are met. First, the information must be of a 
precise nature. This means that, on the one hand, the information has to relate to a situation that 
already exists or an event that has occurred or which can be reasonably expected to come into 
existence or occur. On the other hand, it also has to be specific enough so that a conclusion can be 
drawn on the possible effect of the situation or event on the price of the financial instrument in 
question. Second, the information may not have been made public. Accordingly, the information may 
not have been disclosed to the public by the issuing company or a third party through, for example, 
websites, newswire services, national or financial news services or any other method. If no sufficient 
time lag is respected (i.e. at least 24 hours) and the market as a whole did not have the opportunity to 
become aware of the information, then information is also regarded as non-public. A third 
characteristic of “inside information” is that it has to relate, in a direct or indirect manner, to one or 
more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments. A final condition for 
information to be regarded as “inside information” is that it must be material and thus likely to have a 
significant effect on the price of the financial instrument(s) in question. Examples of such material 
information include news on potential mergers and acquisitions, on financial performance, on changes 
in the senior management and on significant labor disputes or negotiations. 
Following the 2003 European Directive, the Belgian legislation formulates three prohibitions on the 
use of inside information (Law of 2 August 2002, art. 25 and art. 40). First, persons in possession of 
inside information who are aware, or should be aware that the information concerned is inside 
information are prohibited from trading. In particular, they may not use the information by acquiring 
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or disposing of financial instruments to which the information relates, or by trying to do so. Second, 
they may not communicate the inside information to third parties, except within the framework of the 
normal exercise of their job description. Finally, they must also refrain from making recommendations 
or inducing another person to acquire or dispose of the financial instrument(s) in question on the basis 
of inside information.  
An offender of these legal prohibitions may face administrative sanctions imposed by the FSMA as 
well as criminal sanctions. The potential administrative sanctions are twofold: on the one hand, the 
FSMA may impose the payment of damages between 250 euros and 50,000 euros for each day an 
infringement on the insider trading regulations occurs. The total amount of payments may however not 
exceed 2,500,000 euros. On the other hand, the FSMA is also authorized to condemn an offender to 
the payment of an administrative fine between 2,500 euros and 2,500,000 euros. However, if a capital 
gain was obtained from illegal insider trading, the maximum fine is raised to twice this gain and, in the 
event of a repeat offence, to three times this gain (Law 2 August 2002, art. 36). With regard to the 
criminal sanctions, an offender may be condemned to a prison sentence between three months and one 
year, payment of a fine between 50 euros and 10,000 euros and/or payment of a criminal fine 
corresponding to a maximum of three times the gain earned, directly or indirectly, by illegal insider 
trading (Law 2 August 2002, art. 40). An important distinction between the administrative and 
criminal sanctions is that a causal link between the use of inside information and the suspect 
transaction has to be proven before any criminal sanction can be imposed. For administrative penalties 
no causal relation is required. As soon as a person possesses information of which he or she knows or 
should know that it concerns inside information, administrative penalties may be imposed when a 
transaction is executed, even if this particular transaction was not based on the inside information. 
Obviously, as it is quasi impossible to prove that inside information has been used, administrative 
sanctions are much more prevalent than criminal sanctions. To the best of my knowledge, only one 
judicial inquiry on insider trading in Belgium has led to a criminal prosecution up till now.  
In order to prevent illegal trading by insiders, the Belgian legislation has also formulated several 
preventive measures in line with the 2003 European Directive. First, issuers of financial instruments 
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are obliged to reveal inside information immediately. In particular, this information should be 
published on the website of the financial market on which the financial instrument is listed (Law 2 
August 2002, art. 10). Second, issuers must draw up a list of persons who have access to inside 
information (Law 2 August 2002, art. 25bis). This list must be kept at the disposal of the FSMA for a 
period of five years. The FSMA may then ask the issuer to submit this list when conducting an 
investigation on suspicious insider transactions. A third preventive measure is the obligation of 
persons who professionally arrange transactions in financial instruments to inform the FSMA about 
suspicious trades by insiders. Finally, persons who fulfill an executive function in the issuing company 
as well as persons closely related to them (e.g. spouses, partners, children and other relatives) are 
required to report their transactions to the FSMA. The transactions must be reported within five 
working days after their execution. However, as long as the total sum of the transactions during the 
current calendar year is below 5,000 euros, the reporting may be delayed until 31 January of the next 
calendar year (Law 2 August 2002, art. 25bis). In case of overrunning the limit 5,000 euros all 
transactions carried out so far have to be notified after at most five days following the latest 
transaction. Afterwards, everything is reset to zero and reporting of subsequent insider trades within 
the same calendar year may be postponed until the limit is reached again. The FSMA is responsible for 
publishing all reported insider transactions on its website. In case of non-compliance with the above 
preventive measure, the FSMA has the authority to impose administrative sanctions (Law of 2 August 
2002, art. 36).  
 
1.1.2. Facts and figures on insider trading in Belgium  
The empirical analysis on insider trading in Belgium in this dissertation is based on transactions by 
insiders and persons closely related to them (e.g. spouses, partners and children) reported to the 
FSMA. Between May 2006 and April 2012, 6,497 notifications were recorded. These notifications 
were reported by 1,189 different insiders and related to financial instruments of 135 different 
companies. In total, 644 million financial instruments were traded for a total amount of 
11 billion euros. As shown in Table 1.1. (Panel A), during the 2006-2012 period, most insider
  
 
 
Table 1.1.  Descriptive statistics on reported insider transactions in Belgium  
Panel A  Year-to-year evolution  
2006 a 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a Total 
Number of transactions 923 1,408 1,075 863 1,076 883 269 6,497 
Number of transactions (%) 0.14 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.04 
Number of financial instr. 43,594,382 182,188,140 78,874,957 55,060,088 39,723,227 237,567,974 7,496,607 644,505,375 
Trade value  636,247,698 4,773,460,300 2,259,675,347 1,209,895,231 698,278,225 1,287,148,790 96,348,922 10,961,054,514 
Average delay 15 12 10 13 12 8 4 11 
                  
Panel B  Type of financial instrument  
 
Shares Options Warrants Strips ADS Convertible 
obligations 
Subscription 
rights Others 
Number of transactions 4986 750 574 8 73 62 14 30 
Number of transactions (%) 0.77 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Number of financial instr. 563,966,886 36,912,789 9,297,317 15,441 285,681 26,835,109 2,574,502 4,617,650 
Trade value  10,158,908,240 673,660,469 72,239,510 3,122 15,349,745 21,197,459 16,147,931 3,548,038 
Average delay 12 5 9 6 13 19 7 10 
                  
a
 No full-year data are available for the years 2006 and 2012. Regarding the year 2006, insiders were only obliged to report their transactions since May of this year. Regarding the year 2012, the latest 
update of the FSMA-database was obtained in April 2012.  
 
  
10
 
  
Table 1.1. (Continued)  Descriptive statistics on reported insider transactions in Belgium 
Panel C  Capacity of the insider  
 
Executive Member of a company 
organ 
Person related  
to executive 
Person related to member  
of a company organ 
Person related to related 
person  
Number of transactions 1,561 2,565 76 2,134 161 
Number of transactions (%) 0.24 0.39 0.01 0.33 0.02 
Number of financial instr. 15,109,380 164,093,035 5,423,470 457,942,683 1,936,807 
Trade value  299,134,934 3,201,200,051 21,113,142 7,357,368,623 82,237,764 
Average delay 8 14 11 11 5 
         
Panel D  Industry               
 
Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Service Financials Healthcare 
Number of transactions  660 730 912 1,840 560 
Number of transactions (%) 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.09 
Number of financial instr. 8,712,680.00 77,372,652.00 129,320,596.00 255,003,021.00 36,607,576.00 
Trade value  199,992,452 2,350,041,034 3,150,273,074 2,325,279,398 407,495,532 
Average delay 13 7 10 9 8 
      
 Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
Number of transactions  1,010 3 692 69 21 
Number of transactions (%) 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 
Number of financial instr. 24,965,925.00 210.00 73,188,760.00 34,959,027 4,374,928 
Trade value  531,879,068 504,596 299,226,413 1,675,116,019 21,246,924 
Average delay 16 79 18  7  13 
         
a
 No full-year data are available for the years 2006 and 2012. Regarding the year 2006, insiders were only obliged to report their transactions since May of this year. Regarding the year 2012, the latest 
update of the FSMA-database was obtained in April 2012.  
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transactions were executed in 2007. The distribution of the number of financial instruments traded 
over the sample period indicates that a considerable lower number of financial instruments was traded 
during the period 2008-2010 compared to 2007 and 2011. During this period, financial markets were 
disrupted by the occurrence of the financial crisis. The largest amount of financial instruments was 
traded in 2011. Comparing insiders’ transactions in terms of value, the year 2011 is only ranked third. 
Panel A of Table 1.1. also displays the evolution of insiders’ transactions in terms of the delay 
between the execution of a transaction and the notification thereof. On average, insiders reported their 
transactions 11 days after the execution. The largest average delay was recorded in 2006 when the 
notification duty was first imposed. Afterwards the delay declined gradually. Exceptions are the years 
2009 and 2010 when insiders again seemed to have waited longer to report their trades. With regard to 
the year 2012, it must be noted that our sample period only covers the first quarter of 2012. 
Consequently, the average delay of four days may give a biased view as insiders may use the 
opportunity to postpone the notification of transactions during the calendar year as long as the total 
sum is below 5,000 euros. 
In Panel B of Table 1.1., insiders’ trades are divided into different categories of financial instruments. 
Apparently, the vast majority of the insiders’ transactions was related to shares (77%). Other financial 
instruments frequently traded by insiders were options (12%) and warrants (9%). The remainder of the 
notifications (2%) involved American Depository Shares (ADR’s), convertible obligations, strips and 
subscription rights.  
In Table 1.2. (Panel A), an evolution of the number of purchases and sales of shares over the sample 
period is provided. This table shows that insiders predominantly purchased shares instead of selling 
them. This trading behavior is typical of insiders in companies with a concentrated ownership 
structure, which is common in Belgian listed companies (Faccio and Lang, 2002). These insiders 
purchase shares in order to obtain or maintain corporate control and generally refrain from selling 
unless they have unambiguous negative expectations about their company’s future prospects (Cheuk et 
al., 2006). Panel A of Table 1.2. also shows a rather stable distribution of the proportion of purchases 
and sales in most years. A notable exception, however, is the year 2008 in which more than 80% of the 
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share transactions were acquisitions. This significant increase was due to a rise in the number of 
purchases combined with a strong drop in the number of sales compared to other years. In the first 
quarter of 2012, insiders sold a significant larger proportion of shares. In particular, only 60 purchase 
transactions were reported compared to 116 sales. Regarding insider trades in options and warrants, 
more than 75% of the notifications for both categories are related to insiders exercising the right to 
buy or sell the underlying security (Table 1.2., Panel B). Buying and selling of options and warrants 
by insiders was much less common. 
 
Table 1.2.  Detail of transactions in shares, options and warrants  
                  
Panel A  Shares 
2006 a 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a Total 
Number of purchases 281 583 725 428 422 404 60 2,903 
Number sales 407 419 161 305 391 284 116 2,083 
Total 688 1002 886 733 813 688 176 4,986 
  
         
Panel B  Options 
2006 a 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a Total 
Number of purchases 0 1 3 0 21 13 2 40 
Number sales 4 7 15 3 36 45 29 139 
Number of conversions  145 120 40 53 96 72 45 571 
Total 149 128 58 56 153 130 76 750 
  
         
Panel C  Warrants 
2006 a 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a Total 
Number of purchases 6 75 40 0 1 0 0 122 
Number sales 5 1 8 0 3 12 0 29 
Number of conversions  56 135 50 39 83 43 17 423 
Total 67 211 98 39 87 55 17 574 
         
a
 No full-year data are available for the years 2006 and 2012. Regarding the year 2006, insiders were only obliged to report their 
transactions since May of this year. Regarding the year 2012, the latest update of the FSMA-database was obtained in April 2012.  
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A closer inspection of the identity of the insiders who reported transactions indicates that the majority 
of the transactions were executed by “primary” insiders, i.e. executives or members of a company 
organ (e.g. the board of directors, the general meeting of shareholders and the supervisory board) 
(Table 1.1., Panel C). About 34% was executed by persons related to them, including spouses, 
children and partners. A small proportion of the transactions concerns trades by persons related to 
other related persons or corporations (e.g. partner of the insider’s child, partner of the insider’s brother 
or sister). In terms of the number of financial instruments traded as well as total trade value, the largest 
amount was traded by persons related to members of a company organ. Persons related to other related 
persons traded the least financial instruments, while persons related to executives traded the least in 
terms of value. A comparison of the average reporting delay over the different types of insiders 
indicates that the notification term of five days is most respected by persons related to other related 
persons. On the other hand, members of a company organ overrun this term on average by nine days.  
In panel D of Table 1.1., insiders’ trades are classified according to the industry of the issuing 
company. The table indicates that most transactions were reported by insiders of financial and 
industrial companies, while those of oil and gas and utility companies reported least. Most financial 
instruments were traded by insiders of financial companies. In terms of trade value, insiders of 
consumer service companies traded most. The average notification delay was highest in oil and gas 
companies, being 79 trading days.5 Insiders of consumer goods and telecommunications companies on 
average reported their transactions with the smallest time lag.  
 
1.2. Literature on insider trading  
Insider trading is a widely investigated research topic and a broad range of research questions have 
been addressed by academics in the fields of law, economics, finance and accounting. For a detailed 
overview of insider trading studies see Doffou (2003) and Clacher et al. (2009). The literature on 
insider trading can be divided into three broad categories. A first category of studies focuses on the 
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 Two out of the three transactions in oil and gas companies were reported with a delay of almost 100 days. This explains the 
extremely large reporting delay.  
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trading behavior of insiders around specific information events. These studies examine whether 
insiders exploit their informational benefits by investigating the nature and timing of their trades in the 
period leading up to an event. Extensive evidence has been provided, for example, that the intensity of 
insider buy (sell) transactions increases before good (bad) news announcements like earnings increases 
(decreases) (e.g. Ke et al., 2003; Cheng and Leung, 2008). Other examples of information events 
previously studied include announcements on mergers and acquisitions (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981), 
bankruptcies (Gosnell et al., 1992; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), accounting changes (Larcker et al., 
1983; Odaiyappa and Nainar, 1992), cash dividend payments (Fuller, 2003), sell-offs (Hirschey et 
al.,1990) and seasoned equity offerings (Lee, 1997; Clarke et al., 2001).  
A second stream of insider trading literature explores the effect of regulations on the behavior of 
insiders and the profitability of their transactions. These studies have investigated, for example, the 
impact of lax law enforcement (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005), the implementation of new regulations 
(Garfinkel, 1997; Brochet 2010) and the effectiveness of current policies (Bettis et al., 2000; 
Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). While most studies focus on the impact of regulations imposed by 
independent, external bodies, some have also investigated the effectiveness of regulations imposed by 
companies themselves (e.g. Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Chang, 2012). 
A final category of studies focuses on the profitability of insider trading and its potential drivers (e.g. 
Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Del Brio et al., 2002; Cheuk et al., 2006). 
Essentially, these studies test the theory of efficient markets developed by Fama (1970). According to 
this theory, markets are strongly efficient if all information, including inside information, is reflected 
into stock prices. Consequently, if the hypothesis of strongly efficient markets holds, insiders would 
be unable to gain any abnormal trading profits. By also testing whether the mimicking of insiders’ 
transactions results in abnormal gains for outsiders, some studies have addressed the question whether 
markets are either inefficient or semi-strong efficient (e.g. Bettis et al., 1997; Wisniewski and Bohl, 
2005). Under the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis it would be unprofitable for outsiders to imitate 
trades reported by insiders as all publicly available information would be reflected into stock prices. 
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This dissertation on the profitability of insider trading in Belgium contributes to the latter stream of 
literature in several ways. First, it adds to the emerging literature on insider trading in Europe. Early 
studies investigating insider trading mainly focused on the U.S. stock market (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; 
Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986; Lin and Howe, 1990; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003). 
Later, this focus has shifted towards emerging Asian stock markets (e.g. Chiang et al., 2004 (Taiwan), 
Wong et al., 2010 (Malaysia); Cheuk et al., 2006 (Hong Kong)), while European markets were largely 
left uncovered. Until recently, research on European markets was lagging behind as insider trading 
studies are generally based on databases of transactions reported to a supervisory authority. These 
reported transactions provide an abundance of data on the trading behavior of insiders. In the U.S., 
insiders have been obliged to report their trading activity to the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) since 1934. A similar reporting duty was only imposed in Europe since 2003 by the 
introduction of the European Directive on insider trading and market manipulation (Directive 
2003/6/EC). Nonetheless, despite the extensive research on insider trading in the U.S., studies on 
European markets may provide valuable new insights given the large institutional differences between 
both continents (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998). Studies on the European stock market 
have been performed for Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), Spain (Del Brio et al., 2002), Poland 
(Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005), the U.K. (Gregory et al., 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), Italy (Bajo and 
Petracci, 2006) and the Netherlands (Degryse et al., 2009). To the best of my knowledge, no prior 
studies have focused on the Belgian stock market.  
A second contribution of this dissertation is that is provides more insight into the drivers of insider 
trading profitability. While ample evidence exists on the effect of trade and company characteristics 
like transaction size, trading intensity, company size and market-to-book and leverage ratios, there is a 
lack of insight into the effects of economy-wide and corporate governance related characteristics. The 
first dissertation paper therefore focuses on the impact of the world-wide financial crisis on insider 
trading profits, while the second and third paper contribute to the emerging literature on the impact of 
corporate governance quality on insiders’ profits.  
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Finally, the third dissertation paper also contributes to the second stream of insider trading literature 
by focusing on company-specific insider trading policies. These policies include the requirement of ex 
ante approval of insiders’ transactions, restrictions on option trading, short selling, short-term trading 
and on trading around news announcements. Prior research on the effectiveness of these policies is 
limited. To the best of my knowledge only three papers have addressed this issue (Bettis et al., 2000; 
Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Petracci, 2011). In addition, no prior study has considered the combined impact 
of all insider trading policies imposed by companies on the magnitude of insider trading gains. 
Different policies may however complement each other or may be used as substitutes (Jagolinzer et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, not taking into account the joint impact of all policies may give a biased view 
on the effectiveness of the trading policies.  
 
1.3. Overview of dissertation papers  
1.3.1. The impact of the financial crisis on insider trading profitability in Belgium 
Principal topic  
In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis emerged in the U.S. and rapidly spread across the world-wide 
financial system. This global financial crisis was marked by the failure of several financial institutions 
and the fast decline of various stock market indices. The financial turmoil led to a chaotic environment 
in which it was difficult for market participants to determine the fundamental value of companies and 
their capability to withstand the financial crisis. An interesting research question against this 
background is whether the increased uncertainty surrounding the financial crisis enlarged the 
opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational benefits. The Belgian stock market provides a 
particularly interesting environment to test this hypothesis as it was especially vulnerable to the 
financial crisis given the importance financial institutions on the Belgian market. 
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Sample and method  
In our study, we used a unique dataset on the trading activity of Belgian insiders obtained upon request 
from the FSMA. The database contains all transactions reported to the FSMA between May 2006 and 
August 2010. Consistent with prior studies we apply several filters in order to ensure the quality of our 
data and eliminate non-profit-driven transactions as much as possible.  
In line with previous studies, we proxy the informational advantage of insiders by determining the 
profitability of their trades (e.g. Frankel and Li, 2004; Park and Shin, 2009). We apply event study 
methodology and measure trading profits as the cumulative average abnormal return after the trading 
event. A Dimson-correction for thin trading is applied to infrequently traded securities (Dimson, 
1979).  
We empirically assess the impact of the financial crisis by comparing the profitability of insider 
trading during crisis and non-crisis periods. In particular, we estimate an ordinary least squares 
regression. We include several control variables expected to influence the profitability of insider 
trading as well as a dummy variable for transactions carried out during 2008 and 2009, the peak of the 
financial crisis.  
Findings  
Our research results show that, while Belgian insiders were generally able to earn excess returns, the 
magnitude of their abnormal profits was substantially higher during the years of the financial crisis. 
Consequently, our findings suggest that the occurrence of the financial crisis further deteriorated the 
efficiency of the stock market and enlarged the informational benefits of insiders. In addition, given 
that the financial crisis originally harmed bank and insurance companies the most, we also addressed 
the question whether insiders of these companies proportionally benefited more than other insiders. 
However, we did not find evidence supporting this proposition.  
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Contribution 
By evaluating this research question we contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the 
emerging literature on the profitability of insider trading on European stock markets. To the best of 
our knowledge, no prior studies have focused on the Belgian stock market. Second, our study 
identifies crisis periods as an additional driver of insider trading profitability. Previous studies already 
documented that several firm and trade characteristics influence the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outside, uninformed investors. Research into the potential effect of economy-wide 
determinants is however limited. Finally, our results also contribute to the literature on the efficiency 
of stock markets during financial crises. Cheong et al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) provided evidence 
of increased inefficiency on several Asian stock markets during the 1997 financial crisis. We 
corroborate and generalize these findings by focusing on the highly developed Belgian stock market 
during another crisis period.  
 
1.3.2. Does high-quality corporate communication reduce insider trading profitability?  
Principal topic  
This dissertation study examines whether high-quality communication is effective in reducing the 
profitability of insider trading. Previous research has documented that, despite regulations on insider 
trading, insiders still earn significant abnormal returns from trading on information asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders. As suggested by analytical work on disclosure (e.g. Diamond 1985; 
Verrecchia, 2001), an important instrument to decrease this asymmetry could be the dissemination of 
high-quality information. We therefore hypothesize that high-quality corporate communication 
reduces insiders’ abnormal returns.  
In an additional analysis this study also examines whether the impact of disclosure quality differs 
between communications channels, i.e. annual reports, press releases, websites and investor relation 
activities. The different channels and information communicated through these channels have specific 
characteristics that might limit or enhance their ability to affect the level of information asymmetry. 
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Examples of such characteristics are timeliness of the disclosed information, time horizon (forward-
looking versus backward-looking), need for external verification and voluntary versus mandatory 
disclosures. We therefore hypothesize that the impact of disclosure quality on insider trading profits 
and on information asymmetry in general, depends on the communication channel.  
Sample and method  
To measure the quality of corporate communication, we use a disclosure score granted by the Belgian 
Association of Financial Analysts (BVFA).6 Each year, the BVFA invites its members to screen the 
communication of a number of companies and assign a disclosure rating. This rating evaluates several 
disclosure characteristics identified as important attributes of high-quality communication, i.e. 
preciseness, transparency, timeliness and scope (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007).  
To measure the profitability of insider trading, we exploit a unique database on insider trading 
provided by the FSMA. This database contains all transactions reported by insiders between May 2006 
and August 2010. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns that insiders earn when trading in 
their own stock using event study methodology. Since the liquidity of some Belgian listed securities is 
rather low (Buysschaert et al., 2004), the abnormal returns are estimated either using a standard 
market model (MacKinlay, 1997) or market model adjusted for thin trading (Dimson, 1979).  
Findings  
The results of our inquiry show that high-quality communication by companies reduces the 
profitability of insider trading. Furthermore, they indicate that the quality of annual reports, press 
releases and investor relation activities, is relatively more effective in reducing information asymmetry 
than the quality of corporate websites. Investor relation activities, which are used to communicate 
timely and forward-looking information directly to the investor community, appear to be most 
effective.  
                                                     
6
 BVFA stands for “Belgische Vereniging van Financiële Analisten”. 
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Contribution 
Our research contributes to two streams of literature. First, we add to the literature on insider trading 
profitability by examining the impact of high-quality communication, as proxied by a comprehensive 
measure of disclosure quality assigned by professional users of corporate communication. To our 
knowledge, there are only a handful of papers that investigate whether corporate communication 
quality influences insiders’ informational benefits. We corroborate and generalize their findings by 
using a more direct and objective measure of corporate communication quality and by assessing the 
individual impact of different communication channels.  
Second, our work contributes to the literature examining the relationship between disclosure and 
information asymmetry by using an alternative proxy for information asymmetry. Prior work 
examined this relation using, for example, bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading as 
proxies for information asymmetry (e.g. Welker, 1995; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). By contrast, we 
proxy information asymmetry by the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns. Furthermore, the 
majority of prior disclosure studies is based on U.S. data (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Re-examining the 
disclosure - information asymmetry relation for a sample of Belgian listed companies may provide 
valuable new insights as the Belgian institutional setting differs from the U.S.  
 
1.3.3. Corporate insider trading policies: Determinants and effect on insider trading 
profitability  
Principal topic  
This dissertation study focuses on corporate insider trading policies. These policies are restrictions on 
insider trading imposed by companies and fall within the scope of corporate governance mechanisms. 
In particular, we investigate whether the strictness of the policies differs across companies and which 
firm characteristics explain these differences. Following the agency theory of the firm, previous 
studies have argued that incentives for company management to commit to more stringent or higher-
quality corporate governance practices depend on the firm’s contracting environment (Himmelberg et 
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al., 1999). Specifically, these incentives are driven by differences in private benefits available to 
insiders, the need for external funding and the cost of implementing corporate governance mechanisms 
(Anand et al., 2006). In the second part of this study, we analyze the effectiveness of the company-
specific trading policies by investigating their impact on the profitability of insiders’ trades.  
Sample and method  
To address our research questions, we use data collected by the FSMA on insider trading restrictions 
included in the corporate governance charters of Belgian listed companies. The database includes 
information on all companies listed on the Belgian stock exchange and provides a unique and 
comprehensive overview of the insider trading restrictions imposed by each company. 
To analyze which firm characteristics provoke differences in the stringency of corporate insider 
trading policies, we construct a company-specific stringency index. The regression model is estimated 
using an ordinary least squares regression as well as a Tobit regression as the stringency index is left- 
and right-censored.  
To examine the effect of policy stringency on insider trading profits, we rely on a unique database on 
insider trades provided by the FSMA. This database includes transactions reported by insiders between 
January 2010 and April 2012. We use event-study methodology and calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns by using a standard market model (MacKinlay, 1997) or a market model adjusted for 
thin trading (Dimson, 1979) as the liquidity of some Belgian securities is rather low. 
Findings  
Regression analysis of the stringency index shows that restrictions are more stringent in companies 
with more growth opportunities and in non-financial companies. Furthermore, the stringency also 
seems to depend on a company’s board structure. Using hand-collected data on corporate governance, 
our results indicate that a higher representation of independent board members who act in the interest 
of minority groups instead of executives, has a positive impact on the strictness of insider trading 
policies.  
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Interestingly, results on the effectiveness of corporate insider trading policies show that, after 
controlling for several firm and trade characteristics, insiders’ profits are not significantly lower in 
companies with more stringent insider trading restrictions.  
Contribution 
Our research contributes to two streams of literature. First, we add to the literature investigating firm-
level differences in corporate governance practices. While the majority of prior studies have focused 
on how institutional differences result in a different approach towards corporate governance at 
country-level (e.g. Doidge et al., 2007), research into the firm characteristics that lead to differences in 
corporate governance on the company-level is rather limited (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies have specifically analyzed 
how company characteristics affect corporate insider trading policies (i.e. Petracci, 2011; Jagolinzer et 
al., 2011).  
A second stream of literature to which our work contributes is the literature examining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices. Obviously, with regard to insider trading policies, we 
expect a direct impact on insiders’ behavior and the magnitude of their profits. Previous studies 
addressing this issue include Bettis et al. (2000), Jagolinzer et al. (2011) and Petracci (2011). These 
studies generally focus on a single aspect of insider trading restrictions and do not take into account 
differences in the stringency of the restrictions. We expand this research by considering the combined 
impact of all trading restrictions on the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns.   
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Abstract 
The 2007 global financial crisis led to a chaotic financial environment characterized by highly 
uncertain and volatile stock markets. This created additional uncertainty about the 
fundamental value of shares and potentially increased the benefit of inside information. In this 
paper, we use event study methodology to examine whether Belgian corporate insiders were 
able to benefit from these turbulent market conditions. Given the large weight of financial 
institutions, the Belgian stock market was especially vulnerable to the financial crisis and 
provides an interesting environment to test this hypothesis. Our results show that, while 
insiders are generally able to earn abnormal returns, these returns are significantly higher 
during the years of the financial crisis.  
 
 
 
a
 Ghent University, Department of Accountancy and Corporate Finance, Kuiperskaai 55/E, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
*A version of this paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Business Economics and Management. This paper has 
benefited from presentations at the 2010 European Accounting Association Annual Congress (Istanbul, Turkey) and the 2010 
Annual PhD Day of Ghent University. Financial support from the “Special Research Fund‟ (BOF) and the Hercules project 
is gratefully acknowledged.  
  
 33 
2.1. Introduction  
In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis emerged in the U.S. and rapidly spread across the world-wide 
financial system. This global financial crisis was marked by the failure of several financial institutions 
and the fast decline of various stock market indices. The financial turmoil led to a chaotic environment 
in which it was difficult for market participants to determine the fundamental value of companies and 
their capability to withstand the financial crisis.  
An interesting research question against this background is whether the increased uncertainty 
surrounding the financial crisis enlarged the opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational 
benefits. Prior studies have already evidenced that insiders are generally better informed about their 
firm’s prospects as they receive relevant information in a more timely manner (Ching et al., 2006; Li 
and Zhang, 2006; Cheng and Leung, 2008). For example, insiders seem to sell considerably more 
shares prior to the bankruptcy filing of their company (Gosnell et al., 1992; Seyhun and Bradley, 
1997). In addition, numerous studies have documented that insiders are able to convert their 
informational benefit into excess stock market returns (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; 
Del Brio et al., 2002; Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005; Bajo and Petracci, 2006; Cheuk et al., 2006; Betzer 
and Theissen, 2009). Also, using the 1997 Asian financial crisis as a test case, Cheong et al. (2007) 
and Lim et al. (2008) concluded that the efficiency of financial markets is adversely affected by the 
occurrence of a financial crisis. Based on these previous findings, we hypothesize that the highly 
uncertain and volatile stock markets during the recent financial crisis exacerbated the information 
asymmetry between insiders and other market participants and created additional opportunities for 
insiders to gain excess returns.  
Given the large weight of financial institutions, the Belgian stock market was especially vulnerable to 
the financial crisis. This provides an interesting environment to test this hypothesis. Using a unique 
dataset of insider trading transactions in Belgium, we evaluate this research question by testing 
whether higher abnormal profits were earned during the financial crisis compared to non-crisis 
periods. 
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Consistent with previous studies, we proxy the informational advantage of insiders by determining the 
profitability of their trades (e.g. Frankel and Li, 2004; Park and Shin, 2009). We apply event study 
methodology and measure trading profits as the cumulative average abnormal return after the trading 
event. A correction for thin trading is applied to infrequently traded securities (Dimson, 1979). 
Furthermore, transactions with overlapping event windows are excluded from the sample to avoid 
event clustering.  
Our empirical findings confirm that during the peak of the financial crisis, insider trading resulted in 
considerably higher profits. This finding suggests that the crisis enlarged the informational benefits of 
insiders.  
These results are of potential interest to market regulators. They indicate that supervisory authorities 
should be aware of the greater information asymmetry and stock market inefficiency during a financial 
crisis. Consequently, stricter enforcement of insider trading regulation and more supervision might be 
needed during these periods.  
Our results are also of importance to companies. Previous research has identified information 
asymmetry as an important driver of the cost of capital. In addition, Love et al. (2007), and Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010) have shown that credit lines contract in the months and even years following a 
financial crisis. Consequently, companies have an interest in limiting the informational benefits of 
their insiders in order to retain a sufficient supply of external capital. Maybe, reducing this information 
asymmetry could be achieved by increasing corporate transparency.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the emerging literature on 
insider trading in Europe since we are the first to investigate the profitability of insider trading in 
Belgium. Second, our study identifies crisis periods as an additional driver of insider trading 
profitability. Previous studies already documented that several firm and trade characteristics influence 
the information asymmetry between insiders and outside, uninformed investors. Higher profits are, for 
example, earned in small companies (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) and in companies with low market-
to-book values (Rozeff and Zaman, 1988). Third, our results also contribute to the literature on the 
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efficiency of stock markets during a financial crisis. Cheong et al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) 
provided evidence of increased inefficiency on several Asian stock markets during the 1997 financial 
crisis. We corroborate and generalize these findings by focusing on the highly developed Belgian 
stock market during another crisis period.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the insider trading 
regulation in Belgium. Section 3 provides an overview of related insider trading literature. Section 4 
includes a description of the financial crisis and the hypothesis development. Section 5 discusses the 
measurement of insider trading profits and section 6 gives an overview of the data collection and 
sample selection criteria. Section 7 provides some descriptive statistics and finally, section 8 presents 
and discusses our research results.  
 
2.2. Insider trading regulation in Belgium  
The current Belgian legislation on insider trading is founded in the 2003 European Directive on insider 
dealing and market manipulation, i.e. the Market Abuse Directive.1 This directive introduced an 
important amendment to previous regulation by requiring insiders to report their transactions to a 
competent authority. This notification duty is based on the regulation in the U.S., where insiders are 
already required to report their transactions since 1934 under the Securities and Exchange Act.  
In Belgium, insiders must notify their trading activity to the Financial Services and Markets Authority 
(FSMA) which is entrusted with the supervision of the Belgian stock market. They are required to 
report transactions no later than five trading days following the execution. Afterwards, the FSMA 
makes the trading activity publicly available on its website.2 These notification terms are similar to the 
ones in other European and non-European countries.3 
                                                     
1
 Directive 2003/6/EC. 
2
 www.fsma.be 
3
 Examples of other reporting requirements: Poland: 24-hours disclosure deadline (Wisniewski and Bohl 2005); Italy: no 
disclosure required when total quarterly cumulative transactions is below €50,000, quarterly disclosure when between 
€50,000 and €250,000, and within three business days when above €250 000 (Bajo et al., 2009); U.K.: insiders must report as 
soon as possible and no later than five business days after the transaction (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), in addition a black-out 
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2.3. Insider trading: literature review  
Research on the profitability of insider trading is essentially based on the efficient markets paradigm. 
According to this theory, markets are strongly efficient if all information, including inside information, 
is reflected into stock prices. On the contrary, markets are perceived as semi-strong efficient if only 
publically available information is incorporated into prices (Tvaronavičienė and Michailova, 2006). 
As a consequence, insider trading can only be profitable if markets are not strongly efficient.  
Early studies investigating the ability of insiders to profit from their trading were concentrated on the 
U.S. stock markets (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986; Lin and Howe, 1990; Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003). In recent years however, research on insider trading in the European 
and Asian stock market has emerged. Studies on European stock markets were performed for 
Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), Spain (Del Brio et al., 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 
2005), the U.K. (Gregory et al., 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), Italy (Bajo and Petracci, 2006) and the 
Netherlands (Degryse et al., 2009). Studies on Asian stock markets were performed for Taiwan 
(Chiang et al., 2004), Hong Kong (Wong et al., 2000; Cheuk et al., 2006) and Malaysia (Wong et al., 
2010). In general, these insider trading studies support the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis and 
find that insiders are indeed able to profit from their superior information.  
A second evolution in the insider trading literature is the investigation of potential drivers of insiders’ 
profits. First, Jaffe (1974), and Rozeff and Zaman (1988), amongst others, provided evidence that 
abnormal returns are partly or wholly attributable to latent risk factors like company size and the 
market-to-book ratio. For example, regarding company size, these studies documented that insiders in 
small firms earn higher abnormal returns. For these insiders, it is easier to know a significant 
proportion of all inside information. In addition, prior research has shown that information 
asymmetries are larger in small companies as they experience less extensive media (Fang and Peress, 
2009) and analyst coverage (Bhushan, 1989; Barth et al., 2001). In later studies, additional firm and 
trade characteristics were evaluated as potential determinants of insider trading profitability. Examples 
                                                                                                                                                                      
period before earnings announcements is imposed (Betzer and Theissen 2009); U.S.: reporting no later than two days 
following the transaction (Cheng et al., 2007). 
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of such characteristics are the debt-to-equity ratio (Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008), transaction size 
(Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005) and trading intensity (Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008; Betzer and Theissen, 
2009). Furthermore, some recent studies have started to take corporate governance related variables 
into account such as ownership concentration (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), type of controlling shareholder 
(Betzer and Theissen, 2009; Bajo and Petracci, 2006), board composition (Chang et al., 2005) and 
executive compensation (Zhang et al., 2005). Chang et al. (2005), for example, investigated whether 
corporate governance mechanisms which are believed to reduce information asymmetry also reduce to 
opportunities of insiders to earn excess returns. Their results showed that profits were indeed lower in 
companies with a higher proportion of non-executive directors in the board and audit committee, in 
companies where the CEO does not occupy the function of board chair and in companies with lower 
levels of director and block ownership. Other studies investigating the impact of ownership and 
control structures include Del Brio and Perote (2007), and Betzer and Theissen (2009). These studies 
documented that insider trading profits in shares of widely held firms are higher compared to those in 
controlled companies. Also, Bajo and Petracci (2006) investigated whether institutional investors 
monitor management more closely and concluded that the presence of an institutional investor among 
a company’s shareholders decreases profits from insider trading. Studies which, like our paper, focus 
on country-specific or economy-wide determinants are rather limited. In general, they focus on 
differences in the institutional environment such as law enforcement (e.g. Beny, 1999; Wisniewski and 
Bohl, 2005), investor protection (Fidrmuc et al., 2011) and stock market characteristics, i.e. emerging 
versus developed stock markets (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2000; Cheuk et al., 2006). These studies 
found larger trading profits on emerging markets (e.g. Hong Kong: Cheuk et al., 2006) and in 
countries with weak law enforcement (e.g. Poland: Wisniewski, Bohl, 2005). 
 
2.4. Financial crisis and hypothesis development  
In 2007, the United States housing bubble escalated into the subprime mortgage crisis. This crisis did 
not only affect the U.S. stock market but spread throughout the financial system, creating a global 
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financial crisis. Various stock market indices declined rapidly and several financial institutions faced 
considerable liquidity problems. This crisis was so severe that in several countries, including Belgium, 
governments and central banks took remedial actions in an attempt to calm the markets and restore 
confidence in the financial system (European Central Bank, 2008). In this chaotic financial 
environment, investors reacted more nervously to news and experienced more difficulties in 
ascertaining the fundamental value of companies.  
In this paper, we examine whether these turbulent market conditions created additional informational 
benefits for insiders. Previous studies have already confirmed that insiders possess private information 
about their companies (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Del Brio and Perote, 2002; 
Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005; Bajo and Petracci, 2006; Cheuk et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009). 
In addition, using the Asian financial crisis as a test case, Cheong et al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) 
have documented that the efficiency of stock markets is negatively impacted by the occurrence of a 
financial crisis. Based on these findings, we expect insiders to earn higher abnormal profits during the 
financial crisis compared to non-crisis periods.  
We address this research question by investigating the profitability of insider trading on the Belgian 
stock market. In Belgium, the highlight of the financial crisis was situated in the period 2008 and 
2009. This is illustrated by Figure 2.1. which shows a fast depreciation of the BEL 20 Index, i.e. the 
Blue-chip index for Euronext Brussels, from 2008 until the second half of 2009. Since financial 
institutions represent a large share of the Belgian market capitalization, the Belgian stock market was 
especially vulnerable to the financial crisis. At the start of 2008, the three major Belgian banks (Dexia, 
Fortis and KBC) accounted for no less than 36% of the market value of the BEL 20 Index. In addition, 
while the EURO STOXX 50 declined by 45% between the beginning of 2008 and the middle of 2009, 
the BEL 20 lost 51% of its value.  
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Figure 2.1.  BEL 20 Price Index 
 
 
 
To further illustrate the gravity of the crisis in the Belgian stock market, Figure 2.2. provides the 
evolution of the BEL 20 Volatility Index. This index is an indicator of investor sentiment on the 
Belgian stock market. The calculation uses prices of BEL 20 options and is based on the methodology 
of the implied Volatility Index (VIX) for S&P500 Index options, i.e. the sensitivity barometer for the 
U.S. stock market. Figure 2.2. indicates that Belgian insiders perceived the investment environment as 
highly uncertain and unstable during 2008 and 2009. Especially at the end of 2008 the Volatility Index 
rose dramatically.  
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Figure 2.2.  BEL 20 Volatility Index 
 
 
In order to empirically assess the impact of the financial crisis, we compare the profitability of insider 
trading during crisis and non-crisis periods. We estimate the following OLS regression and include the 
dummy variable FinancialCrisis, which is equal to one for transactions carried out during 2008 and 
2009 and zero otherwise, i.e. during 2006, 2007, and 2010: 
 
εβα +++= γxrisisFinancialCCAR )20,0(
, 
(1) 
where CAR(0,20) stands for the event-specific cumulative abnormal return over 21 trading days, 
FinancialCrisis is the test variable and x represents a vector of control variables which are expected to 
influence the profitability of insider trading. In particular, we included TradeSize, which is measured 
as the net transaction value scaled by the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal 
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year.4 Previous studies have documented that insiders execute larger transactions if they have stronger 
beliefs in the future company performance (Karpoff, 1987).  
FirmSize, which is measured as the log of the market value of equity, is also controlled for as potential 
information asymmetries are expected to be larger in smaller firms (Grant, 1980; Collins et al., 1987; 
Bhushan, 1989). In particular, smaller companies are less followed by financial analysts (Bhushan, 
1989; Barth et al., 2001) and experience less media coverage (Fang and Peress, 2009). As a 
consequence, it is easier for insiders of smaller companies to have an informational benefit over other 
investors. Insider trading profits should thus be negatively related to firm size (Seyhun, 1986; 
Finnerty, 1976; Betzer and Theissen, 2009).  
MarketToBook, which is equal to the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity (both 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year), is also included. MarketToBook may have a positive 
association with insiders’ abnormal returns as growth firms with high market-to-book ratios have more 
unrecognized intangible assets and valuable research and development projects. This allows insiders to 
have greater informational benefits with respect to future prospects and cash flows (Dierkens, 1991; 
Smith and Watts, 1992). MarketToBook may, on the other hand, also have a negative association with 
insiders’ gains as previous studies have shown that low market-to-book companies outperform high 
market-to-book companies, i.e. the value premium (e.g. Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and 
Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). Therefore, no prediction is made on the relationship between MarketToBook 
and insider trading profits.  
Leverage, which is measured as the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year, is controlled 
for because more levered firms are expected to disseminate more information in an attempt to reduce 
agency costs. Furthermore, creditors often produce additional information about the borrower in 
question (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Firms with higher debt-to-asset ratios are therefore expected to 
have smaller information asymmetries.  
                                                     
4
 Jenter (2005) argues that it is preferable to measure trade size relative to some measure of wealth or total equity instead of 
using absolute trade size. The former is assumed to be a more relevant measure of trading behavior.  
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A dummy variable for sales transactions (Sale) is included because sales of Belgian insiders are 
expected to be more profitable than purchases. In particular, Belgian listed companies are 
characterized by a highly concentrated ownership structure (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Controlling 
shareholders are expected to refrain from selling unless they have strong negative believes about the 
company future. While, regarding purchases, they are expected to more often execute purchase 
transactions driven by the objective to obtain or maintain corporate control and less by a profit 
objective.  
A dummy variable BanksInsurance, which is set equal to one if a company belongs to the bank or 
insurance industry and zero otherwise, is also included because of the prevalence of these industries on 
the Belgian stock market. This approach is in line with Chang and Corbitt (2012) who control for the 
mining and resource industry, which is predominant on the Australian stock exchange.  
Next, we also controlled for companies with a concentrated ownership structure. A dummy variable 
OwnershipConc is set equal to one for companies where a shareholder directly or indirectly controls 
50% of the shares and zero otherwise. On the one hand, incentives to monitor the company 
management may be stronger for dominant shareholders (Del Brio and Perote, 2002). However, on the 
other hand, controlling shareholders may also use their power to privately obtain information and may 
consequently increase the information asymmetry with other investors (Demsetz, 1986). Therefore, no 
prediction is made on the relationship between OwnershipConc and insiders’ profits.  
Furthermore, two variables are included which potentially drive our results regarding the magnitude of 
insiders’ abnormal gains during the financial crisis. First, we expect that the increased uncertainty in 
financial markets provides additional opportunities for insiders to take advantage of their privileged 
information. To control for this, we included the BEL 20 Volatility Index as a measure for uncertainty 
(VolatilityIndex). Second, we control for the number of shares traded per transaction day 
(InsiderTradesPerDay) as it can be expected that the trading behavior of insiders differs between crisis 
and non-crisis periods. On the one hand, insiders might increase their trading frequency as the 
opportunities to obtain abnormal profits are believed to be larger during the financial crisis. On the 
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other hand, insiders may also face a higher risk of prosecution if financial markets are unstable as 
market authorities are even more on alert for violations of trading regulations and especially for 
infringements on insider trading restrictions. Consequently, insiders might refrain from trading during 
a period of financial crisis. 
 
2.5. Measurement of insider trading profits  
Consistent with previous insider trading studies, we use event-study methodology to measure 
abnormal gains from insider trading (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 
2009). A first step is to calculate the “normal” or “expected” return using a standard market model 
(MacKinlay, 1997) or a market model adjusted for thin trading (Dimson, 1979) as the Belgian stock 
market consists of frequently traded and thinly traded securities (Buysschaert et al., 2004). When a 
stock is thinly traded this means that it sometimes does not trade for a prolonged period of time. As a 
consequence, stock prices might cease to immediately reflect new information. This, in turn, leads to 
an imperfect synchronization between movements in individual stock prices and the market index 
because both are recorded over different time intervals. This phenomenon is referred to as non-
synchronous trading and causes a downward bias in market model beta estimates (Scholes and 
Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979). In the Dimson-adjusted market model, stock returns are not only 
regressed on the contemporaneous market return but also on a number of leading and lagged market 
returns. Following Buysschaert et al. (2004), we added one leading and three lagged coefficients to the 
market model for Belgian thinly traded securities. In order to determine for which shares the thin 
trading model should be used, we follow the approach of Friederich et al. (2002). According to this 
approach, we sort companies based on the number of zero returns during the estimation and event 
window. Next, we apply the Dimson market model to companies in the bottom quartile and the 
standard market model to all other companies.  
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++=  Standard market model,  (2) 
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jtktmjkjjt RR εβα  Dimson-adjusted market model,  (3) 
where Rjt is the daily stock return for firm j on day t adjusted for stock dividends, stock splits and 
issues; Rmt and Rm,t+k are the daily value-weighed and dividend-adjusted returns on the market index 
for day t and day t+k respectively. For Belgian listed companies, the benchmark market index is the 
Brussels All Shares Return Index. 
Forecasted “expected” returns are then equal to:  
mtjjjt RR βα ˆˆˆ +=  Standard market model,  (4) 
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ktmjkjjt RR βα  Dimson-adjusted market model,  (5) 
where jαˆ  and )k(jˆβ are estimated over an estimation window of 160 trading days (day -160 to day -1) 
using OLS regression.  
Second, abnormal returns, ARjt, are calculated on a company-per-company basis for each day t, with t 
ranging from day zero, the day of the insider trade, to day 20. This event window of 21 trading days is 
commonly used in insider trading literature (e.g. Betzer and Theissen, 2009). It enables us to capture 
the full market reaction to the insider trade without introducing excessive noise from subsequent 
events. Abnormal returns are calculated by deducting the forecasted “expected” return from the actual 
return.  
jtjtjt RRAR ˆ−=
 , 
 (6) 
In particular,  
mtjjjtjt RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=
 
Standard market model, (7) 
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ktmjkjjtjt RRAR βα  Dimson-adjusted market model, (8) 
Third, the cumulative abnormal return for event i of company j, CARij(0,20), is calculated over a time 
interval of 21 trading days ranging from day 0 to 20 trading days thereafter. This variable is used as 
the dependent variable in our regression analysis.  
∑
=
=
20
0t
jt)20,0(ij ARCAR , 
(9) 
Finally, the cumulative average abnormal return over 21 days, CAAR(0,20), is calculated by averaging 
the cumulative abnormal returns across all events of all companies.  
∑
=
=
N
1i
ij)20,0( CARN
1CAAR . (10) 
where N is the number of events.  
 
2.6. Sample selection 
In our study, we used a unique dataset on the trading activity of Belgian insiders obtained upon request 
from the FSMA. Data on daily return indices for Belgian companies were gathered from Datastream, 
while data on the Brussels All Shares Return Index were provided by Euronext Brussels.5 Both indices 
are adjusted for dividends as well as stock splits and issues. Furthermore, data on company size and 
market-to-book and debt-to-asset ratios were collected from Worldscope. Information on company 
ownership structures was gathered from the Belfirst database of Bureau Van Dijk. Industry 
classifications were obtained from Euronext Brussels and were based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). 
                                                     
5
 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Euronext Brussels for providing the data on the Brussels All Shares Index 
(ISIN: BE0389550956). 
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The initial insider trading database included 4889 insider trades reported between May 2006 and 
August 2010. Consistent with previous studies, several filters were applied to ensure the quality of our 
data. In order to focus on trades which are most likely to be driven by superior information, we first 
excluded all over-the-counter transactions as these are expected to be mainly inter-insider trades. In 
addition, prices negotiated during these private transactions may differ substantially from the quoted 
stock prices. This could introduce a serious bias in the estimation of abnormal trading gains as the 
calculation of abnormal returns is based on market-determined prices. Second, we also eliminated all 
trades involving the acquisition, exercise or conversion of options, warrants, or scripts. For example, 
regarding the exercise of stock options, previous studies have documented a high correlation between 
the exercise of options and the subsequent sale of the underlying shares (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). 
Exercise-events were therefore excluded from the sample in order to avoid double-counting (Huddart 
and Ke, 2007). Third, we deleted transactions that were reported before their execution because, once 
the information on insider trades is available to other investors, we expect this information to be 
incorporated into stock prices and to eliminate any abnormal gains.  
Sample size was also further reduced because we deleted all transactions that were not reported 
in euros, transactions of companies which were not listed during the entire estimation and event 
window and transactions of companies which were not included in the Brussels All Shares index. In 
addition, if insiders of the same company executed more than one transactions on the same day, we 
calculated net transactions. More specifically, trading volumes were deducted from each other when 
both purchases and sales were executed on the same day and were aggregated when only one of these 
transaction types occurred. The calculation of daily net transactions is in line with previous insider 
trading studies (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009) and allows us to 
determine the daily investment consensus among insiders. Transactions with a net transaction size 
equal to zero were filtered out. Furthermore, we checked for event-clustering on a company-per-
company basis. Transactions for a specific company executed within the event-window of a previous 
insider trade were eliminated from the sample. If we would not adjust for event-clustering, abnormal 
returns may be biased because they would also reflect the price reaction to trades that were carried out 
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later in the event window. Finally, transactions were deleted because of missing data on control 
variables.  
Table 2.1. provides an overview of the applied filters and the number of deleted transactions. The final 
sample consists of 780 firm-event observations of 96 different companies. 427 transactions were 
executed outside the financial crisis and 353 trades were executed during the financial crisis. 
Furthermore, 440 transactions (56.41%) are net purchases and 340 transactions (43.59%) are net sales. 
In particular, our financial crisis sample consists of 237 net purchases (67.14%) and 116 net sales 
(32.86%). The non-crisis sample contains 203 net purchases (47.54%) and 224 (52.46%) net sales.  
 
Table 2.1.  Sample selection 
Initial sample  4,889 
Applied filters: 
  
 
- over-the-counter transactions 
 
1,241 
 
- trades not involving buying and selling of common shares 
 
369 
 
- trades reported before execution 
 
5 
 
- trades not reported in euro 
 
27 
 
- trades of companies not included in benchmark 
 
128 
 
- net transactions 
 
488 
 
- event clustering adjustment 
 
1,760 
 
- missing stock price data  
 
16 
 
- net trade value equal to 0  
 
5 
 
- missing data on control variables  
 
70 
Final sample  780 
  
 
2.7. Summary statistics 
In Figure 2.3., we show the evolution of the cumulative average abnormal returns over 21 trading 
days. As can be observed in this figure, the cumulative average abnormal returns following purchases 
and sales display a similar pattern during crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
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Figure 2.3. seems to indicate that during the financial crisis insider purchases yield more positive 
abnormal returns, while insider sales yield more negative abnormal returns.  
 
Figure 2.3.  Post-event cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
 
In Table 2.2., we evaluate whether the difference in mean and median cumulative abnormal returns 
between crisis and non-crisis periods is statistically significant using a univariate t-test and a Mann-
Whitney U test respectively. In Table 2.2., it can be observed that insider trading profits are higher 
during the financial crisis. In particular, the mean (median) cumulative abnormal return in the non-
crisis period is equal to 0.67% (0.34%) compared to 2.98% (0.52%) during the financial crisis. For 
insider purchases, the difference between crisis and non-crisis mean cumulative abnormal returns is 
equal to 2.78 percentage points. For insider sales, this difference is slightly smaller being 2.28 
percentage points. For both transaction types the difference in means is statistically significant. When 
median cumulative abnormal returns are compared, results are somewhat different. Only for purchases 
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Table 2.2.  Descriptive statistics 
  mean   Median 
  non-crisis crisis t-stat p-value non-crisis crisis z-stat p-value 
CARij(0,20) 0.67 2.98 -2.88 0.00 0.34 0.52 -1.51 0.13 
CARij(0,20) purchases -0.15 2.63 -2.50 0.01 -0.53 0.29 -1.67 0.10 
CARij(0,20) sales  -1.41 -3.69 1.79 0.08 -0.98 -1.72 0.99 0.32 
TradeSize 0.10 0.11 -0.17 0.87 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.39 
FirmSize 6.30 5.89 2.59 0.01 6.29 5.65 0.01 0.01 
MTBV 2.29 1.94 2.13 0.03 1.89 1.25 6.82 0.00 
Leverage 23.01 21.97 0.76 0.45 22.67 15.27 1.99 0.05 
Sale 0.52 0.33 5.63 0.00 1.00 0.00 5.49 0.00 
BanksInsurance 0.05 0.07 -0.80 0.42 0.00 0.00 -0.81 0.42 
OwnershipConc 0.27 0.31 -1.29 0.20 0.00 0.00 -1.297 0.19 
InsiderTradesPerDay 1.12 1.08 1.42 0.16 1.00 1.00 1.46 0.14 
VolatilityIndex 17.63   29.65   -18.87   0.00   15.22   24.82   -18.55   0.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=780). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus 1 for the calculation of CARij(0,20). CARij(0,20) is equal to 
the cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the 
company expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market 
value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed 
in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sales transactions and zero otherwise. BankInsurance is a dummy variable equal to one if a company belongs to the bank or insurance industry 
based on the ICB-classification and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is a dummy variable equal to one if a shareholder directly or indirectly controls at least 50% of the company shares and zero otherwise. 
FinancialCrisis represents a dummy variable equal to one for trades executed in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. InsiderTradePerDay is equal to the number of shares traded by insiders on a particular 
trading day. VolatilityIndex represents the BEL20 Volatility Index.  
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the difference between the median CAR during the crisis period (0.29%) and non-crisis period 
(-0.53%) is significant at the 10%-level. For insider sales, the median CAR earned during the 2008–
2009 financial crisis is 0.74 percentage points higher. This difference is, however, not statistically 
significant. 
Table 2.2. further also includes descriptive statistics on the explanatory and control variables. In 
particular, this table shows that insiders do not trade a significantly larger proportion of company 
shares during the financial crisis (TradeSize) and do not execute more transactions per trading day 
(InsiderTradesPerDay). Also, notwithstanding the fact that Belgian bank and insurance companies 
suffered severe losses during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, their insiders did not trade substantially 
more frequent during this financial crisis (BanksInsurance). Comparing the proportion of sales 
transactions between crisis and non-crisis periods (Sale), results show that insiders executed relatively 
less sales during the financial crisis. Finally, crisis-period transactions seem to be concentrated in 
smaller firms (FirmSize) and in firms with a lower market-to-book value (MarketToBook).  
Table 2.3. contains Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients of the regression variables. 
Although both methods indicate that insider trading profitability and the FinancialCrisis-dummy are 
positively related, only the Pearson correlation is significant. Based on the reported correlations, no 
multicollinearity problems should be expected as the correlations between the independent variables 
are below the 0.7 limit identified by Kervin (1992). 
 
2.8. Results  
In Table 2.4., OLS regression results are reported. The CARs for sales transactions were multiplied by 
minus one because we estimated a single, pooled regression for purchases and sales. Furthermore, 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm-level (Rogers, 
1993).  
  
  
 
 
Table 2.3.  Spearman and Pearson correlations  
  CARij(0,20) 
Financial 
Crisis TradeSize FirmSize 
Market 
ToBook Leverage Sale 
Banks 
Insurance 
Con-
centrated 
Own 
Insider 
Trades 
PerDay 
Volatility 
Index 
                       
CARij(0,20) 
 
0.11 * 0.05 
 
-0.11 * -0.08 * -0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.04 0.05 
 
FinancialCrisis 0.05 
  
0.01 
 
-0.09 * -0.08 * -0.03 
 
-0.20 * 0.03 
 
0.05 
 
-0.05 0.58 * 
TradeSize 0.01 
 
0.03 
  
-0.09 * 0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.04 -0.02 
 
FirmSize -0.07 
 
-0.09 * -0.37 * 
 
0.22 * 0.31 * 0.20 * 0.42 * 0.02 
 
0.06 -0.07 * 
MarketToBook -0.04 
 
-0.24 * -0.02 
 
0.39 * 
 
0.10 * 0.32 * -0.08 * -0.08 * -0.02 -0.04 
 
Leverage 0.03 
 
-0.07 * -0.01 
 
0.32 * 0.16 * 
 
0.02 
 
0.23 * -0.11 * 0.06 0.01 
 
Sale 0.07 * -0.20 * -0.05 
 
0.20 * 0.40 * 0.03 
  
-0.07 * -0.06 
 
0.03 -0.27 * 
BanksInsurance -0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.23 * 0.37 * -0.03 
 
0.21 * -0.07 * 
 
-0.13 * 0.03 0.01 
 
ConcentratedOwn 0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.00 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.14 * -0.06 
 
-0.13 * 
 
-0.06 0.01 
 
InsiderTradesPerDay 0.00 
 
-0.05 
 
0.13 * 0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
-0.09 * -0.04 
 
VolatilityIndex 0.03   0.66 * 0.03   -0.10 * -0.22 * -0.04   -0.30 * 0.01   0.03   -0.07       
Notes: Spearman (below diagnonal) and Pearson (above diagonal) correlations for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=780). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus 1. 
CARij(0,20) is equal to the cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model. FinancialCrisis represents a dummy variable equal to one for trades 
executed in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the company expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the 
market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at 
the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net 
sales transactions and zero otherwise. BankInsurance is a dummy variable equal to one if a company belongs to the bank or insurance industry based on the ICB-classification and zero otherwise. 
OwnershipConc is a dummy variable equal to one if a shareholder directly or indirectly controls at least 50% of the company shares and zero otherwise. InsiderTradePerDay is equal to the number of 
shares traded by insiders on a particular trading day. VolatilityIndex represents the BEL20 Volatility Index. * denotes two-tailed significance at the 0.05 level. 
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With respect to the control variables our results show that insider trading profits are significantly 
higher when insiders buy or sell a larger proportion of the company. Transaction size thus seems to be 
a reflection of the quality of inside information (Karpoff, 1987). This result was also found in Seyhun 
(1986) and Cheuk et al. (2006). 
Furthermore, as in other studies (e.g. Gregory et al., 1994; Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008; Betzer and 
Theissen, 2009), insider trading profits are negatively related to the size of the company. Insiders of 
large companies are expected to have a smaller informational advantage as large companies are more 
intensely monitored by media (Fang and Peress, 2009) and analysts (Bhushan, 1989; Barth et al., 
2001).  
Our regression results also show that the market-to-book value of a company has a significant negative 
influence on the profitability of insider trading. This finding is consistent with, amongst others, Cheuk 
et al. (2006), and Betzer and Theissen (2009). Trades in value stocks with low market-to-book ratios 
thus yield high abnormal returns, while trading in overvalued, high market-to-book companies renders 
lower abnormal profits.  
Furthermore, a firm’s financial structure does not seem to influence the magnitude of insiders’ gains as 
the coefficient on Leverage is insignificant. This contrasts prior studies’ expectations of less 
information asymmetry and lower abnormal gains in companies with a higher proportion of debt as 
both creditors and debtors disseminate incidental information when a company raises debt financing 
(Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
As expected for insiders of Belgian listed companies, our results show that net sales transactions yield 
higher abnormal returns than net purchases. Other studies documenting that sales are more informative 
than purchases include Del Brio et al. (2002) and Cheuk et al. (2006). 
Regarding the profitability of insider trading in bank and insurance companies, our regression analysis 
indicates that transactions executed by their insiders generate significant higher abnormal returns 
compared to other industries. Furthermore, as the 2008–2009 financial crisis was denoted as a banking 
crisis, we also included the interaction of the sector dummy and the financial crisis dummy 
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(Crisis*BanksIns) in order to investigate whether the increased profitability of insider trading during 
the financial crisis was especially driven by transactions in shares of these financial companies. Our 
results however indicate that transactions in shares of the bank and insurance companies did not yield 
significant higher abnormal profits during this period.  
Finally, concentrated ownership structures do not seem to affect insiders’ abnormal gains as 
OwnershipConc is not significant.  
 
Table 2.4.  OLS regression results  
Variables Expected sign 
 
Coef. s.e. 
Constant ? 2.522 
 
2.21 
TradeSize + 0.678 ** 0.31 
FirmSize - -0.749 *** 0.30 
MarketToBook - -0.305 ** 0.16 
Leverage  - 0.005 
 
0.02 
Sale + 2.673 *** 0.89 
BanksInsurance ? 2.608 ** 1.20 
Crisis*BanksIns ? 
 
3.228 
 
5.38 
OwnershipConc ? 1.107 
 
0.92 
FinancialCrisis + 2.032 ** 1.10 
InsiderTradesPerDay ? 1.197 
 
0.91 
VolatilityIndex + 0.012 
 
0.06 
   
 
 
Observations 
 
780 
 
R² 
 
0.05 
 
R² adj. 
 
0.03 
 
F-stat. 
 
2.21 
 
P-value     0.02     
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=780). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are 
multiplied by minus 1. CARij(0,20) is equal to the cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-
adjusted market model. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the company 
expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in 
millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year 
expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sales transactions and zero otherwise. BankInsurance is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a company belongs to the bank or insurance industry based on the ICB-classification. 
OwnershipConc is a dummy variable equal to one if a shareholder directly or indirectly controls at least 50% of the company shares 
and zero otherwise. FinancialCrisis represents a dummy variable equal to one for trades executed in 2008 and 2009 and zero 
otherwise. InsiderTradePerDay is equal to the number of shares traded by insiders on a particular trading day. VolatilityIndex 
represents the BEL20 Volatility Index. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. ***,**,* denote two-
tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels respectively when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed otherwise.  
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In order to address our main research question, we included a dummy variable which is equal to one 
when transactions were carried out during the highlight of the financial crisis in the period 2008–2009 
and zero otherwise. The significant and positive coefficient on the dummy variable indicates insider 
trading yielded significantly higher abnormal returns during the financial crisis.612Consequently, the 
financial crisis increased the level of asymmetric information and negatively affected the efficiency of 
the Belgian stock market. Our research result corroborates and generalizes the findings by Cheong et 
al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) who investigated the influence of the 1997 financial crisis on various 
Asian stock markets and who find that the level of information asymmetry is higher in times of 
financial crises.  
In order to investigate which factors are potentially driving our results concerning the profitability of 
insider trading during the financial crisis, we also included the BEL 20 Volatility Index 
(VolatilityIndex) and the number of shares traded per transaction day (InsiderTradesPerDay) in our 
regression analysis. With regard to the volatility index, our results show that this index does not have 
an incremental impact over the financial crisis dummy. So it seems that while the increased volatility 
over the crisis period, which is reflected by our yearly crisis dummy, is significant in explaining 
insiders’ returns; it is not so that the day-to-day changes in volatility, which are reflected in the 
volatility index itself, are reflected in changes in insiders’ returns once the crisis dummy is included. 
Also, insider trading activity does not seem to provide incremental information over the financial 
crisis dummy.  
 
2.9. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examined the profitability of trades made by Belgian insiders. Especially, we 
investigated whether insiders were able to earn higher abnormal gains during the peak of the financial 
crisis in 2008 and 2009.  
                                                     
612In order to check the robustness of our results, we performed an ANOVA and ANCOVA. Both analyses confirm our results 
from the OLS regression. Furthermore, our results are also robust if no adjustment for non-contaminated event windows is 
applied.  
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Our research results show that, while Belgian insiders were generally able to earn excess returns, the 
magnitude of their abnormal profits was substantially higher during the years of the financial crisis. 
Consequently, our findings indicate that the efficiency of the stock market was further deteriorated by 
the occurrence of the financial crisis.  
By evaluating this research question we contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the 
emerging literature on the profitability of insider trading on European stock markets. Second, our 
results show that the occurrence of a financial crisis is an important determinant of insider trading 
profitability. Contrary to our study, prior studies have focused on firm and trade characteristics to 
explain differences in profitability. Finally, our results also contribute to the literature on the efficiency 
of stock markets during financial crises. Cheong et al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) focused on Asian 
stock markets during the 1997 financial crisis and found evidence of increased inefficiency. We 
confirm and generalize their findings by evaluating the efficiency of the highly developed Belgian 
stock market during another financial crisis.  
Our research results also have practical implications. First, they are of potential interest to market 
regulators. By providing evidence of increased information asymmetry and stock market inefficiency, 
they indicate that stricter enforcement of insider trading regulation and more supervision might be 
needed during a financial crisis. Second, our results are also of importance to companies. Previous 
research has identified information asymmetry as an important driver of the cost of capital. In 
addition, Love et al. (2007), and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) have shown that credit lines contract 
following a financial crisis. Consequently, companies have an interest in limiting the informational 
benefits of their insiders in order to retain a sufficient supply of external capital. A reduction in insider 
trading profitability could be achieved by increasing corporate transparency. The influence of 
corporate transparency on information asymmetry seems an interesting area for future research.  
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Abstract  
Exploring a unique database on insider trading in Belgium, we investigate whether high-
quality corporate communication contributes to reducing insider trading profitability and 
information asymmetry. Using disclosure scores of professional financial analysts as a proxy 
for communication quality, we find a significant negative association between corporate 
communication quality and insider trading profitability. Closer inspection of different 
communication channels shows that the quality of annual reports, press releases and investor 
relation activities is more relevant in explaining insiders’ abnormal returns than the quality of 
corporate websites.  
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3.1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether high-quality communication is effective in reducing the profitability of 
insider trading. Previous research has documented that, despite regulations on insider trading, insiders 
still earn significant abnormal returns from trading on information asymmetries between insiders and 
outside investors. As suggested by analytical work on disclosure (e.g. Diamond 1985; Verrecchia, 
2001), an important instrument to decrease this asymmetry could be the dissemination of high-quality 
information. Particularly, when a company improves its communication by disseminating more, 
precise and/or timely information, then the informational advantage of insiders should decrease as the 
quality and quantity of information available to other investors ameliorates. Consequently, as insiders’ 
trading returns are a representation of the importance and precision of their informational advantage, 
we hypothesize that insiders’ abnormal returns are reduced in companies with higher-quality corporate 
communication.  
In an additional analysis this paper also examines whether the impact of disclosure quality differs 
between communications channels, i.e. annual reports, press releases, websites and investor relation 
activities. The different channels and information communicated through these channels have specific 
characteristics that might limit or enhance their ability to affect the level of information asymmetry, 
like, for example, timeliness of the disclosed information, time horizon (forward-looking versus 
backward-looking), need for external verification and voluntary or mandatory disclosures. We 
therefore hypothesize that the impact of disclosure quality on insider trading profits and on 
information asymmetry in general depends on the communication channel.  
Within the extensive literature on insider trading, an important line of research has focused on the 
determinants of insider trading profitability. Early studies by Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) 
identified company risk factors like size and the market-to-book ratio as important drivers of insiders’ 
abnormal returns. Building on these findings, later studies attempted to broaden the scope of analysis 
and considered additional firm and trade characteristics. For example, some researchers examined 
whether the informational benefit of insiders is related to their position within a company (e.g. 
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Seyhun, 1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009). Others investigated the influence of 
the debt-to-asset ratio (Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008), trade size (Seyhun, 1986; Cheuk et al., 2006; 
Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005), trade intensity (Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008; Betzer and Theissen, 2009) 
and cross-listing on foreign stock markets (Korczak and Lasfer, 2007; Chang and Corbitt, 2012). More 
recently, as researchers and practitioners emphasized the importance of good corporate governance in 
managing the information asymmetry problem, insider trading research has started to explore whether 
corporate governance practices affect the magnitude of insiders’ trading profits. Accordingly, previous 
studies have looked into the effect of ownership concentration (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Del Brio and 
Perote, 2007; Betzer and Theissen, 2009), type of controlling shareholder (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), 
board composition (Chang et al., 2005) and executive compensation (Zhang et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, while it is generally acknowledged that comprehensive, transparent and timely 
disclosures are essential elements of good corporate governance (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Mallin, 
2002; Mitton, 2002; Patel and Dallas, 2002; OECD, 2004), no prior study has thoroughly investigated 
the effect of the quality of corporate disclosures on insider trading returns. In this study, we examine 
this relation by relating professional analyst disclosure scores to the profitability of insider trading.  
To address our research question, we use data from Belgian listed companies. La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998) and Faccio and Lang (2002) depict Belgium as an insider economy characterized by highly 
concentrated and controlling ownership. In such an environment, minority shareholders are at a 
disadvantage as large, dominant shareholders can use their power to privately acquire information, 
which makes them less dependent on public communication. As a consequence, in Belgium, the role 
of corporate communication in reducing information asymmetry is potentially very important. 
To measure the quality of corporate communication, we use a disclosure score granted by the Belgian 
Association of Financial Analysts (BVFA).1 Each year, the BVFA invites its members to screen the 
communication of a number of companies and assign a disclosure rating. This rating evaluates several 
disclosure characteristics identified as important attributes of high-quality communication, i.e. 
preciseness, transparency, timeliness and scope (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Contrary to comparable 
                                                     
1
 BVFA stands for “Belgische Vereniging van Financiële Analisten”. 
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analyst ratings, like those assigned by Standards and Poor’s (S&P) and the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) (Welker, 1995; Patel et al., 2002; Khanna et al., 2004; Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007), the BVFA also evaluates the communication quality of smaller companies. For these 
companies, information asymmetries between insiders and other market participants are potentially 
more significant, which makes high-quality communication even more relevant (BVFA press release, 
2010).  
To measure the profitability of insider trading, we exploit a unique database on insider trading 
provided by the Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) and calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns that insiders earn when trading in their own stock. Since the liquidity of 
some Belgian listed securities is rather low (Buysschaert et al., 2004), the abnormal returns are 
estimated either using a standard market model (MacKinlay, 1997) or market model adjusted for thin 
trading (Dimson, 1979) depending on whether stocks are thinly traded or not. 
Based on a sample of insider trades that occurred between May 2006 and August 2010, our results 
show that high-quality communication is important in reducing the profitability of insider trading. 
Furthermore, we find that the quality of annual reports, press releases and investor relation activities, 
is relatively more effective in reducing information asymmetry than the quality of corporate websites. 
Investor relation activities, which are used to communicate timely and forward-looking information 
directly to the investor community, appear to be most effective.  
Our research contributes to two streams of literature. First, we add to the literature on insider trading 
profitability by examining the impact of high-quality communication, as proxied by a comprehensive 
measure of disclosure quality assigned by professional users of corporate communication. To our 
knowledge, there are only a handful of papers that investigate whether corporate communication 
quality influences insiders’ informational benefits. In addition, these papers obtain inconclusive results 
and use indirect measures of reporting quality, such as analyst following, news coverage and value 
relevance (e.g. Frankel and Li, 2004). In contrast to these studies, we use a more direct and objective 
measure of communication quality which is assigned by professional users of corporate 
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communication, i.e. financial analysts and fund managers. In addition, our measure includes an 
individual assessment of the quality of annual reports, press releases, websites and investor relation 
activities. This allows us to assess whether the effect of the quality of communication differs across 
alternative communication channels. A general advantage of using externally-developed disclosure 
ratings is that these do not involve judgment by the researcher(s) in question. This facilitates the 
verification of research results and the application of the rating in other research designs (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). In addition, researchers only have access to published information and lack knowledge 
of disclosures distributed through unpublished channels like analyst meetings and conference calls 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts are also regarded as the primary and most influential users of 
corporate communication as they communicate with companies on a daily basis (e.g. Schipper, 1991; 
Hirst et al., 1995; Revsine et al., 2004; IASB, 2005). This puts them in a privileged position to 
objectively evaluate the quality of corporate disclosures.  
Second, our work contributes to the literature examining the relationship between disclosure and 
information asymmetry by using an alternative proxy for information asymmetry. Prior work 
examined this relation using, for example, bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading as 
proxies for information asymmetry (e.g. Welker, 1995; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). By contrast, we 
proxy information asymmetry by the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns. The use of this proxy is 
well-established in the empirical literature (e.g. Frankel and Li, 2004; Chang et al., 2005) and 
supported by theoretical work (Kyle, 1985). Furthermore, the majority of prior disclosure studies is 
based on U.S. data (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Re-examining the disclosure - information asymmetry 
relation for a sample of Belgian listed companies may provide valuable new insights as the Belgian 
institutional setting differs from the U.S. For example, with regard to ownership structures, Belgian 
listed companies generally have a concentrated and controlling ownership (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; 
Renneboog, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). In addition, they are often 
controlled by a family or a single controlling owner (Faccio and Lang, 2002). U.S. companies, on the 
other hand, tend to have diffuse ownership and are less (family-) controlled. Regarding the provision 
of external capital, Belgian companies primarily raise external capital through bank financing while 
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their U.S. counterparts generally rely an equity financing (La Porta, 1997). Obviously, information 
needs of both capital providers differ substantially. Other institutional differences include the weaker 
level of investor protection (La Porta, 1998; Djankov et al., 2008; Fidrmuc et al., 2011) and the 
influence of corporate law and taxation on financial reporting in Belgium (Vanstraelen et al., 2003). 
The above characteristics of the Belgian institutional environment do on the other hand bear a strong 
resemblance to the economies of other continental European countries with a French-based civil law 
system. According to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), the Belgium legal and institutional environment is 
similar to the French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese environment. Consequently, we may 
assume that the results of our inquiry are, to some extent, generalizable to these economies. Prior 
research on the disclosure - information asymmetry relation in French civil law countries is very 
limited. The only examples that we are aware of are Vanstraelen et al. (2003) which focused on three 
European countries including Belgium and the Netherlands, Aerts et al. (2007) which examined 
disclosure practices in several continental European countries including Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands and finally, Lakhal (2009) which focused on French listed companies. None of these 
studies have however used a comprehensive disclosure score similar to the BVFA-rating that evaluates 
different communication channels. In addition, both Vanstraelen et al. (2003) and Lakhal (2009) do 
not take the quality of disclosures into account. Aerts et al. (2007) accounts for disclosure quality by 
considering the way in which items are described, i.e. general terms, specific terms or quantitative/ 
monetary terms.  
From a regulator’s point of view, we believe that the results of our inquiry provide additional insight 
into the effect of higher-quality communication on information asymmetry. In general, they confirm 
the importance of high-quality communication in reducing information inequities between a company 
and its stakeholders and in preventing unfair enrichment by privileged insiders. In addition, we further 
deepen the insight into the disclosure - information asymmetry relationship by examining this relation 
for different communication channels, i.e. semi-mandatory (i.e. annual reports)2 and voluntary 
channels (i.e. press releases, websites, investor relations), and providing evidence that different 
                                                     
2
 Information included in annual reports consists of mandatory financial statements information possibly supplemented by 
voluntary disclosures on business segments, future prospects, company objectives, etc. 
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channels have a different effect on the level of information asymmetry. Interestingly, our results show 
that, whereas regulators primarily focus on annual reports and backward-looking financial statements 
information, this communication channel is not the most effective in reducing the level of information 
asymmetry. By contrast, investor relation activities, which are used to communicate timely and 
forward-looking information on a voluntary basis, appear to be most effective. We believe that this 
finding is relevant for regulators and may shed new light on the discussion concerning the shift 
towards more or less regulation of markets.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 a discussion is provided of the 
current Belgian legislation on insider trading. In section 3 a brief overview of related literature is 
given, accompanied by the hypothesis development. The research design and proxies for information 
asymmetry and corporate communication quality are discussed in section 4. Next, section 5 describes 
the data which are used and section 6 reports some descriptive statistics. The results of the empirical 
inquiry are disclosed and interpreted in section 7. In section 8 some sensitivity checks are performed. 
Finally, section 9 concludes.  
 
3.2. Belgian legislation on insider trading  
The current Belgian legislation on insider trading is founded in the 2003 European Directive on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (Directive 2003/6/EC), i.e. the Market Abuse Directive. The 
legislation is based on the central concept of “inside information” which is defined as “any 
information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one 
or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were 
made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or 
on the price of related financial instruments” (Law of 2 August 2002, art. 2). The Belgian legislation 
formulates three prohibitions on the use of this inside information (Law of 2 August 2002, art. 25 and 
art. 40). First, persons in possession of inside information who are aware, or should be aware that the 
information concerned is inside information are prohibited from trading. In particular, they may not 
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use the information by acquiring or disposing of financial instruments to which the information 
relates, or by trying to do so. Second, they may not communicate the inside information to third 
parties, except within the framework of the normal exercise of their job description. Finally, they must 
also refrain from making recommendations or induce another person to acquire or dispose of the 
financial instruments in question on the basis of the information.  
An offender of these legal prohibitions may face administrative sanctions imposed by the FSMA as 
well as criminal sanctions.3 In particular, the FSMA may order the offender to pay damages between 
250 euros and 50,000 euros for each day an infringement on the insider trading regulations occurs. The 
total amount of payments may however not exceed 2,500,000 euros. In addition, the FSMA may also 
impose an administrative fine between 2,500 euros and 2,500,000 euros. If however the offender 
obtained a capital gain from the infringement, the maximum fine is raised to twice this gain and, in 
case of a repeat offence, to three times the capital gain (Law 2 August 2002, art. 36). With regard to 
the criminal sanctions, an offender may be condemned to a prison sentence between three months and 
one year, payment of a fine between 50 euros and 10,000 euros and/or payment of criminal fine 
corresponding to a maximum of three times the gain earned, directly or indirectly, by illegal insider 
trading (Law 2 August 2002, art. 40). 
In order to prevent illegal trading by insiders, the Belgian legislation has also formulated several 
preventive measures including: (1) the obligation for issuers of financial instruments to reveal inside 
information immediately. This information should be published on the website of the financial market 
on which the financial instrument is listed (Law 2 August 2002, art. 10). (2) The requirement for 
issuers to draw up a list of persons who have access to inside information. This list must be kept at the 
disposal of the FSMA for a period of five years (Law 2 August 2002, art. 25bis). (3) The obligation for 
persons who professionally arrange transactions in financial instruments to inform the FSMA about 
suspicious insider transactions (Law 2 August 2002, art. 25bis). (4) And the requirement for persons 
                                                     
3
 With regard to the prohibition of trading on inside information an important distinction is made between administrative and 
criminal sanctions. In particular, in case of trading by insiders themselves, criminal sanctions can only be imposed if there is 
sufficient proof of a causal connection between the possession of inside information and the reprehensible transaction. 
Administrative fines, on the other hand, may be enforced as soon as a person is in possession of inside information and 
makes a transaction. No proof is required that a transaction was actually inspired by the inside information. (Tison and 
Ravelingien, 2007). 
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who fulfill an executive function in the issuing company as well as persons closely related to them, 
e.g. spouses, partners, children and other relatives, to report their transactions to the FSMA. The 
transactions must be reported within five working days after their execution. However, as long as the 
total sum of the transactions during the current calendar year is below 5,000 euros, the reporting may 
be delayed until 31 January of the next calendar year (Law 2 August 2002, art. 25bis). The FSMA is 
responsible for publishing all reported transactions on their website. In case of non-compliance with 
the above preventive measure, the FSMA has the authority to impose administrative sanctions (Law of 
2 August 2002, art. 36).  
 
3.3. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
3.3.1. The impact of corporate communication quality on insider trading profitability  
Theoretical research on disclosure shows that information asymmetry should be negatively associated 
with the quality of corporate communication (e.g. Diamond, 1985; Verrecchia, 2001). By disclosing 
more, precise and complete information in a timely and transparent manner, companies reduce the 
amount of private information while simultaneously increasing the amount and quality of public 
information available to investors. In general, the existence of this negative association is supported by 
empirical research. Using a myriad of proxies for disclosure quality, including conference call activity 
and analyst disclosure ratings, studies have shown that a lower level of information asymmetry results 
into more informative stock prices (Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm and Myers, 2002), lower bid-
ask spreads (Welker, 1995; Heflin et al. 2005), less analyst forecast dispersion (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Hope, 2003), and a lower cost of equity (Botosan, 1997) and dept capital (Sengupta, 1998). 
Information asymmetry can, however, also affect the profitability of insider trading. In particular, 
insider trading research is based on the presumption that a certain level of information asymmetry 
exists between insiders and outside investors as insiders are assumed to have a more in-depth 
knowledge of a firm’s economics as well as privileged access to private information. If insiders decide 
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to trade upon their informational benefits, prior research indicates that significant abnormal trading 
profits can be earned (e.g. Lin and Howe, 1990; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Aktas et al., 2008). In addition, 
supporting theoretical work by Kyle (1985), these studies have shown that insiders’ profits increase 
with their informational benefits.  
Hence, given the above theory and findings that higher-quality communication decreases the level of 
information asymmetry and that information asymmetry determines the profitability of insider trading, 
it can be expected that better communication reduces the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns. 
However, despite the large attention given to corporate communication quality by practitioners and by 
researchers in corporate governance and disclosure literature (e.g. Patel and Dallas, 2002; OECD, 
2004; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Chen et al., 2007), only few studies have examined the effect on 
insider trading profitability. One theoretical study by Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) examined this 
relationship and confirmed that higher-quality disclosures reduce the profits from insider trading. 
Empirically, Frankel and Li (2004) found that some elements of a firm’s information environment, i.e. 
the extent of analyst following and the value relevance of financial statements, indeed mitigate the 
informational benefits of insiders (i.e. lower gains for and/or less purchase transactions by insiders). 
However, other elements of the information environment, i.e. news coverage, seem to enhance these 
informational benefits. A more recent study by Betzer and Theissen (2009) used the voluntary 
adoption of international accounting standards (i.e. U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or 
International Accounting Standards) as a proxy for the informativeness and transparency of financial 
statements. Contrary to their expectations, their results suggested that higher abnormal insider trading 
profits are earned in companies preparing financial statements according to the international standards.  
In light of this mixed evidence, we re-examine the relationship between the quality of corporate 
communication and insider trading profitability using analyst disclosure ratings. This proxy of 
corporate communication quality has been widely used in previous disclosure studies for it provides a 
comprehensive measure of disclosure quality assigned by professional users of corporate 
communication. Testing the relationship between corporate communication quality and insider trading 
profitability, we expect better communication to mitigate the information asymmetry between insiders 
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and outside, uninformed investors and to simultaneously lower abnormal trading profits. Our test 
hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The profitability of insider trades will be negatively associated with the quality of 
corporate communication. 
 
3.3.2. The role of alternative communication channels 
The aggregate measure of corporate communication quality used in this study covers four individual 
corporate communication quality ratings. Each rating assesses the quality of communication through a 
specific communication channel, i.e. the annual report, press releases, corporate websites and investor 
relation activities. The extent to which the communicated information impacts the level of information 
asymmetry may differ across these communication channels as both the information communicated 
through each channel and the channel itself have specific characteristics. Regarding annual reports, for 
example, the included information consists of mandatory financial statements information possibly 
supplemented by voluntary disclosures on business segments, future prospects, company objectives, 
etc. An important characteristic of the mandatory financial statements information is that this 
information is verified by an external auditor which enhances the level of credibility. Nevertheless, the 
fact that this mandatory information is subject to international reporting requirements and external 
verification, limits the degrees of freedom for companies to distinguish themselves regarding the 
quality of the financial statements information. Consequently, differences in the quality of annual 
report disclosures, if any, are expected to ensue from differences in the quantity and quality of the 
included voluntary information (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Furthermore, despite the focus of 
regulators on annual reports and financial statements in particular, practitioners (i.e. financial analysts 
and investors) often no longer regard them as the main tool of communication because of their 
backward-looking nature and lack of timeliness (Vergoossen, 1993; AIMR, 2000).  
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A second potential communication channel are press releases. This communication channel is used by 
companies to voluntarily disclose periodic updates of financial results (i.e. quarterly and half-year 
results) as well as information on important events that could affect the risk profile of a company 
(BVFA evaluation grid, 2010). From analysts’ point of view, the high degree of timeliness has made 
press releases essential for the assessment of companies (BVFA press release, 2010). Empirical 
support for this proposition was found by McNichols and Manegold (1983) who showed that press 
releases containing interim financial results pre-empt some information which is later disclosed 
through annual reports. In addition, Brown and Niederhoffer (1968) and Brown and Rozeff (1979) 
provided evidence that financial press releases improve the accuracy of annual earnings forecasts by 
financial analysts. A potential limitation of press releases could be that the disseminated information is 
unaudited and may therefore be less credible. Nonetheless, studies by Stocken (2000), Lundholm 
(2003) and Ball et al. (2012) suggest that as the credibility of press release disclosures can be 
subsequently verified using audited financial statements information, managers are likely disciplined 
to be more truthful in their ex ante communications.  
A third communication channel used by companies are corporate websites. This communication 
channel is a permanent source of information which is often used to disclose information on, for 
example, the company’s history and mission statement, corporate governance structures and social and 
environmental issues complementary to the traditional financial information (BVFA evaluation grid, 
2010; Trabelsi et al., 2008). As such, the information disclosed through corporate websites is often 
also disseminated through other communications channels like annual reports and press releases. This 
characteristic might potentially limit the ability of web disclosures to affect the level of information 
asymmetry. Nevertheless, prior studies on internet reporting agree that voluntary web disclosures are 
taking an increasingly prominent place in corporate communication because of their timeliness and 
ease of access and the consequent lower cost of disclosure (e.g. Jones and Xiao, 2004; Marston and 
Polei, 2004; Bollen et al., 2006). Focusing on the usefulness of web disclosures in reducing the level 
of information asymmetry, Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Aerts et al. (2007) found that the extent of 
voluntary disclosures through corporate websites is negatively related to the dispersion of analyst 
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forecasts. This finding indicates that web disclosures provide relevant information for the evaluation 
of companies. 
A final communication channel used by companies are investor relation activities. The use of this 
communication channels has been well established in the U.S. and U.K. for a considerable time. More 
recently, investor relation activities have also in Europe become increasingly important in response to 
the growing reliance on (foreign) equity financing (Marston and Straker, 2001). A study by Chang et 
al. (2008, pp. 378) defined investor relations as the continuous dissemination of “company 
information in the form of annual reports, earnings forecasts, proposed investments, governance 
procedures, dividends and financing intentions and a wide range of other information, both formal and 
informal”. Accordingly, much of the information communicated through investor relation activities is 
voluntary, timely and forward-looking (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). The credibility of the 
information may, however, be lower for it is often disclosed verbally and sometimes represents non-
quantifiable and non-verifiable information such as the degree of optimism held by executives (Brown 
and Hillegeist, 2007). Despite these negative characteristics, the BVFA considers good investor 
relation services as crucial for companies to get information across to the investor community (BVFA 
press release, 2010).  
In sum, the above discussion clearly indicates that each communication channel and the included 
information have specific characteristics that can enhance or limit their ability to affect the level of 
information asymmetry. Given the above findings, we investigate whether the effect of corporate 
communication quality on insiders’ trading profits differs across alternative communication channels. 
The second hypothesis proposed in our study is:  
Hypothesis 2: Any relation between the quality of corporate communications and insider trading 
profitability differs between the communication channels.  
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3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Research design  
To empirically investigate whether high-quality communication reduces information asymmetry - and 
hence the profitability of insider trading - we estimate the following regression using ordinary least 
squares and clustered, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993).  
εωα +++= γxionQualityCommunicatCAR 1200 ),( , (1) 
where the dependent variable, CAR(0,20), is the cumulative average abnormal return over a 21-day event 
window following each insider trade. The test variable, CommunicationQuality, represents the 
disclosure score awarded by the financial analysts and fund managers of the BVFA. The vector x 
includes a set of control variables. In the following subsections, the measurement of the regression 
variables is explained in detail.  
 
3.4.2. Measurement of insider trading profitability 
To measure the abnormal gains of insider trading, we apply event study methodology and calculate 
abnormal returns of insider trades over a certain period starting from the transaction date of each 
insider trade. However, since the liquidity of some Belgian listed securities is rather low (Buysschaert 
et al., 2004), we estimate the abnormal returns either using a standard market model (MacKinlay, 
1997) or a market model adjusted for thin trading (Dimson, 1979) depending on the liquidity of the 
underlying shares. The issue is that when a stock is infrequently traded, stock prices recorded at the 
end of a time period may include adjustments to news events occurring earlier in that period. 
Consequently, when using a standard market model for such stocks, a problem of non-synchronous 
trading arises due to a mismatch between the return of these stocks and the return of the market index. 
To address this problem, the aggregated coefficients method of Dimson (1979) includes lagged, 
leading and contemporaneous beta coefficients in order to provide unbiased beta estimates for thinly 
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traded securities. Following a suggestion by Friederich et al. (2002), we apply the Dimson-adjustment 
to stocks with the highest number of daily zero returns. More specifically, firms are first sorted in 
ascending order based on the number of daily zero returns during the estimation and event window. 
Next, the ordinary market model is applied to firms belonging to the first three quartiles (with the 
lowest number of zero return days), while the Dimson-adjusted model is used to calculate betas for 
firms in the bottom quartile (with the highest number of zero return days). Applying the adjustment to 
all stocks would lead to an overestimation of the betas of actively traded securities. Following 
Buysschaert et al. (2004), we add one leading and three lagged coefficients to the market model for 
Belgian, thinly traded securities.  
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++=  Standard market model,  (2) 
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jtktmjkjjt RR εβα  Dimson-adjusted market model,  (3) 
where Rjt is the daily stock return for firm j on day t adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends and 
issues; Rmt and Rm,t+k are the daily value-weighed and dividend-adjusted returns of the market index on 
day t and day t+k respectively. Our benchmark index Rm is the Brussels All Shares Return Index. 
Next, the abnormal return to firm j on day t, ARjt, is calculated each day from the insider trading day 
(day 0) to 20 trading days after the event (day + 20):  
mtjjjtjt RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Standard market model, (4) 
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where jαˆ
 
and )k(jˆβ
 
are estimated by means of an OLS regression over an estimation window of 
160 trading days, going from day -160 to day -1. Since our results are reported for a pooled sample 
including both purchases and sales, the abnormal returns for insider sales are multiplied by minus one, 
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as insiders profit when securities outperform the market after a buy transaction and when stocks 
underperform the market after a sales transaction.  
Finally, to evaluate the event-specific cumulative abnormal performance from day 0 to day 20, the 
abnormal returns are summed over the time interval in question: 
 ∑
=
=
20
0t
jt)20,0(ij ARCAR , 
 
(6) 
where CARij(0,20) represents the cumulative abnormal return over 21 trading days for a particular event i 
of firm j.4 The latter is the dependent variable in equation (1).  
 
3.4.3. Measurement of corporate communication quality  
Corporate communication quality is measured using a disclosure rating awarded by the Belgian 
Association of Financial Analysts (BVFA). In particular, we measure the explanatory variable in 
equation (1) as the BVFA-score assigned to company j in the year in which the insider trade occurred. 
The BVFA is part of the European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies (EFFAS) and the 
Association of Certified International Investment Analysts (ACIIA). For the past 50 years, this 
organization has granted an “Award for the Best Financial Information”. According to the President of 
the BVFA, the purpose of the award is to “reward Belgian listed companies that stand out in terms of 
financial communication policy, transparency and investor relations”.  
Each year, a group of financial analysts and fund managers assigns the disclosure rating. More 
specifically, financial analysts evaluate companies on four different communication channels, i.e. 
annual reports, press releases, corporate websites and investor relation activities. In addition, fund 
managers also provide an appreciation of the investor relation activities from their point of view. Each 
communication channel is evaluated on different criteria. These criteria focus on different aspects of 
                                                     
4
 Obviously, a particular firm can have more than one insider trading event during the sample period. 
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quality and quantity tailored to the specific communication objectives of each channel. Annual reports, 
for example, are screened on the provision of key numerical items, the reliability and transparency of 
financial data, and the availability of information on products, services and markets and on strategy 
and long-term objectives. For press releases, scores are provided on the disclosure of half- and full-
year results, on whether explanations are given on the year-over-year evolution of these numbers, on 
the dissemination of other important information and on the timing of the press releases. Websites are 
judged on the presence of a financial calendar and an archive of annual reports and press releases, on 
the availability and preciseness of information on investor relation activities and corporate governance 
and on the navigation comfort of the website. Finally, investor relation activities are rated on, among 
other things, the quality of the guidance, consistency and reliability of the provided information, 
quickness of response to analysts’ questions, and the organization of analyst meetings, conference 
calls and client visits. In Appendix 3.A. a full overview of the evaluation criteria for each 
communication channel is provided.5  
For listed companies to qualify for the BVFA-award, obviously, a first criterion to be selected is that 
there is a sufficient number of analyst following the company.6 In a first stage, a preliminary 
questionnaire is sent to the companies themselves. The responses to the included factual questions are 
used to underpin the screening process and give a first indication about the willingness of companies 
to support financial communication. In a second stage, each company is screened in detail by financial 
analysts and fund managers on a company per company basis. In a third and final stage, the final 
results are compared and discussed within a panel of financial analysts that makes a decision on the 
final ranking.  
The use of analyst disclosure ratings as a measure of communication quality is well-established in 
prior literature. Studies focusing on U.S. listed companies generally use the AIMR-rating which 
strongly resembles the Belgian BVFA-rating (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993,1996; Welker, 1995; 
Sengupta, 1998; Healy et al., 1999; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Nagar et al., 2003; Brown and 
                                                     
5
 Appendix 3.A. includes the evaluation criteria for the award of 2010. Criteria for all other years can be found on the website 
of the BVFA: www.bvfa.be.  
6
 A minimum of three analysts per company is imposed. 
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Hillegeist, 2007). In cross-country studies, the CIFAR7 (e.g. Salter, 1998; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; 
Hope, 2003; Bushman and Smith, 2001) or S&P index (e.g. Patel et al., 2002; Khanna et al., 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005: Litvak, 2007) are often applied. A general advantage of using externally-
developed disclosure ratings is that these do not involve judgment by the researcher(s) in question. 
This facilitates the verification of research results and the application of the rating in other research 
designs (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Furthermore, unlike researchers, analysts also have access to 
unpublished and sometimes informal information disclosed during analyst meetings and conference 
calls (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts are also regarded as the primary and most influential users of 
corporate communication as they communicate with companies on a daily basis (e.g. Schipper, 1991; 
Hirst et al., 1995; Revsine et al., 2004; IASB, 2005). This gives them the expertise and experience to 
objectively evaluate the quality of corporate disclosures.  
For studies using researcher-developed instead of externally-developed disclosure indices, two main 
approaches can be distinguished, i.e. content analysis (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994; Aerts et al., 2007) or a 
dichotomous scoring mechanism where an item is given a score of one if it is disclosed and a score of 
zero otherwise (e.g. Bollen et al., 2006; Trabelsi et al., 2008). Both approaches, however, have several 
drawbacks. A major issue related to content analysis is the determination of the unit of analysis, i.e. 
words, sentences, paragraphs, etc. (Bravo et al., 2009). Studies which have applied content analysis 
often also claim to not only measure the quantity of communication but also the quality as they 
assume that quantity and quality are positively related. Obviously, a higher number of sentences or 
words does not necessarily imply that higher-quality information is provided (Bravo et al., 2009). A 
potential drawback for studies using a dichotomous scoring mechanism is that researchers have to rely 
on prior studies and/or survey evidence in an attempt to select items which are considered useful by 
investors, financial analysts and standard setters. Furthermore, the disclosure score is obtained by 
counting the number of disclosed items. Consequently, again only the quantity of disclosures is taken 
into account. Some studies have attempted to incorporate the quality of disclosures by assigning 
weights. These weights are subjectively determined by the researcher in question (e.g. Aerts et al., 
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 CIFAR stands for Center for International Financial Analysis and Research 
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2007) or based on surveys among practitioners (e.g. Bollen et al., 2006). Finally, a general 
disadvantage of both approaches is the labor-intensity. As a consequence, studies using these 
researcher-developed disclosure indices have a tendency to focus on one specific communication 
channel whereas the AIMR and BVFA-rating both evaluate the overall communication quality by 
taking multiple disclosure channels into account. The latter is an important advantage of both analyst 
disclosure scores as different communication channels may be used as complements or substitutes of 
each other (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
A potential drawback of analyst disclosure scores is that analysts’ personal motivations may bring bias 
to the assigned ratings. However, the BVFA is aware of this possibility and imposes several control 
mechanisms to enhance to objectivity of the rating. First, companies are individually evaluated by 
more than one financial analyst and only summary scores are presented. This reduces the opportunity 
and incentives for an individual analyst to provide a more positive evaluation than warranted in order 
to gain favor with company management (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Second, evaluations are based 
on a checklist of criteria constructed by the BVFA in consultation with their members. Analysts 
cannot make their evaluations capriciously as they have to provide a written justification for each item 
where they score a company’s disclosure policy above or below average. To further exclude any errors 
in the analyst ratings, an ex post and ad hoc verification is performed by BVFA board members and 
the top-ranked companies are subjected to an additional evaluation before a panel of financial analysts 
makes a decision on the definitive ranking.  
A specific advantage of the BVFA-rating against other analyst ratings is that it also evaluates the 
quality of communication by smaller companies. In 2007, for example, the sample of screened 
companies consisted of 18 members of the Belgian blue-chip index (i.e. Bel20-index), 18 midcaps and 
13 smallcaps. For these smaller companies, information asymmetries between insiders and other 
market participants are potentially larger, which makes high-quality communication even more 
necessary (BVFA press release, 2010). Furthermore, the BVFA-rating has been granted annually 
between 1951 and 2010. This differs from CIFAR and S&P ratings which are only published 
intermittently making it impossible to evaluate the year-over-year evolution of a specific company. 
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Furthermore, CIFAR and AIMR-rating were no longer published after 1995 and 1996 respectively. As 
a consequence, researchers have raised concerns about the applicability of these scores in 
contemporary studies since disclosure requirements have substantially changed over time (Hussainey 
et al., 2003; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Ertimur, 2007). 
Like the AIMR-rating, BVFA-scores provide a comprehensive evaluation of corporate communication 
quality, including both quantitative and qualitative criteria. This is an important advantage compared 
to researcher-based indices and the CIFAR and S&P-index which generally focus on the number of 
disclosed items and not on disclosure content.  
Finally, for this country-specific study, the BVFA-rating is preferred above cross-country indices as it 
covers a broad range of Belgian listed companies. In particular, the BVFA-sample on average includes 
50 companies each year, while only 8 Belgian companies were included in the S&P index of 2002 
(Khanna et al., 2004).  
 
3.4.4. Control variables  
A number of control variables which are assumed to influence the profitability of insider trading are 
included in the regression. The first control variable is the size of the transaction (TradeSize), which is 
equal to the value of the net transaction scaled by the market value of the company at the beginning of 
the fiscal year.8 This control variable is included because larger transactions are assumed to signal 
stronger beliefs in the future performance of the company (Karpoff, 1987). Thus, if insiders are in 
possession of higher-quality information, we expect this to be reflected in a larger proportion of the 
firm being traded.  
Second, we control for the size of the firm (FirmSize), which is measured by the log of the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. A higher potential for information asymmetry is 
expected in smaller companies (Grant, 1980; Collins et al., 1987; Bhushan, 1989). These firms 
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 Jenter (2005) argues it is preferable to measure trade size relative to some measure of wealth or total equity instead of using 
absolute trade size. The former is assumed to be a more relevant measure of trading behavior. 
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experience less extensive analyst following (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Barth et al., 
2001) and media coverage (Fang and Peress, 2009), which makes it easier for insiders of small 
companies to have greater informational benefits. In support of this reasoning, Seyhun (1986), 
Finnerty (1976), and Betzer and Theissen (2009), for example, documented that abnormal trading 
profits have a negative relation with the size of the company. Also Lakonishok and Lee (2001) found 
that insider purchases predict future returns only in small companies. Accordingly, we expect 
abnormal profits to be negatively associated with firm size.  
The third control variable we include is the market-to-book ratio (MarketToBook) calculated as the 
ratio of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, both measured at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. This variable controls for a firm’s investment opportunity set as firms with a higher 
market-to-book ratio are assumed to have more unrecognized intangible assets and valuable research 
and development projects. As a result, these growth firms are characterized by a greater uncertainty 
regarding their fundamental value, allowing insiders to have greater informational benefits with 
respect to future prospects and cash flows (Dierkens, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992). Accordingly, we 
expect a larger amount of privileged information to be available to insiders of high market-to-book 
companies. On the other hand, previous studies have also documented that insiders act as contrarian 
investors who take the under- or overvaluation by the market into account (e.g. Rozeff and Zaman, 
1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005; Gregory et al., 2009). More specifically, these studies 
assume that low market-to-book values signal undervaluation and thus good future stock market 
performance, while high market-to-book ratios are associated with bad future share performance as 
they signal overvaluation. If insiders act as contrarian investors, we expect insiders of low market-to-
book firms to earn higher abnormal profits.  
A fourth control variable is the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year (Leverage). We 
include this variable to control for the proportion of external debt financing in a firm’s capital 
structure. Agency theory assumes that disclosure increases with the amount of external financing 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In particular, levered firms try to reduce agency costs by disseminating 
more information, while creditors also produce additional information about the borrower in question 
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(Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). In line with this conjecture, Frankel and Li (2004) argue that firms with 
more external financing issue more earnings forecasts in order to reduce information asymmetry. In 
addition, Bradbury (1992) found that a larger amount of voluntary segment information was disclosed 
by highly-levered firms. Hossain et al. (1995) extended this research and documented a positive 
association between the total amount of voluntary disclosed information and the ratio of long-term 
debt-to-equity. Based on these findings, we argue that insiders in highly-levered firms earn lower 
abnormal returns.  
Fifth, we include a dummy variable Sale equal to one if an insider executes a sales transaction and 
zero otherwise. In general, previous literature suggests that purchases are more informative than sales 
because sales transactions are not always driven by a profit objective but may also result from 
diversification or liquidity needs of the seller (Lakonhishok and Lee, 2001). However, in a setting with 
highly concentrated ownership, sales might be more profitable, because controlling shareholders limit 
sales transactions for fear of losing control and only sell as a result of negative future prospects. In 
addition, purchases by insiders of companies with concentrated ownership probably have a lower 
information content because they are often control-induced. As a consequence, for Belgian insiders, 
we expect higher abnormal returns for sales transactions.  
Next, we control for the effect of cross-listing (Cross-listing) using a dummy variable equal to one if a 
company is listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. According to the bonding 
hypothesis, cross-listing subjects companies to domestic as well as foreign regulatory requirements 
(Coffee, 1999; Coffee, 2002). Consequently, the additional and potentially stricter regulations likely 
mitigate the opportunities for insiders and controlling shareholders to exploit their informational 
benefits at the expense of other shareholders (Sami and Zhou, 2008; Chang and Corbitt, 2012). 
Moreover, cross-listing is expected to further reduce the level of information asymmetry by enhancing 
firm visibility through greater analyst following, increased disclosure requirements, a more thorough 
investor monitoring and an increased media coverage (e.g. Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003, 2004; 
Lambert et al., 2006). Supporting these assumptions, prior studies by Korzak and Lasfer (2008) and 
Chang and Corbitt (2012) found that insiders in cross-listed companies earn less abnormal returns 
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compared to insiders in domestically-listed companies. Consequently, given the above findings, we 
expect potential gains from insider trading to be lower in companies cross-listed on a foreign stock 
exchange.  
Finally, we control for a company’s ownership structure (OwnershipConc) proxied by the percentage 
of shares held by the five largest shareholders. Generally, incentives for shareholders to monitor 
corporate insiders are elevated in companies with a concentrated ownership structure as supervisory 
costs are expected to be lower in such companies (Del Brio and Perote, 2007). However, this increased 
monitoring may not result in a lower level of information asymmetry as the interests of large 
shareholders and minority shareholders are not necessarily aligned (Betzer and Theissen, 2009). In 
particular, controlling shareholders might use their power to obtain representation in the board of 
directors and acquire inside information. Accordingly, the information asymmetry problem between 
managers and controlling shareholders on the one hand and minority shareholders on the other hand 
might even enlarge (Demsetz, 1986). Empirically, support for both propositions has been found. 
Betzer and Theissen (2009) provided evidence of larger abnormal returns in widely held companies, 
while Demsetz (1986) reported higher abnormal returns in companies with controlling share 
ownership. In light of this mixed evidence, we do not make any a priori assumptions on the relation 
between insider trading profitability and ownership structure.  
 
3.5. Sample selection  
The insider trading data were obtained upon request from the FSMA, which is entrusted with the 
supervision of the Belgian stock market. Since 2005, insiders are required to report their transactions 
to this authority within five business days following the execution. This legislation is based on 
the 2003 European Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation (i.e. the Market Abuse 
Directive) and is similar to the requirements on other stock markets including the U.S.9 The database 
                                                     
9
 Examples of other reporting requirements are New Zealand: continuous disclosure of trades by all insiders (Tourani-Rad et 
al., 2003); Poland: 24-hours disclosure deadline (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005); Italy: no disclosure required when total 
quarterly cumulative transactions is below €50,000, quarterly disclosure when between €50,000 and €250,000, and disclosure 
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includes all insider trades reported between May 2006 and August 2010. The fact that transactions are 
reported does, however, not guarantee that no illegal transactions are included in our sample as the 
distinction between legal and illegal transactions is made based on the fact whether transactions are 
inspired by inside information or not.10  
The annual BVFA-disclosure scores were gathered from the association’s website. For each individual 
company the yearly total score is disclosed as well as the subscores on four individual communication 
channels, i.e. annual reports, press releases, corporate websites and investor relation activities. 
Information on cross-listing and the daily return index for Belgian listed companies was collected 
from Datastream. Data on the Brussels All Shares Return Index were obtained from Euronext 
Brussels.11 Furthermore, data on company size, market-to-book and debt-to-asset ratios were gathered 
from Worldscope. The Belfirst database of Bureau Van Dijk was used to collect data on ownership 
structure.  
The initial insider trading database included 4,889 transactions reported by insiders of 138 different 
companies from May 2006 through August 2010. The database was filtered based on several sample 
selection criteria. First, our study focuses only on open market purchases and sales. We expect over-
the-counter transactions to be mainly inter-insider trades, which are not driven by an informational 
benefit. Moreover, private transactions lack a market-determined price (Finnerty, 1976), which leads 
to a potentially large deviation between the negotiated and quoted stock price. Since the calculation of 
abnormal returns is based on market-determined prices, this could introduce a serious bias in the 
estimation of insiders’ abnormal gains.  
Second, trades involving the acquisition, exercise or conversion of options, warrants, or scripts, were 
filtered out. We expect these transactions to be less plausible to be information-motivated. For 
                                                                                                                                                                     
within three business days when above €250,000 (Bajo et al., 2009); U.K.: insiders must report as soon as possible and no 
later than five business days after the transaction (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), in addition a black-out period before earnings 
announcements is imposed (Betzer and Theissen, 2009); U.S.: reporting no later than two days following the transaction 
(Cheng et al., 2007). 
10
 Following the European Market Abuse Directive, the Belgian law defines inside information as “any information of a 
precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments 
or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related financial instruments” (Law of 2 August 2002, art. 2). 
11
 We are grateful to Euronext Brussels for providing the data on the Brussels All Shares Return Index 
(ISIN: BE0389550956). 
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example, regarding the exercise of stock options, a study by Ofek and Yermack (2000) documented 
that option exercises are highly correlated with the subsequent sale of the underlying securities. 
Huddart and Ke (2007) therefore claim that the exercise-event should be excluded from the sample in 
order to avoid double counting.  
Third, transactions were deleted if they were reported before the execution. The regulatory objective 
of the notification duty is to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and other market 
participants as the knowledge of insider trades provides valuable information (Givoly and Palmon, 
1985). Consequently, once transactions are reported, we no longer expect abnormal trading profits as 
prices have already adjusted to the previous release of this information.  
Fourth, transactions not reported in euro were also deleted. This approach is consistent with other 
insider trading studies and intends to prevent bias in the calculation of abnormal returns due to the 
evolution of the underlying currency. In particular, the abnormal returns calculated in insider trading 
studies are a measure of the advantage insiders have in terms of superior inside knowledge or because 
they are more familiar with their company and its environment. However, when transactions in a 
foreign currency are transformed into euro transactions, the evolution of the underlying currency 
influences the magnitude of the abnormal returns and thus the measurement of the profits earned by 
insiders. As the currency evolution is a priori unknown to insiders, the calculated abnormal returns 
may give a biased picture of the informational advantage of insiders.  
Fifth, transactions were filtered out if the company involved is not included in the Brussels All Shares 
index. This index is used as the benchmark index in the calculation of abnormal returns. Transactions 
were therefore removed in order to avoid bias in the calculation of these returns.  
If more than one trade was executed on the same day by the same or different insiders from the same 
company, net transactions were calculated. First, we sum the transaction size of all purchases and sales 
respectively. Next, the total value of sold securities is deducted from the total value of purchased 
securities.  
 87 
Furthermore, net transactions less than 20 trading days apart were deleted from the sample to filter out 
noise due to successive trades. If no adjustment for event-clustering is made, the cumulative abnormal 
returns will not only capture the price reaction related to the transaction in question, but also to other 
trades carried out later within the event window. These adjustments for netting and event-clustering 
are consistent with other insider trading studies (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Friederich et al., 
2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009). 
To be included in the sample, companies were also required to be listed 160 trading days prior to the 
event date and 20 days thereafter in order to prevent missing data problems. Next, we filtered out 
transactions with a net transaction size equal to zero. In addition, because a disclosure rating is not 
available for all Belgian listed companies, the sample was further reduced by eliminating all 
transactions of companies for which no disclosure rating was reported. Finally, transactions were 
deleted due to missing data with regard to the control variables. In Table 3.1. an overview is provided 
of the applied filters and the number of deleted insider transactions.  
 
Table 3.1.  Sample selection 
Initial sample  4,889 
Applied filters: 
- over-the-counter transactions 1,241 
- trades not involving buying and selling of common shares 369 
- trades reported before execution 5 
- trades not reported in euro 27 
- trades of companies not included in benchmark 128 
- net transactions 488 
- event clustering adjustment 1,760 
- missing stock price data  16 
- net trade value equal to 0  5 
- not in BVFA sample  430 
- missing data on control variables  13 
Final sample     407 
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3.6. Descriptive statistics 
The application of the above filters resulted in a final sample of 407 firm-event observations. The 
sample consists of 199 net purchases and 208 net sales reported by insiders of 52 different companies. 
Additional descriptive statistics at company-level are provided in Table 3.2. This table shows that 
insiders of a particular company on average earn an abnormal return of 1.14%, the median being 
0.89%. This indicates that insider trading is, on average, profitable on the Belgian stock market. 
Furthermore, a high standard deviation is observed with regard to the total BVFA-scores. This 
indicates that there is much variety in corporate communication quality across companies. The lowest 
standard deviation is observed with respect to corporate websites. The quality of web disclosures thus 
  
Table 3.2.  Descriptive statistics (company-level) 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
       Dependent variable  
      
CARj(0,20) 1.14 3.88 
 
-1.19 0.89 3.72 
Explanatory variables 
CommunicationQualityj 307.44 51.40 
 
274.21 310.64 344.91 
AnnualReportj 59.03 13.52 
 
50.00 60.00 67.75 
PressReleasej 55.89 17.49 
 
44.75 55.17 69.63 
Websitej 68.53 10.02 
 
61.63 68.50 75.38 
InvestorRelationsj 124.26 20.37 
 
114.83 123.13 135.13 
       
Control variables 
      
TradeSizej 0.07 0.13 
 
0.01 0.02 0.06 
FirmSizej 6.80 1.62 
 
5.56 6.47 7.84 
MarketToBookj 2.40 2.06 
 
1.28 1.63 2.47 
Leveragej 24.62 18.10 
 
8.89 24.55 37.49 
Salej 0.48 0.36 
 
0.13 0.50 0.82 
Cross-listingj 0.73 0.45 
 
0.00 1.00 1.00 
OwnershipConcj 54.04 23.68   36.57 52.42 66.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics on company-level (N=52). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus one. 
CARj(0,20) is equal to the average cumulative abnormal return for company j. Abnormal returns were measured using a standard 
market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. CommunicationQualityj, AnnualReportj, 
PressReleasej, Websitej, and InvestorRelationsj respectively represent the average disclosure quality score of company j over the 
sample period for the total disclosure strategy (score on 500), annual reports (score on 100), press releases (score on 100), corporate 
websites (score on 100) and investor relation activities (score on 200) awarded to Belgian listed companies by the BVFA. TradeSizej 
is equal to the average eurovalue of the net transactions from company j divided by the market value of the company at the 
beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSizej is equal to the average of the log of the market value of the company j 
expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBookj is equal to the average ratio of the market value of the company j divided by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leveragej is equal to the average debt-to-asset ratio of 
company j at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Salej is equal to the average proportion of net sales 
transactions for company j. Cross-listingj is a dummy variable equal to one if a company is cross-listed in 2010 and zero otherwise. 
OwnershipConcj is equal to the average percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders of company j. 
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seems relatively most uniform across companies. Also, corporate websites seem to score the highest 
on the evaluation by financial analysts. Table 3.2. further shows that, on average, only a small 
proportion of the company (0.07%) is traded by insiders. The average (median) firm size is equal to 
6.80 (6.47) million euros. Unreported results show that the market value of equity ranges from 4.20 to 
10.58 million euros, providing evidence of both small and large companies being incorporated in the 
sample. The market-to-book ratio is on average equal to 2.40%, while the median ratio is equal to 
1.63%. The average (median) debt-to-asset ratio is equal to 24.62% (24.55%). On average, 48% of the 
transactions within a particular company are net sales, the median being 50%. Furthermore, the 
majority of sample companies is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange. Finally, the five largest 
shareholders of companies included in our sample on average hold 54.04% of all shares.  
Tables 3.3. and 3.4. provide some additional descriptive statistics on the BVFA-scores and their 
evolution between 2006 and 2010. In order to calculate these descriptives, we retained one firm-
observation each year. This resulted in a total sample of 143 observations.12 Table 3.3. containing the 
summary statistics on the total BVFA-scores indicates that the average and median quality of 
corporate communication is rather stable between 2006 and 2010. The highest and lowest score earned 
by a company in which insiders have traded shares was recorded in 2007. In Table 3.4. descriptives 
are reported on the separate communication channels. Comparing median and mean scores between 
these channels, the quality of annual reports and press releases is generally worse than the quality of  
 
Table 3.3.  Descriptive statistics on the total BVFA-score 
Year N   Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max 
2006 19 352.76 37.67 273.77 363.14 403.34 
2007 36 308.59 55.58 98.50 323.51 421.88 
2008 37 305.42 47.99 202.92 315.90 388.56 
2009 27 310.00 48.90 196.00 317.43 393.46 
2010 24 311.96 46.88 217.55 305.09 391.75 
Total 143   314.47 50.50 98.50 320.64 421.88 
                                                     
12
 The number of 143 observations for the BVFA descriptives differs from the number of 52 unique sample companies as a 
particular company may have qualified for screening by the BVFA in multiple years.  
  
 
 
Table 3.4.  Descriptive statistics on the separate communication channels  
    AnnualReport    PressRelease 
Year N   Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max   Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max 
              
2006 19 70.79 7.58 54.00 72.00 86.00 68.68 16.65 30.00 70.00 100.00 
2007 36 60.86 14.26 13.00 62.50 90.00 54.94 21.42 5.00 61.00 90.00 
2008 37 57.76 14.33 30.00 60.00 85.00 58.73 16.12 20.00 60.00 90.00 
2009 27 56.15 16.50 13.00 58.00 84.00 57.78 16.46 15.00 60.00 85.00 
2010 24 54.96 13.29 33.00 55.50 82.00 58.04 15.78 38.00 55.50 87.00 
Total 143 59.50 14.56 13.00 60.00 90.00 58.80 17.92 5.00 61.00 100.00 
              
    Website   InvestorRelations 
Year N   Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max   Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max 
              
2006 19 71.63 7.96 52.00 72.00 84.00 141.79 15.49 112.00 143.00 163.00 
2007 36 68.86 10.42 38.00 70.00 85.00 124.17 23.83 43.00 123.00 162.00 
2008 37 69.22 11.17 45.00 69.00 86.00 119.97 19.77 82.00 122.00 162.00 
2009 27 70.52 11.33 48.00 71.00 88.00 125.81 15.58 98.00 125.00 151.00 
2010 24 71.83 8.67 58.00 71.50 87.00 127.46 20.77 84.00 131.50 168.00 
              
Total 143   70.13 10.17 38.00 71.00 88.00   126.29 20.68 43.00 126.00 168.00 
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websites and investor relation activities.13 In addition, the quality of annual reports and press releases 
seems to diminish over time, while the quality of websites and investor relations improves. In 2006, 
one sample company earned the maximum score on press release. The lowest score for press releases 
was recorded in 2007, when one company only scored 5 points out of 100. Comparing standard 
deviations, Table 3.4. indicates that the largest quality differences are observed between press releases. 
The quality of websites on the other hand is most uniform over our sample companies, confirming our 
finding based on the company-level descriptive statistics.  
Table 3.5. reports Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients of the regression variables. The 
highly significant negative correlation between the total disclosure score and insiders’ abnormal 
profits seems to indicate that higher-quality communication contributes to reducing insider trading 
profitability. Comparing the correlation between insider trading profitability and the four separate 
disclosure scores, only press releases and investor relation activities seem to be significantly correlated 
with insiders’ abnormal profits. The separate disclosure scores are furthermore all highly correlated 
with the total score and positively correlated with each other. The latter finding shows a certain 
consistency within the communication strategy of companies. Companies do not seem to devote their 
efforts to one particular communication channel, but enhance the quality of all forms of corporate 
communication simultaneously.  
 
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. The impact of the overall corporate communication quality on insider trading 
profitability 
Table 3.6. reports the OLS regression results with regard to the overall communication quality. These 
results generally support our expectations regarding the control variables. First, with respect to 
TradeSize, we find a positive relation between transaction size and insiders’ gains (Karpoff, 1987). If 
                                                     
13
 For investor relation activities scores are provided on 200 as this channels is rated by financial analysts as well as fund 
managers. For all other channels, the maximum score is equal to 100.  
  
 
Table 3.5.  Spearman and Pearson correlations 
  
CARij(0,20) 
Comm. 
Quality 
Annual 
Report 
Press 
Release Website 
Investor 
Relations 
Trade 
Size 
Firm 
Size 
Market 
ToBook Leverage Sale 
Cross 
Listing 
Ownership 
Conc 
CARij(0,20) 
 
-0.13 * -0.08 
 
-0.14 * -0.05 
 
-0.11 * 0.09 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.09 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
 
-0.10 * 0.02 
 CommunicationQuality -0.14 * 
 
0.73 * 0.78 * 0.78 * 0.74 * -0.14 * 0.44 * -0.06 
 
0.08 
 
0.10 * 0.33 * -0.27 * 
AnnualReport -0.03 
 
0.66 * 
 
0.39 * 0.54 * 0.37 * -0.08 
 
0.42 * -0.24 * 0.13 * 0.10 * 0.12 * -0.05 
 
PressRelease -0.13 * 0.74 * 0.38 * 
 
0.59 * 0.34 * -0.17 * 0.45 * 0.04 
 
0.11 * -0.04 
 
0.43 * -0.22 * 
Website -0.08 
 
0.77 * 0.50 * 0.56 * 
 
0.41 * -0.10 
 
0.38 * -0.27 * 0.09 
 
-0.02 
 
0.29 
 
-0.19 * 
InvestorRelations -0.14 * 0.73 * 0.29 * 0.30 * 0.39 * 
 
-0.07 
 
0.13 * 0.13 * -0.04 
 
0.23 * 0.16 * -0.31 * 
TradeSize 0.01 
 
-0.18 * -0.16 * -0.08 
 
-0.13 * -0.14 * 
 
-0.12 * 0.14 * 0.05 
 
0.06 
 
-0.01 
 
0.09 
 
FirmSize -0.08 
 
0.49 * 0.41 * 0.49 * 0.43 * 0.18 * -0.28 * 
 
0.06 
 
0.30 * 0.15 * 0.31 * 0.15 * 
MarketToBook -0.04 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.20 * -0.02 
 
-0.29 * 0.11 * 0.09 
 
0.26 * 
 
0.07 
 
0.30 * 0.11 * 0.06 
 
Leverage 0.07 
 
0.05 
 
0.17 * 0.05 
 
0.08 
 
-0.11 * -0.01 
 
0.31 * 0.03 
  
-0.04 
 
-0.06 
 
0.29 * 
Sale 0.05 
 
0.11 * 0.10 * -0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
0.20 * -0.02 
 
0.15 * 0.38 * -0.03 
  
0.06 
 
0.04 
 Cross-listing -0.10 * 0.31 * 0.09 
 
0.40 * 0.24 * 0.23 * -0.08 
 
0.36 * 0.05 
 
-0.09 
 
0.06 
  
-0.27 * 
OwnershipConc 0.05   -0.27 * -0.02   -0.21 * -0.22 * -0.35 * 0.06   0.14 * 0.28 * 0.36 * 0.04   -0.28 *     
Notes: Spearman (below diagonal) and Pearson (above diagonal) correlations for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return 
measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus one. 
CommunicationQuality, AnnualReport, PressRelease, Website, and InvestorRelations respectively represent the disclosure quality score on 100 for the total disclosure strategy, annual reports, press 
releases, corporate websites and investor relation activities awarded to Belgian listed companies by the BVFA. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the 
company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. 
MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset 
ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is dummy variable equal one if a company 
is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. * denotes two-tailed significance at the 0.05 level.  
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insiders put a higher proportion of their stock ownership at stake, they earn higher abnormal profits. 
This finding is consistent with Seyhun (1986) and Cheuk et al. (2006).14 Second, our results also show 
that FirmSize is negatively associated with the profitability of insider trading.152This finding seems to 
confirm that there is a higher potential for information asymmetry in smaller companies (Seyhun, 
1986; Cheuk et al., 2006). Third, the market-to-book ratio (MarketToBook) is negatively associated 
with abnormal profits. This finding indicates that investing in undervalued securities yields positive 
abnormal returns, while investing in overvalued securities yields negative abnormal returns. 
 
Table 3.6.  OLS regression results: total disclosure score 
  Expected 
sign 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Variables  Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. 
                
 
   
Constant ? 5.536 *** 2.09 11.970 *** 3.61 
TradeSize + 4.494 * 2.73 4.136 * 2.76 
FirmSize - -0.460 ** 0.25 -0.204 0.25 
MarketToBook ? -0.408 *** 0.14 -0.450 *** 0.16 
Leverage  - 0.014 0.02 0.017 0.02 
Sale + 1.580 *** 0.63 1.767 *** 0.60 
Cross-listing - -1.739 * 1.34 -1.319 1.28 
OwnershipConc ? 0.330 0.01 -0.984 0.01 
CommunicationQuality - -0.123 ** 0.01 
Observations 407 407 
R² 0.04 0.05 
R² adj 0.02 0.03 
F-stat 3.60 3.82 
P-value     0.00       0.00     
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are 
multiplied by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market 
model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. CommunicationQuality represents the 
disclosure quality score on 100 points awarded to Belgian listed companies by the BVFA. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the 
net transactions divided by the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is 
equal to the log of the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook 
is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year 
expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale 
is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is dummy variable equal one if a 
company is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage of shares held by 
the five largest shareholders. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are two-
tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
 
                                                     
14 Similar results are obtained when measuring trade size as the percentage of the number of shares traded relative to the 
number of shares outstanding. 
152Similar results are obtained when using alternative measures for company size. 
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Furthermore, Leverage, which measures the proportion of external financing, does not seem to affect 
the magnitude of insiders’ profits. With regard to the profitability of sales transactions, our results 
provide evidence that sales (Sale) yield substantially higher abnormal returns compared to purchases. 
This result is consistent with other studies performed in countries with highly concentrated ownership 
structures (e.g. Cheuk et al., 2006). Furthermore, support is also found for the bonding hypothesis as 
cross-listing (Cross-listing) on foreign stock exchanges negatively influences the magnitude of 
insiders’ abnormal returns. Finally, the ownership structure (OwnershipConc) does not seem to affect 
the profitability of insider trading.  
With regard to our main research question, model 2 of Table 3.6. shows a highly significant negative 
coefficient on disclosure quality. This finding implies that high-quality corporate communication is 
effective in reducing information asymmetry and the profitability of insider trading, consistent with 
hypothesis 1.163  
 
3.7.2.  The impact of the quality of individual communication channels on insider trading 
profitability  
Next, we evaluate whether the individual communication channels have a different impact on reducing 
the informational benefits of insiders.174To investigate this proposition, we first performed four 
separate regression analyses containing the control variables and the disclosure score on the respective 
communication channel (Table 3.7., models 3 to 6). It must be noted that, although the BVFA values 
investor relation activities twice as important as the other communication channels, we standardized 
all disclosure scores to a score on 100 for reasons of comparability.  
In general, the regression results in Table 3.7. are consistent with hypothesis 2 and show that the 
influence of disclosure quality differs across communication channels. First, our results show that the 
                                                     
163Similar results are obtained when no adjustment for overlapping event windows is applied. Results are available upon 
request. 
174It must be noted that we do not investigate the relation between insiders’ abnormal returns and the content or quality of a 
particular disclosure. As such, we do not investigate the reaction of insiders to good or bad news. Our analysis only evaluates 
whether the average quality of all disclosures through a specific communication channel during a fiscal year affects the 
abnormal returns from insider trading 
 95 
quality of corporate websites does not seem to affect the level of information asymmetry and the 
resulting insider trading returns (model 5). Contrary to all other communications, website disclosures 
are not directly and primarily aimed at the investor community. In addition, the quality of websites and 
web disclosures is rather uniform across companies, which limits the opportunities to have a decisive 
impact on insiders’ informational benefits. Second, models 3 and 4 of Table 3.7. report significant 
negative coefficients on AnnualReports and PressReleases. This finding suggests that the quality of 
these communication channels has an impact on the profitability of insider trading. The most 
important tool in reducing insiders’ trading gains and getting valuable information across to the 
investor community, however, seems to be a firm’s interactions with financial analysts and fund 
managers as suggested by the coefficient on InvestorRelations (model 6). The information 
communicated through investor relation activities is typically informal, unaudited and not subject to 
litigation. However, as suggested by Brown and Hillegeist (2007), the credibility of investor relation 
activities might be enhanced by reputational concerns of managers.  
Following the approach of Botosan and Plumlee (2002), we also performed a regression analysis 
including the disclosure score on all communication channels (Table 3.7., model 7). The authors found 
that, although the correlation between individual communication channels might induce 
multicollinearity, not controlling for other types of disclosure might lead to a correlated omitted 
variable bias and erroneous conclusions regarding the impact of a particular communication channel. 
However, we do not expect any multicollinearity problems in the aggregated regression model 
(model 7) as the correlations between the independent variables reported in Table 3.5. are below the 
0.7 limit identified by Kervin (1992). In addition, VIF values are well below the recommended cutoff 
of 10 (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006). Regression results in model 7 confirm our previous results.  
In sum, our regression results seem to indicate that the content and quality of annual reports and press 
releases has a comparable impact on the level of information asymmetry. Furthermore, they suggest 
that the disclosure quality of investor relation activities has the largest contribution to the reduction of 
  
 
Table 3.7.  OLS regression results: individual disclosure scores 
  Expected 
sign 
  Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   Model 7 
Variables  Coef. s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. VIF 
                
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
  
 
Constant ? 8.347 *** 2.62 6.853 *** 2.18 7.460 *** 3.41 11.940 *** 3.60 10.290 *** 3.41 
TradeSize + 4.536 ** 2.82 4.046 * 2.65 4.497 * 2.75 4.260 * 2.73 3.953 * 2.64 1.08 
FirmSize - -0.252 0.26 -0.299 0.25 -0.399 * 0.24 -0.389 * 0.24 -0.234 0.26 1.76 
MarketToBook ? -0.507 *** 0.17 -0.395 *** 0.15 -0.443 *** 0.15 -0.377 *** 0.15 -0.376 *** 0.15 1.53 
Leverage  - 0.017 0.02 0.016 0.02 0.015 0.02 0.015 0.02 0.017 0.02 1.22 
Sale + 1.823 *** 0.63 1.416 ** 0.63 1.595 *** 0.62 1.947 *** 0.64 1.901 *** 0.65 1.25 
Cross-listing - -1.770 * 1.25 -1.179 1.35 -1.595 1.41 -1.740 * 1.25 -1.580 1.23 1.41 
OwnershipConc ? -0.101 0.01 -0.292 -0.98 0.094 0.01 -0.909 0.01 -0.011 0.01 1.40 
AnnualReport - -0.065 ** 0.04 -0.047 * 0.04 1.75 
PressRelease - -0.043 ** 0.02 -0.035 * 0.02 2.10 
Website - -0.032 0.04 0.063 0.06 2.26 
InvestorRelations - -0.101 ** 0.04 -0.085 ** 0.04 1.59 
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 
R² 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
R² adj. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
F-stat. 3.70 3.18 3.27 3.72 3.21 
P-value     0.00       0.01       0.00       0.00       0.00     
  
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific 
cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. AnnualReport, PressRelease, Website, and 
InvestorRelations respectively represent the disclosure quality score on 100 for annual reports, press releases, corporate websites and investor relation activities awarded by the BVFA to company j in the 
year of the insider trade. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal 
to the log of the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable 
equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal one if a company is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal 
to the number of shares held by the five largest shareholders. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. VIF are the Variance Inflation Factors. Significance levels are two-tailed 
when ‘Expected sign’ is a ‘?’ and one-tailed otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
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information asymmetry and the resulting abnormal trading profits.18 This communication channel is 
aimed directly at the investor community and exhibits a substantial level of discretion. This provides 
companies with more degrees of freedom to customize their disclosures to the investors’ needs. 
Possibly, the importance of this voluntary disclosure channel is further enhanced by the broad range of 
disseminated information as well as the high degree of timeliness.  
 
3.8. Robustness checks  
In order to check the robustness of our results, we present some sensitivity analyses for the event study 
methodology. First, we re-examine the relation between corporate communication quality and insider 
trading profitability using cumulative abnormal returns only calculated by means of a standard market 
model instead of using a combination of a standard market model and a market model adjusted for thin 
trading. Results reported in Table 3.8., model 8 show that an alternative estimation of the insiders’ 
gains does not alter our conclusions.192Consistent with results in Table 3.6., we find a significant 
negative association between corporate communication quality and the abnormal insider trading 
profits.  
Second, we test whether our conclusions hold if alternative event windows are used and estimate the 
cumulative abnormal returns from day 0 to day 5 and day 10 respectively. Regression results are 
reported in models 9 and 10 of Table 3.8. They indicate that our results are not sensitive to the length 
of the event window. Again, we find support for hypothesis 1 and find that abnormal returns to 
insiders are significantly lower in companies with a higher communication quality.  
Furthermore, we also checked whether the results of our inquiry are potentially driven by fluctuations 
in the overall economic situation and investment climate. A study by Van Geyt et al. (2012), for 
example,  showed  that  the  turbulent market conditions and uncertain investment environment created 
                                                     
18
 Using alternative estimation windows for the cumulative abnormal returns does not alter our conclusions. Results are 
available upon request.  
192Also, results on the impact of different communication channels are similar when cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated using the standard market model.  
  
Table 3.8.  Robustness checks : Alternative estimation method and event windows  
  
Expected sign 
  Model 8 : CARMM ij(0,20)   Model 9 : CARij(0,5)   Model 10 : CARij(0,10) 
Variables  Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
        
 
           
Constant ? 11.717 *** 3.54 5.450 *** 1.25 6.920 *** 2.28 
TradeSize + 4.129 * 2.76 1.394 1.48 -0.601 1.00 
FirmSize - -0.193 0.25 -0.109 0.10 -0.159 0.16 
MarketToBook ? -0.446 *** 0.16 -0.119 0.11 -0.215 ** 0.11 
Leverage  - 0.017 0.02 0.017 0.01 0.023 0.01 
Sale + 1.726 *** 0.60 0.022 0.26 0.020 0.52 
Cross-listing - -1.300 1.29 -1.353 ** 0.71 -1.051 1.06 
OwnershipConc ? -0.009 0.01 -0.016 ** 0.01 -0.012 0.01 
CommunicationQuality - -0.121 ** 0.05 -0.036 ** 0.02 -0.055 * 0.04 
Observations 407 664 515 
R² 0.04 0.02 0.02 
R² adj. 0.02 0.01 0.01 
F-stat. 3.78 4.08 2.16 
P-value     0.00     
  
0.00       0.05 
    
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus one. CARMM ij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific 
cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model (Model 8). CARij(0,5) and CARij(0,10) are equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return from day 0 to day 5 or day 10 
respectively and are measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns (Models 9 and 10). CommunicationQuality represents the 
disclosure quality score on 100 points awarded by the BVFA to company j in the year of the insider trade. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of the 
company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. 
MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset 
ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is dummy variable equal one if a company 
is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and 
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10. 
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by the recent financial crisis enlarged the opportunities for insiders to exploit their informational 
benefit. Accordingly, the study evidenced that the magnitude of insiders’ trading profits was 
substantially higher during the years of the financial crisis. Following their approach, we included a 
dummy variable (FinancialCrisis) for transactions carried out during 2008 and 2009, the peak of the 
financial crisis in Belgium. Results reported in Tables 3.9. and 3.10. confirm the prior research results 
and show that insider trading was indeed more profitable during 2008 and 2009. In addition, our 
results on communication quality also hold when the FinancialCrisis-dummy is included as the 
overall communication quality and voluntary disclosure channels in particular still have a significant 
negative influence on insider trading profitability.  
 
Table 3.9.  Robustness check : OLS regression results on total disclosure score including 
FinancialCrisis-dummy 
    Model 11   Model 12 
Variables  Expected sign Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. 
                
 
   
Constant ? 4.720 ** 2.10 10.504 *** 3.62 
TradeSize + 4.694 ** 2.66 4.351 * 2.70 
FirmSize - -0.407 * 0.25 -0.189 
 
0.26 
MarketToBook ? -0.429 ** 0.16 -0.463 *** 0.17 
Leverage  - 0.009 
 
0.02 0.013 
 
0.02 
Sale + 1.964 *** 0.74 2.076 *** 0.70 
Cross-listing - -2.135 * 1.38 -1.710 * 1.34 
OwnershipConc ? 0.002 
 
0.01 -0.009 
 
0.01 
FinancialCrisis + 1.763 ** 0.86 1.518 ** 0.83 
CommunicationQuality - -0.109 ** 0.01 
        
 
 
Observations 407 407 
R² 0.04 0.05 
R² adj 0.02 0.03 
F-stat 3.38 3.62 
P-value     0.00       0.00     
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied 
by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-
adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. CommunicationQuality represents the disclosure quality score on 100 points 
awarded to Belgian listed companies by the BVFA. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market value of 
the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of the company at 
the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company 
divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at 
the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. 
Cross-listing is dummy variable equal one if a company is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is 
equal to the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. FinancialCrisis is a dummy variable equal to one for net trades 
executed in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are 
two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
  
Table 3.10.  Robustness check : OLS regression results on separate communication channels including FinancialCrisis-dummy 
  Expected 
sign 
  Model 13   Model 14   Model 15   Model 16   Model 17 
Variables  Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. Coef.   s.e. 
                
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
  
Constant ? 7.179 *** 2.64 6.003 *** 2.17 6.693 * 3.47 10.250 *** 3.48 9.101 ** 3.53 
TradeSize + 4.704 ** 2.75 4.258 * 2.58 4.697 ** 2.67 4.466 * 2.67 4.137 * 2.59 
FirmSize - -0.240 
 
0.26 -0.254 
 
0.26 -0.345 * 0.25 -0.355 * 0.25 -0.210 
 
0.27 
MarketToBook ? -0.509 *** 0.18 -0.416 ** 0.16 -0.465 *** 0.17 -0.399 ** 0.16 -0.396 ** 0.17 
Leverage  - 0.012 
 
0.02 0.011 
 
0.02 0.010 
 
0.02 0.010 
 
0.02 0.013 
 
0.02 
Sale + 2.119 *** 0.72 1.799 *** 0.74 1.980 *** 0.74 2.215 *** 0.72 2.117 *** 0.72 
Cross-listing - -2.111 * 1.31 -1.589 
 
1.39 -1.989 * 1.45 -2.075 * 1.30 -1.828 * 1.30 
OwnershipConc ? -0.001 
 
0.01 -0.004 
 
0.01 0.000 
 
0.01 -0.008 
 
0.01 -0.010 
 
0.01 
FinancialCrisis  + 1.539 ** 0.84 1.731 ** 0.84 1.768 ** 0.87 1.494 ** 0.82 1.347 ** 0.77 
AnnualReport - -0.054 * 0.04 
   
-0.039 
 
0.03 
PressRelease - 
 
-0.041 * 0.03 
  
-0.035 * 0.03 
Website - 
 
-0.033 
 
0.05 
 
0.051 
 
0.05 
InvestorRelations - 
 
-0.085 ** 0.04 -0.070 * 0.04 
                
 
   
 
 
Observations 407 407 407 407 
 
407 
 
R² 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 
0.05 
 
R² adj 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
F-stat 3.62 3.10 3.20 3.45 3.10 
 
P-value     0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00     
Notes: OLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=407). Abnormal returns for sales transactions are multiplied by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal 
return measured using a standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. AnnualReport, PressRelease, Website, and InvestorRelations respectively represent the 
disclosure quality score on 100 for annual reports, press releases, corporate websites and investor relation activities awarded to Belgian listed companies by the BVFA. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net 
transactions divided by the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year 
expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to 
the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is dummy variable equal one if a 
company is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. FinancialCrisis is a dummy variable equal to one for 
net trades executed in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed 
otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
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3.9. Conclusion 
High-quality communication is a key feature of a firm’s corporate governance strategy. Using a 
sample of Belgian listed companies, this paper investigated whether high-quality communication can 
reduce insider trading profitability, and thus information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. A 
unique feature of our analysis is that we have proxied the quality of corporate communication by 
disclosure scores that were assigned by financial analysts and fund managers who are familiar with the 
peculiarities and demands of the companies’ investor community. One of the advantages of using 
these scores is that they are more objective than researcher-assigned scores. Consistent with 
expectations, we have found that high-quality communication limits the profitability of insider trading. 
Moreover, we have reported evidence on the communication channels that contribute most to the 
reduction of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and the resulting insider trading 
gains. In particular, we have documented that, although disclosures in mandatory annual reports have 
some impact, voluntary disclosure channels, such as investor relation programs and press releases, are 
the most effective channels to reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
Furthermore, since the quality of corporate websites is rather uniform across companies, they are 
unable to explain the variance in insider trading profitability.  
The results of this study are of interest to academics and regulators. From an academic point of view, 
this study contributes to various strands of literature. First, it contributes to the academic literature on 
insider trading profitability by providing evidence on the impact of high-quality communication and of 
the different channels through which companies can communicate on insider trading profitability. 
Second, the study also contributes to the academic literature on the relation between disclosure quality 
and information asymmetry by using insider trading profitability as a proxy for information 
asymmetry rather than, for example, bid-ask spreads or the probability of informed trading. 
Furthermore, we are also the first to investigate the disclosure - information asymmetry relation in a 
French civil law country using disclosure scores assigned by professional financial analysts and which 
rate the quality of different communication channels. 
102 
The results are furthermore of interest to regulators for the findings generally underline the importance 
of high-quality communication as an instrument to prevent information inequities and unfair 
enrichment by privileged insiders and to stimulate a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Interestingly, however, our results show that whereas regulators primarily focus on annual reports and 
backward-looking financial statements information, this communication channel is not the most 
effective in reducing the level of information asymmetry. By contrast, investor relation activities, 
which are used to communicate timely and forward-looking information on a voluntary basis, appear 
to be most effective. We believe that this finding is relevant for regulators and may shed new light on 
the discussion concerning the shift towards more or less regulation of markets. 
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 3.11. Appendix 3.A. 
BVFA –evaluation criteria for annual reports (Award 2010) (source: www.bvfa.be) 
  
Criteria for score 
below average   Criteria for average score   Criteria for score above average 
Key Figures and Ratios           
Key numerical data on P&L, 
balance sheet and cash flow 
statements  
conditions for average 
score are not 
(sufficiently) fulfilled  
relevant, nicely presented and easy to find 
key numbers (min. 3 years): sales, EBITDA, 
(R)EBIT, net & recurring profit (per share), 
dividend, equity; + some ratios 
 
numbers and ratios are given over a period 
of at least 5 years or if extra numbers are 
given (e.g. number of shares, net debt, 
capex or working capital) 
Products/Services/Markets/Competition         
Information on key products, 
services, geographic markets 
and competitive positioning 
conditions for average 
score are not 
(sufficiently) fulfilled  
a clear and detailed presentation of most 
relevant products, services and markets (incl. 
description, numbers and/or pictures)  
additional data is given on the competitive 
position, like a SWOT analysis or 
quantitative data on market shares of 
relevant products or services 
Strategy and long-term objectives         
Information on the 
company's strategy and on 
how the company wants to 
reach its objectives 
conditions for average 
score are not 
(sufficiently) fulfilled  
a relevant comment on strategy: how does 
the group intend to develop its product 
portfolio, geographic presence & financial 
performance with time horizon > 1 year? 
 
additional data is given, like quantified 
strategic objectives (e.g. on future market 
shares, sales volumes, sales number, 
margins, profit numbers or other) 
Financial data           
Financial section of the 
annual report: screen for 
disclosure & transparency on 
balance sheet risks 
conditions for average 
score are not 
(sufficiently) fulfilled  
clear and relevant footnotes on goodwill 
(composition), pension deficits (with 
allocation of asset classes) and financial debt 
(composition & maturities) 
 
more details are given like impairment 
criteria and valuation results for goodwill, 
a sensitivity analysis for pension deficits 
and/or covenants on individual loans 
Other           
Other (relevant) content of 
the annual report 
conditions for average 
score are not 
(sufficiently) fulfilled 
  
other info that can help to better understand 
the company's history or its group structure, 
like a chronologic overview of past 12 
months key events, or a chart with group 
subsidiaries 
  
additional info is included like a lexicon 
(explaining abbreviations & technical 
terms) or an analysis of risks (legal, 
operational, financial, a.o.) 
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BVFA –evaluation criteria for press releases (Award 2010) (source: www.bvfa.be) 
  
Criteria for score below 
average   Criteria for average score   Criteria for score above average 
HY/FY Results: Numbers           
Numbers presented in P&L, balance 
sheet and (if applicable) cash flow 
statement 
conditions for average 
score are not (sufficiently) 
fulfilled  
an IFRS-compliant set of numbers (P&L, 
balance sheet, cash flow, changes in 
equity), including non-recurring numbers 
(if applicable) 
 
on top, FY results includes H2 (or Q4) 
results for the current and the previous 
year as separate set of numbers to allow 
an easy yoy comparison 
HY/FY Results: Changes in numbers 
    
Relevant information explaining the 
year-over-year (yoy) evolution in the 
numbers 
conditions for average 
score are not (sufficiently) 
fulfilled  
a breakdown of the yoy change in 
revenues (volumes, prices/product mix, 
currencies, consolidation scope...)  
on top, a breakdown of the yoy change in 
other relevant numbers like EBIT, net 
profit, net financial debt and/or working 
capital 
HY/FY Results: Segments 
     
Numbers and Comments on 
Segments 
conditions for average 
score are not (sufficiently) 
fulfilled  
relevant numbers and comments on the 
performance of the segments  
on top, additional numbers or other and 
high-quality information is given on 
segment results 
HY/FY Results: Timing REMARK: No input required, the score will be based on input from the company and checked by BVFA-ABAF 
Timing of press releases on final full- 
and half-year results 
conditions for average 
score are not (sufficiently) 
fulfilled  
the press releases on HY or FY results 
are made public more than 1 but no more 
than 2 months after the closing of the 
period 
 
the press releases on HY and FY results 
are made public no more than 1 month 
after the closing of the period 
Quarterly results & Other press releases 
   
Quantity and quality of other press 
releases, including a press release 
with full quarter results  
conditions for average 
score are not (sufficiently) 
fulfilled  
the company publishes good quality 
trading updates, preliminary results 
and/or ad hoc press releases on relevant 
events (with impact on risk profile or fair 
value estimate) 
 
the company publishes complete 
quarterly results, within 2 months after 
the closing of the quarter 
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BVFA –evaluation criteria for corporate websites (Award 2010) (source: www.bvfa.be) 
Operational info 
Company history 
Detailed overview divisions / products / services / markets 
Useful links (e.g. sector organizations, subsidiaries…) 
Financial Info and IR 
Archive with annual reports and financial press releases 
Are full- and half-year press releases available in pdf-format? 
Recent analyst, investor, and roadshow presentations 
Separate section on debt (credit ratings, debt composition and maturities, covenants) 
Easy to find contact details of the investor relations department (phone number, address, e-mail, etc.)? 
Can you subscribe to an e-mail service to receive press releases? 
Corporate governance 
Info on shareholder structure 
Info on option plans 
Info on annual general meeting (agenda) 
Financial Calendar 
How far does the calendar look forward (with concrete data) 1 week before half-year reporting? 
Number of events included (e.g. annual general meeting results, investor day, ex-dividend date, 
dividend payment date, …) 
Varia 
Navigation comfort (including interactive analytical tools, excel conversion options, etc.) 
How up to date is the website (e.g. key numbers, PowerPoint presentations immediately available?) 
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BVFA –evaluation criteria for investor relation activities (Award 2010) (source: www.bvfa.be) 
Guidance 
IR ability to give clear and consistent guidance on key parameters (sales, margins ...) throughout the 
year 
Consistency 
Consistency of the information provided by the IR (team) 
Reliability 
Reliability of the information provided by the IR (team) 
Reactivity 
Speed and quality of the IR (team)'s answers to analyst questions (face to face, by telephone or by 
e-mail) 
Availability 
Day-to-day availability of the IR (team) 
Access to senior management 
Access to senior management via the IR (team) 
Date Alert Service 
E-mail service to inform analysts on future event or publication dates (annual general meeting, 
publication of annual reports, results etc.) 
Analyst meetings / Conference calls  
Organization by IR (team) of analyst meetings and/or conference calls (quantity & quality) 
Field Trips / Investor days 
Field trips (plant visits), investor days (quantity & quality) or other efforts to support assist the analyst 
Roadshows / Client visits 
Effort of IR (team) to participate in roadshows or broker client visits (quantity & quality) 
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CHAPTER 4:  
CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING POLICIES: 
DETERMINANTS AND EFFECT ON INSIDER TRADING 
PROFITABILITY* 
Debby Van Geyt a, Philippe Van Cauwenberge a and Heidi Vander Bauwhede a 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on corporate governance practices related to insider trading. In particular, 
we explore a unique and comprehensive dataset on the restrictions that companies impose on 
their insiders in addition to legal requirements, i.e. corporate insider trading policies. We are 
interested in the stringency of these restrictions and, more specifically, in which firm 
characteristics provoke differences in the stringency-level. Furthermore, using a unique 
database on insider trading activity in Belgium, we examine the effectiveness of the 
restrictions and examine whether abnormal insider trading gains are lower in companies with 
more strict insider trading policies. We develop a company-specific stringency index and find 
that restrictions are more stringent in companies with more growth opportunities and in non-
financial companies. Furthermore, using hand-collected data on company board structures, 
we find that a higher representation of independent directors on the board has a positive 
impact on the stringency of insider trading policies. Analysis of the effectiveness shows no 
significant impact of policy stringency on insider trading returns. This lack of effectiveness is 
especially pronounced in smaller companies.  
 
 
a
 Ghent University, Department of Accountancy and Corporate Finance, Kuiperskaai 55/E, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
*This paper has benefited from presentation at the Annual EIASM Corporate Governance Workshop 2012 (Brussels, 
Belgium). Financial support from the “Special Research Fund‟ (BOF) and the Hercules project is gratefully acknowledged.
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4.1. Introduction  
This paper focuses on corporate insider trading policies. These policies are restrictions on insider 
trading imposed by companies and fall within the scope of corporate governance mechanisms. In 
particular, we investigate whether the strictness of the policies differs across companies and which 
firm characteristics explain these differences. Some companies, for example, forbid their insiders from 
trading one week before the announcement of annual results, while others prohibit trading for as long 
as two months prior to the announcement. Following the agency theory of the firm, previous studies 
have argued that incentives for company management to commit to more stringent or higher-quality 
corporate governance practices depend on the firm’s contracting environment (Himmelberg et al., 
1999). Specifically, these incentives are driven by differences in private benefits available to insiders, 
the need for external funding and the cost of implementing corporate governance mechanisms (Anand 
et al., 2006).  
In the second part of this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of the company-specific trading policies 
by investigating their impact on the profitability of insiders’ trades. By introducing trading policies, 
companies aim to limit the opportunities for insiders to benefit from their potential inside information. 
As mentioned, companies for example forbid trading by insiders around the announcement of financial 
results. Within these so-called black-out periods, there is a higher risk of insiders having superior 
inside knowledge. By forbidding them to trade, companies prevent that insiders misuse this knowledge 
to obtain high trading returns at the expense of other investors and company stakeholders. Another 
possible restriction could be that insiders first have to ask permission to trade. Again this should 
prevent insiders from misusing information as speculative or information-driven trades will not be 
permitted. Similarly, companies sometimes prevent insiders for engaging in speculative trading by 
imposing restrictions on short selling and short term trading. Accordingly, we expect that if companies 
enforce more and stricter trading policies on their insiders, opportunities for insiders to exploit their 
informational benefit should be reduced, resulting in a lower profitability of their transactions  
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To address our research questions, we use data collected by the Belgian Financial Services and 
Markets Authority (FSMA) on insider trading policies included in the corporate governance charters 
of Belgian listed companies. The database includes information on all companies listed on the Belgian 
stock exchange and provides a unique and comprehensive overview of the trading restrictions imposed 
by each company. The data revealed that companies generally implement all restrictions suggested by 
the Belgian corporate governance code, but customize the strictness to their own contracting 
environment. Substantial differences are, for example, observed regarding the trading windows within 
which insider trading is allowed or not. Furthermore, it appears that companies do not only impose 
restrictions suggested by the Belgian corporate governance code, but often also implement additional 
restrictions in line with U.K. or U.S. best practices. These additional restrictions include policies on 
the trading of options, short selling, short-term trading and on the requirement to ask permission to 
trade.  
To analyze which firm characteristics provoke differences in the stringency of corporate insider 
trading policies, we construct a company-specific stringency index. Regression analysis of the 
stringency index shows that restrictions are more stringent in companies with more growth 
opportunities and in non-financial companies. Furthermore, the stringency also seems to depend on a 
company’s board structure. Using hand-collected data on corporate governance, our results indicate 
that a higher representation of independent board members who act in the interest of minority groups 
instead of executives, has a positive impact on the strictness of insider trading policies.  
To examine the effect of policy stringency on insider trading profits, we rely on a unique database on 
insider trades provided by the FSMA. We use event-study methodology and calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns by using a standard market model (MacKinlay, 1997) or a market model adjusted for 
thin trading (Dimson, 1979) as the liquidity of some Belgian securities is rather low. Interestingly, our 
results show that, after controlling for trade size, company size, market-to-book, leverage, transaction 
type, ownership concentration and cross-listing, insiders’ profits are not significantly lower in 
companies with more stringent insider trading restrictions. However, a closer examination of the effect 
of stringency showed that this lack of effectiveness is especially pronounced in smaller companies.  
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Our research contributes to two streams of literature. First, we add to the literature investigating firm-
level differences in corporate governance practices. Based on the seminal work of La Porta et al. 
(1998), prior research on corporate governance has primarily focused on how institutional differences 
result in a different approach towards corporate governance at country-level (e.g. Doidge et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, as prior studies have shown, corporate governance practices also differ substantially 
between companies located within the same country (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006). 
In particular, corporate governance practices are often regulated based on the self-regulation principle 
of “comply or explain”. This principle implies that (national) corporate governance codes formulate 
some broad principles and that companies are allowed to adapt their governance practices to their own 
contracting environment. Research into the firm characteristics that motivate companies to invest in 
higher-quality corporate governance is however rather limited (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies have specifically analyzed 
how company characteristics affect corporate insider trading policies. A first study was performed by 
Petracci (2011) and examined differences between firms which have adopted black-out periods and 
firms without black-out periods. Similarly, Jagolinzer et al. (2011) examined whether companies 
which exhibit a lower level of information asymmetry and were insiders consequently have less 
profitable trading opportunities, are more or less likely to require ex ante approval of insider trades by 
a general counsel. We expand this line of research in two ways. First, we do not focus on a single 
aspect of corporate restrictions like black-out periods or ex ante approval of insider trades. Instead, we 
consider the full set of policies that a company imposes on its insiders. Second, in contrast to previous 
studies which are mere compliance studies and only consider whether a policy was adopted or not, we 
also take into account the stringency of the adopted policy. As the policies on insider trading are part 
of corporate governance practices, the “comply or explain” principle should provoke substantial 
differences in the restrictions imposed on insiders as companies can customize the elaboration to their 
specific characteristics and environment. Consequently, it can be expected that companies exhibit 
substantial differences in the restrictions they impose on their insiders.  
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A second stream of literature to which our work contributes is the literature examining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices. A company which chooses to improve its corporate 
governance practices intends to mitigate agency problems and commits itself to act in the best interest 
of its stakeholders. If governance practices are effective and stakeholders acknowledge a company’s 
efforts, this should be reflected in higher market valuation (Goncharov et al., 2006), better operating 
performance (Gompers et al., 2003) and easier access to external capital (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
Obviously, with regard to insider trading policies, we expect a direct impact on insiders’ behavior in 
terms of timing, frequency and volume, and on the magnitude of their profits. Previous studies 
addressing this issue include Bettis et al. (2000), Jagolinzer et al. (2011) and Petracci (2011). Again, 
these studies generally focus on a single aspect of insider trading restrictions and do not take into 
account differences in the stringency of the restrictions. We expand this research by considering the 
combined impact of all trading restrictions on the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns. We believe 
that the use of a comprehensive score that also takes into account the stringency of the imposed 
restrictions may provide better insight into the effect of corporate trading polices. As argued by 
Jagolinzer et al. (2011), trading policies may complement each other or may be used as substitutes. As 
such, the effectiveness of black-out periods may for example depend on whether or not ex ante 
approval of trades is required (Bettis et al., 2000; Jagolinzer et al., 2011) 
Our research results may be of interest to policy makers as they provide evidence that companies make 
use of the self-regulation principle by adjusting their insider trading policies to their own contracting 
environment. Nonetheless, our result seem to indicate that this is no guarantee for success as the 
policies appear to have no effect on gains ensuing from insider trading. 
The results of our inquiry may also be relevant for practitioners and policy makers outside the Belgian 
market because the recommendations on insider trading restrictions formulated in the Belgian 
corporate governance code are in line with those of other European countries (e.g. the Netherlands and 
France) (FSMA, 2011). In addition, according to La Porta et al. (1998), countries like the Netherlands 
and France have similar institutional environments to Belgium as they are also French civil law 
countries.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the Belgian 
corporate governance code and the recommended insider trading restrictions. Section 3 provides an 
overview of previous literature and develops our hypotheses. Next, section 4 describes the data which 
are used and section 5 outlines the research design. Section 6 contains descriptive statistics and the 
results of the empirical inquiry. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
4.2. Background on the Belgian regulatory framework  
The first official Belgian corporate governance code was introduced in December 2004 (“Code 
Lippens”). Later, in March 2009, the 2004 Code was updated in the wake of new corporate crises 
which brought to light pitfalls in the existing corporate governance guidelines. The update, “Code 
Daems” (further denoted in this study as the 2009 Code), also incorporated the publication of new 
European Directives and changes in Belgian legislation and in corporate governance best practices in 
other EU countries.  
The Belgian corporate governance code is composed of nine principles which are each supplemented 
by several provisions and guidelines. These principles are general statements on good corporate 
governance practices. They are broadly defined and therefore applicable to all companies irrespective 
of their specificities. The corporate governance provisions, on the other hand, describe how companies 
should implement these principles. Companies are expected to comply with the provisions or explain 
why they are not being applied, i.e. the “comply or explain” principle.1 Finally, guidelines provide 
some practical guidance to companies as to how they should implement and interpret the corporate 
governance provisions. Companies can however deviate from the guidelines without further 
justification as they are not subject to the “comply or explain” principle.  
Corporate governance rules concerning transactions in company stock and trading by insiders in 
particular fall under principle 3 of the 2009 Code which states that “all directors shall demonstrate 
                                                     
1
 Since 2010, the “comply or explain”-principle has been incorporated in the Belgian legislation. Consequently, companies 
are legally bonded to indicate where they deviate from the 2009 Code and why (Law 6 April 2010 on the reinforcement of 
corporate governance in listed companies). 
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integrity and commitment” (Corporate Governance Committee, p. 15). Specifically, provision 3.7 
posits that “the board shall take all necessary and useful measures for effective and efficient execution 
of the Belgian rules on market abuse.2 In this respect it should at least adhere to the provisions and 
guidelines laid down in Appendix B” (Corporate Governance Committee, p. 15). In this appendix, the 
code prescribes companies to draw up a Dealing Code including rules on the execution and disclosure 
of insider transactions. From a more practical point of view, a first guideline in the appendix suggests 
that companies should impose black-out periods around the announcement of financial results and 
other important events in which insiders cannot trade. A second guideline advises companies to 
appoint a compliance officer who should make sure that insiders comply with the company Dealing 
Code. A third guideline suggests that the compliance officer should be at least notified by insiders of 
their trading intentions before they execute a transaction. Finally, a fourth guideline proposes that all 
insider transactions should be made public by the company.  
 
4.3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.3.1. Determinants of policy stringency  
Following prior studies, we formulate various hypotheses regarding the firm-level determinants of the 
stringency of corporate insider trading policies. We derive our hypotheses from prior empirical work 
on the determinants of corporate governance in general (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005) and from other empirical studies focusing on corporate insider trading policies (e.g. Bettis 
et al., 2000; Roulstone, 2003). Firm characteristics are expected to drive differences in corporate 
governance practices as they help form a company’s contracting environment. In particular, these 
characteristics affect the risk of minority expropriation and consequently the trade-off between costs 
and benefits related to governance practices (Himmelberg et al., 1999). Accordingly, the optimal 
stringency level of insider trading restrictions may therefore be lower in companies with a low risk of 
minority expropriation and vice versa.  
                                                     
2
 An overview of the Belgian rules on market abuse can be found on the FSMA-website : 
http://www.fsma.be/nl/Supervision/fm/ma/mm/wetteksten/wetgeving.aspx.  
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Company Size  
It is well-documented in previous literature that larger companies are more visible and attract more 
attention from financial analysts and investors (e.g. O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). As a consequence, they are subject to a higher level of public scrutiny and may 
therefore be more inclined to impose stricter rules on their insiders. This tendency for a stricter 
monitoring may furthermore be amplified since large companies are likely to have a greater number of 
insiders and consequently a greater number of insider trades, making insider trading a more prominent 
issue (Bettis et al., 2000). According to Roulstone (2003) it is also easier for larger companies to 
monitor and restrict insider trading as they have more organizational resources. Based on these 
previous findings, we therefore expect that corporate insider trading policies will be more strict in 
larger companies. We formulate our first hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the size of the company.  
 
Asset Tangibility  
The composition of a company’s asset structure and more specifically the proportion of (in)tangible 
assets, may influence management decisions on corporate governance practices. Companies with 
relatively more “soft” assets, like intangibles, research and development and short-term assets such as 
inventory, may face higher agency problems as soft assets are harder to monitor compared to tangible, 
long-term assets like property, plant and equipment. In addition, the need for a stricter monitoring of 
insiders may be further augmented in companies with a larger proportion of intangibles as incentives 
for insider trading are especially high in these companies. In particular, companies with more 
intangible assets face greater uncertainty with regard to their fundamental value which in turn allows 
insiders to have greater informational benefits and gives rise to more profitable trading opportunities 
(Dierkens, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992). Companies with more intangible (tangible) assets may thus 
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be more (less) inclined to augment the stringency of their trading policies. Following this rationale, we 
formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is negatively 
related to the tangibility of a company’s assets. 
 
Growth Opportunities  
A company’s growth opportunities may influence company choices on corporate governance practices 
by increasing the need for external capital (Doidge et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 
2006; Chen et al., 2010). Particularly, in an attempt to raise equity or debt capital at more favorable 
terms, companies will improve their governance practices to lower the cost of capital. An important 
driver of this cost is the level of information asymmetry. Companies may reduce this asymmetry for 
example by improving their disclosure practices (Welker 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) but also by 
monitoring their insiders more strictly (Choy and Silvers, 2009). By imposing various restrictive 
insider trading policies, companies show their commitment to reduce the risks of wealth expropriation 
by insiders and of trading against informed counterparties. Following this reasoning, we formulate our 
hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to a company’s growth opportunities. 
 
Financial Structure  
According to the findings of previous studies, a company’s financial structure may impact corporate 
governance quality in two ways. First, as debt yields are determined by the likelihood that a company 
fails to meet its commitment of debt repayment and by the degree of protection that is offered to 
creditors, creditors are likely to offer better credit terms to better governed companies (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003). In support of this reasoning, Anderson et al. (2004) for example found that the cost 
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of debt financing is lower in companies where more independent directors are sitting in the board of 
directors. Similarly, Klock et al. (2005) documented that the use of antitakeover measures also lowers 
the cost of debt. More levered firms may thus be motivated to ameliorate their corporate governance 
practices in an attempt to reduce the cost of debt. In addition, a request for better corporate governance 
mechanisms may also originate from creditors themselves. In particular, they may demand the 
establishment of certain safeguarding procedures and mechanisms in order to prevent misuse of 
company resources and protect their investment (Goncharov et al., 2006). We believe that the 
implementation of restrictions on insider trading may help improve a company’s governance practices 
as it disciplines insiders and reduces agency risks (Choy and Silvers, 2009). The enforcement of black-
out periods as well as restrictions on short-term and speculative trading may for example reduce 
incentives of investing in high-risk projects aimed at short-term returns. Based on this reasoning, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the proportion of external capital.  
 
Cross-Listing  
According to the so-called bonding hypothesis developed in prior empirical studies (e.g. Coffee, 1999; 
Coffee, 2002), cross-listing on foreign stock exchanges often imposes additional regulatory 
requirements. Investigating the effect of cross-listing on the overall corporate governance quality, 
Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) provided evidence that companies from 
emerging markets who cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange tend to have a better overall corporate 
governance quality. Based on these findings, we expect that Belgian companies which cross-list on 
stock exchanges with more rigorous governance systems compared to the home country will be 
compelled to adopt more stringent insider trading policies in order to comply with the higher level of 
investor protection. In particular, we expect cross-listing in the U.S. or U.K. to especially influence the 
stringency of trading policies imposed by Belgian listed companies because trading restrictions in 
126 
these countries are more extensive and more strongly enforced compared to Belgium (Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005; FSMA, 2011). Based on these arguments, we formulate our hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to a cross-listing on a U.S. or U.K. stock exchange.  
 
Ownership Structure  
Prior studies report mixed evidence on the impact of a company’s ownership structure on its overall 
corporate governance quality. The evidence seems to suggest that the presence of large shareholders 
can incite as well as prevent companies from adopting stricter corporate governance mechanisms 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006; da Silveira et al., 2009). On the one hand, one could argue 
that large shareholders may be opposed to better corporate governance practices because actions like 
increasing minority voting rights and restricting trading by insiders are not necessarily in their best 
interest. In particular, large shareholders may be affected by corporate insider trading policies because 
they are included in the range of application as a consequence of their large share ownership or 
because they often use their power to obtain representation on the board in order to get access to inside 
information. By trading on this information, they are able to gain superior trading profits relative to 
other shareholders which in turn compensates them for their monitoring activities and for the risk of 
holding an undiversified portfolio (Bhide, 1993; Demsetz, 1986).  
On the other hand, if better corporate governance practices are valued by the capital market, this 
increases the value of the firm and thus the value of the ownership stake of all shareholders (Drobetz 
et al., 2009). Obviously, large shareholders proportionally benefit the most from a higher valuation by 
the capital market. Furthermore, companies with a concentrated ownership structure that wish to 
reduce the high agency cost ensuing from the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders may do 
this by improving their overall corporate governance quality. A more stringent monitoring of trading 
by insiders may certainly contribute to the amelioration of corporate governance practices. 
Accordingly, it can be expected that companies where shares are closely held may be compelled by 
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their large shareholders to improve their corporate governance in general and strengthen the 
monitoring of insider trading in particular. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is related to the 
level of ownership concentration.  
 
Corporate Governance Structure  
Following prior studies on the determinants of corporate governance quality, we believe that the 
overall governance quality and consequently the quality and stringency of insider trading policies will 
be higher in companies with better corporate governance structures. The quality of these structures is 
generally derived from the size and composition of the board and the presence of specialized 
committees and functions which support the board in their monitoring activities (e.g. an internal audit 
function, and a nomination, remuneration and/or audit committee).  
Board Size Using the number of board members as a measure for board size, Drobetz et al. (2009) 
found that larger boards decrease the overall corporate governance quality. Large boards often fail to 
perform their monitoring and control duties because they are faced with an increased problem of 
director free-riding (Drobetz et al., 2009). Similarly, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) 
argue that the effectiveness of large boards may be lower as the emphasis in the communication 
between board members tends to shift from truth and frankness to politeness and courtesy. An 
additional problem related to large boards is the higher potential of conflicting groups of stakeholders 
sitting on the board (e.g. employees, creditors, representatives of large stakeholders), which again has 
an adverse influence on the decision-making process. Based on this rationale, we formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is negatively 
related to the number of board members. 
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Board composition With regard to the composition of the board, prior studies use the proportion of 
independent and/or non-executive board members3 as proxies for good governance (e.g. Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Barucci and Falini, 2005; Petracci, 2011). Researchers as well as regulators believe that 
the presence of more independent and non-executive directors should help improve the monitoring of 
management decisions and board activities (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). These directors must prevent that 
board decisions are solely meeting executive’s interests. In support of this assumption, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) documented a strong decrease in the level of executive compensation after the 
Sarbanex-Oxley act had introduced the obligation of a majority of independent directors. Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) reported a positive association between the representation of independent board members 
and the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Similarly, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) provided 
evidence of a positive relation between the number of non-executives sitting on the board and the level 
of voluntary disclosures. Furthermore, relating to insider trading policies, Petracci (2011) found that 
the occurrence of black-out periods is higher in companies where more independent directors are 
sitting on the board. These findings lead to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
 
A third important governance characteristic of the board is the separation of the functions of CEO and 
chairman of the board. The chairman of the board is involved in, among other things, the monitoring 
of the company management, setting the agenda of board meetings, nominating managers including 
the CEO and deciding upon executive compensation (Petra, 2005). Obviously, execution of these 
functions by the same person may thus bring about conflicts of interests. Regulators and academics 
                                                     
3
 Independent directors are non-executive directors which meet with several additional criteria. For example, they may not be 
related to an executive director or receive any remuneration apart from a compensation related to their function as board 
member. A complete overview of the independence criteria for directors of Belgian listed companies is provided in 
Appendix A of the 2009 Belgian code on corporate governance (Corporate Governance Committee, 2009, p. 27)  
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therefore strongly advise that the CEO should not serve as chairman of the board. Based on this 
reasoning, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 10: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman of the board. 
 
Internal Audit Function One of the most important features of a company’s governance structure in 
supporting the company board is the function of internal auditor. The internal auditor is involved in all 
aspects of corporate governance as he is (jointly) responsible for improving the efficiency of 
operations, augmenting the reliability of financial reporting, deterring and investigating fraud, 
safeguarding assets and assuring compliance with laws and regulations. Obviously, the internal auditor 
may therefore be directly involved in the prevention and reporting of insider trading (Curtis and 
Mwangi, 2007). He may assist in assuring that corporate insiders comply with the national rules on 
insider trading and market abuse as well as with trading policies formulated by the company itself. 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 11: Ceteris paribus, the stringency of corporate insider trading policies is positively 
related to the presence of an internal auditor in a company. 
 
4.3.2. Influence of policy stringency on insider trading profits  
Corporate governance codes were created to mitigate the agency problems between corporate insiders 
on the one hand and outsiders on the other hand. In particular, corporate governance best practices are 
intended to improve the way in which a company is monitored and managed, enhance transparency on 
company practices towards outsiders and to lower the risk of minority expropriation. By ameliorating 
the quality of their corporate governance, companies show commitment to their stakeholders to act in 
their best interest. An interesting question set against this background is whether these improvements 
are indeed effective. Although various studies have examined the impact of the overall corporate 
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governance quality on general performance measured in terms of stock returns (e.g. Drobetz et al., 
2004; Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2004), operating performance (e.g. Goncharov et al., 2006) and 
access to external capital (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004), few studies have examined the impact of 
insider trading policies on insiders’ profits. By introducing these policies, companies aim to limit the 
opportunities for insiders to benefit from their potential inside knowledge. As a result of the different 
trading restrictions, insiders are then compelled to adjusted their trading behavior in terms of timing, 
frequency and volume, which will in turn affect the resultant returns. The first study to specifically 
focus on the effect of corporate governance practices related to insider trading was a paper by Bettis et 
al. (2000). This paper investigated the effectiveness of the imposition of black-out periods in U.S. 
companies by examining the impact on insider trading frequency and profitability. They showed that 
insider trading activity was significantly reduced during black-out periods compared to periods in 
which trading was allowed. Moreover, the profitability of insider trades appeared higher during the 
allowed trading period than during black-out periods. The authors argued that insiders potentially had 
to obtain permission to trade during the black-out periods, and that this permission would only be 
granted if a trade was liquidity motivated. A later study by Jagolinzer et al. (2011) expanded Bettis et 
al. (2000) and found that black-out periods are not effective by themselves but only if companies also 
impose ex ante approval of trades by a general counsel. Contrary to Bettis et al. (2000), they 
documented higher trading returns during black-out periods compared to during non-restricted trading 
periods. Ex ante approval of insider trades by a general counsel however significantly lowered returns 
during black-out periods. A final study on the effectiveness of black-out periods was performed by 
Petracci (2011). Focusing on the Italian stock market, this paper concluded that the lack of strong 
enforcement mechanisms for which Italy is notorious (see La Porta et al., 1998; Barucci et al., 2006; 
Bajo et al., 2009) results in insiders ignoring any trading restrictions. No significant difference in the 
number of trades or number of active insiders was found when comparing black-out periods with non-
restricted periods.  
Building on these prior studies, we wish to expand the understanding of the effect of corporate trading 
policies on insider trading profitability. As opposed to previous research, we do not focus on one or 
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two aspects but look into the effect of the full set of trading restrictions imposed on insiders. In 
addition, we take into account the strictness of the corporate policies and hypothesize that, if stricter 
policies are imposed and insiders have less freedom in choosing when and how they trade, trading 
profits will be lower. We formulate our hypothesis as follows.  
Hypothesis 12: Ceteris paribus, the profitability of insider trading is negatively related to the 
stringency of corporate insider trading policies. 
 
4.4. Sample selection  
4.4.1. Corporate insider trading policies 
Data on the corporate insider trading policies imposed by Belgian listed companies were obtained 
upon request from the FSMA. In 2010, the FSMA performed a comparative study on the corporate 
insider trading policies imposed by all 127 companies which were listed on Euronext Brussels on 6 
September 2010 (FSMA, 2011). These policies are included in the so-called “Dealing Codes” 
prescribed by the Belgian Corporate Governance Code. In a first stage, the FSMA consulted the 
company websites to search for Dealing Codes. A small proportion of companies, however, did not 
make their codes publically available. These companies were contacted by the FSMA and asked to 
send a copy of their code to the FSMA or confirm that they did not have a Dealing Code. Using this 
combination of web search and direct request, the FSMA was able to collect data on the Dealing 
Codes of the complete Belgian stock market. Three companies were however deleted from the sample. 
First, one company which was in state of liquidation at the time of the survey was filtered out. Second, 
after analyzing the codes, the FSMA decided to eliminate two additional companies from the sample. 
A first company, i.e. PCB, was excluded because all forms of trading in securities and other financial 
instruments are prohibited which made comparison with other companies difficult. A second 
company, i.e. the Belgian National Bank, was removed because it imposes different sets of rules on 
different kinds of insiders which again hampered comparison with the Dealing Codes of other 
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companies which are uniform across all insiders. In addition, the sample was further reduced from 124 
to 109 companies when analyzing the determinants of the stringency of the imposed restrictions due to 
missing data on the explanatory variables.  
  
4.4.2. Insider trading data 
Data on insider trading in Belgium was obtained upon request from the FSMA. The FSMA is 
responsible for making all insider transactions publicly available. Insiders therefore have to report 
their transactions to the FSMA within five business days after the execution. The initial database 
contained 4284 transactions reported by insiders of 102 different companies from January 2010 
through April 2012. In line with previous studies, this sample was reduced based on several selection 
criteria intended to focus on transactions which are most likely driven by a profit objective. First, we 
deleted all transactions involving options, warrants or scripts. This approach is consistent with, for 
example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Huddart and Ke (2007). In particular, regarding the exercise 
of options, Ofek and Yermack (2000) found that the exercise-event is strongly correlated with the 
subsequent sale of the underlying security. Huddart and Ke (2007) therefore argue that these 
transactions should be excluded from the sample in order to avoid double counting.  
Second, we excluded all insider trades which are not open market purchases and sales. On the one 
hand, we expect that the majority of over-the-counter transactions are transactions between insiders of 
the same company. Hence, it can be assumed that these insiders possess a similar amount of inside 
information and do not have an informational benefit when carrying out these inter-insider trades. On 
the other hand, Finnerty (1976) also argues that the negotiated stock price of private transactions can 
differ substantially from the quoted stock price. Consequently, as the estimation of the insiders’ 
abnormal profits is based on market-determined prices, these estimated profits can deviate strongly 
from the actual profits gained in private transactions.  
Third, we filtered out transactions which were reported to the FSMA before their execution. As the 
FSMA immediately makes all reported transactions public on its website, outside investors are 
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informed about these transaction and insiders will no longer be able to earn abnormal trading profits as 
stock prices immediately incorporate the information once it is made public (Givoly and Palmon, 
1985).  
Fourth, we deleted transactions which were not reported in euro. This approach is consistent with 
other insider trading studies and intends to prevent bias in the calculation of abnormal returns due to 
the evolution of the underlying currency. In particular, the abnormal returns calculated in insider 
trading studies are a measure of the advantage insiders have in terms of superior inside knowledge or 
because they are more familiar with their company and its environment. However, when transactions 
in a foreign currency are transformed into euro transactions, the evolution of the underlying currency 
influences the magnitude of the abnormal returns and thus the measurement of the profits earned by 
insiders. As the currency evolution is a priori unknown to insiders, the calculated abnormal returns 
may give a biased picture of the informational advantage of insiders.  
If more than one transaction is executed on the same day by (an) insider(s) from the same company, 
we calculated net transactions. In a first step, we take the sum of the trade size of all purchases and 
sales respectively. Next, we deduct the total value of sold securities from the total value of purchased 
securities. Furthermore, we deleted net transactions which were less than 20 trading days apart in 
order to filter out noise due to successive trades. In particular, if no adjustment for event-clustering 
was made, cumulative abnormal returns would be biased as they would not only incorporate the price 
reaction to the transaction in question, but also to other trades carried out later within the event 
window. The latter adjustments for netting and event-clustering are consistent with the insider trading 
literature (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and 
Theissen, 2009). 
Application of the above filters reduced the insider trading sample to 416 insider trades executed in 81 
different companies. All companies were included in the FSMA study on corporate insider trading 
policies. When analyzing the effect of the stringency of the trading restrictions on insiders’ abnormal 
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returns, 37 additional transactions were deleted due to missing data on the control variables. This 
resulted in a final sample of 379 insider trades.  
 
4.4.3. Firm-level data  
Firm-level data are used as explanatory variables in our analysis on the determinants of the company-
specific stringency index and as control variables in our analysis on the effect of the stringency level 
on insiders’ abnormal returns. The firm-level data were obtained from various sources. In particular, 
company size, asset tangibility, growth opportunities and leverage were collected from Worldscope. 
Information on ownership concentration was retrieved from the Belfirst database of Bureau Van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing.4 The market-to-book ratio and data on cross-listing were gathered from 
Datastream. Data on the presence of an internal audit function and on board size and structure was 
collected by hand from the annual reports our sample companies.5 Finally, information on trade size 
was provided in the insider trading database. 
 
4.5. Methodology  
4.5.1. Stringency index  
For the development of the stringency index we use the data from the FSMA study on the Dealing 
Codes of Belgian listed companies (FSMA, 2011). This study analyzes the Dealing Codes effective in 
2010 and provides a detailed and comprehensive overview of restrictions imposed on insider trading 
by companies listed on Euronext Brussels. The study provides information on whether companies 
implement the recommendations stated in the Belgian corporate governance code and how they do 
this. In particular, the study first concentrated on the three guidelines listed in the appendix of the 
Belgian code. These recommend that companies should impose black-out periods in which insiders 
                                                     
4
 The Belfirst database of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing is a database that contains detailed information on the 
financial statements of Belgian companies. The information is obtained from financial statements deposited at the National 
Bank of Belgium. More information about Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing can be found on www.bvdep.com.  
5
 All Belgian listed companies are obliged to include a corporate governance statement in their annual reports.  
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cannot trade, appoint a compliance officer who supervises the compliance with the company Dealing 
Code and require insiders to report their trading intentions to the compliance officer. Regarding the 
black-out period, the FSMA registered the length of the black-out period around the announcement of 
annual and interim (i.e. half-yearly and/or quarterly) financial results and whether companies leave the 
option of imposing additional black-out periods around the announcement of other important events 
which may contain price-sensitive information. With regard to the compliance officer, the study 
indicates whether a compliance officer was appointed or not. Finally, with respect to the notification 
of trading intentions, it was documented if and when this notification was required. In particular, 
insiders may have to notify the compliance officer before they execute a transaction, after they have 
executed a transaction or both before and after a transaction.  
In a second step, the FSMA also screened the Dealing Codes for potential incidental restrictions 
besides those recommended by the Belgian corporate governance code. First, the FSMA documented 
whether companies subject their insiders to a “clearance”-mechanism. This mechanism implies that 
insiders should ask permission to trade from a compliance officer. By requiring clearance to trade, the 
compliance officer is not only notified of the trading intentions, he can also decide whether or not a 
transaction may be executed. Hence, this mechanism provides the compliance officer with additional 
resources to ensure that insiders do not violate internal and external trading restrictions.  
Second, the study recorded whether companies impose restrictions on short-term trading. If a company 
imposes such a restriction, it was registered whether the company only advises against short-term 
trading or whether it prohibits insiders to execute transactions within one, three or six months from 
each other. In particular, this restriction implies that if an insider purchases or sells shares of the 
company, he may not resell or repurchase those shares within the imposed period.  
Finally, the FSMA also screened the Dealing Codes for restrictions on the trading of options and/or 
short selling. They documented whether companies impose no restrictions on the trading of options 
and short selling, only forbid one of the two or forbid both.  
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Using this information on which restrictions are imposed by Belgian listed companies and how strict 
they are, a company-specific stringency index was constructed as follows: first, for each restriction, 
we rank the different policies from the least to the most stringent. A detailed overview of the different 
polices and the assigned scores is provided in Appendix 4.A. For example, regarding the notification 
of trading intentions to the compliance officer, the policy of requiring no notification at all was 
classified as the least stringent and received a score of zero. If companies request their insiders to 
notify the compliance officer after they had already executed a transaction, they received a score of 
one. Furthermore, a score of two was appointed to companies that require their insiders to inform the 
compliance officer before executing a transaction and finally, a score of three was awarded when 
notification before and after a transaction was demanded. This approach is based on an unweighted 
scoring mechanism to determine the strictness each policy. The use of unweighted scores has been 
encouraged in previous studies, especially in the disclosure literature (e.g. Cooke, 1991; Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994; Meek et al., 1995). It is generally argued that assigning weights would introduce 
subjectivity into the scoring and that weighted scores may not correspond with reality as perception 
may differ across different interested parties. Furthermore, prior studies have also shown that results 
are not affected if weighted or unweighted scores are used (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
In a second step, the scores on each restriction are standardized following the suggestion of Krajnc and 
Glavič (2005) and Barrios and Komoto (2006). Specifically, the assigned policy score is divided by 
the highest policy score of each restriction respectively in order to obtain a score between zero and one 
for each restriction.6 Finally, we sum the standardized scores to obtain a total stringency index for each 
company.  
 
                                                     
6
 The standardization formula is defined as follows: 
valueminimumvaluemaximum
valueminimumvalueactual
−
−
. However, as the minimum value is 
equal to zero for all policies, this formula is reduced to: 
valuemaximum
valueactual
.  
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4.5.2. Determinants of the stringency index 
To analyze the firm-level determinants of the stringency of corporate insider trading policies, we 
estimate the following regression model using two different estimation techniques i.e. ordinary least 
squares and Tobit. The latter is used because our stringency index is a censored variable with a 
minimum of zero and a maximum of nine. Both regressions are estimated using robust standard errors. 
Consistent with prior studies on corporate governance determinants we included a control variable for 
the company’s industry in order to control for differences in asset structure, accounting practices, 
government regulation and competitiveness between industries (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 
2006; da Silveira et al., 2009; Drobetz et al., 2009). However, to preserve degrees of freedom, we 
follow the approach of Bettis et al. (2000) and Petracci (2011) and only control for financial 
companies. These authors argue that due to the nature of their operations, financial companies may 
adopt insider trading restrictions which may differ substantially from other industries. Our regression 
model is defined as follows:  
jj12j11j10
j9j8j7
j6j5j4
j3j2j1j
FinancialditInternalAuCEODuality
ectorsNonExecDirtorsIndepDirecBoardSize
oncOwnershipCngCrosslistiLeverage
rtunitiesGrowthOppobilityAssetTangiFirmSizeIndexStringency
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ωωω
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(1) 
With:  
StringencyIndexj = the company-specific stringency index of firm j. This index is based on the content 
of the Dealing Codes operative in 2010.  
FirmSizej = natural log of the market capitalization of firm j at the beginning of the fiscal year 2010.  
AssetTangibilityj = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets of firm j at the beginning 
of the fiscal year 2010. 
GrowthOpportunitiesj = net sales growth of the previous year (i.e. fiscal year 2009). 
Leveragej = debt-to-asset ratio of firm j at the beginning of the fiscal year 2010. 
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Cross-listingj = a dummy variable equal to one if firm j cross-listed on a U.S. or U.K. stock exchange 
during the year 2010 and zero otherwise. 
OwnershipConcj = percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal 
year 2010. 
BoardSizej = natural log of the number of board members during fiscal year 2010.  
IndepDirectorsj = percentage of independent directors on the board during fiscal year 2010. 
NonExecDirectorsj = percentage of non-executive directors on the board during fiscal year 2010. 
CEODuality = a dummy variable equal to one if the functions of CEO and chairman of the board are 
executed by a different person during fiscal year 2010 and zero otherwise. 
InternalAuditj = a dummy variable equal to one if a company has an internal audit function during 
fiscal year 2010 and zero otherwise. 
Financialj = a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is a financial company according to the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) adopted by Euronext Brussels and zero otherwise.  
 
4.5.3. Insider trading profits 
In the second part of this paper, we investigate whether more stringent insider trading restrictions are 
indeed effective in reducing the profitability of insiders’ transactions. To determine the profitability of 
insider trades, we apply event study methodology and calculate the cumulative abnormal returns over 
a 21-day period starting from the transaction date of each insider trade. For this, we first calculate the 
abnormal return of each net transaction of firm j on day t as the difference between the actual return on 
day t and the estimated return day t. Following Buysschaert et al. (2004), the latter is calculated using 
a standard market model (MacKinlay, 1997) or a market model adjusted for thin trading (Dimson, 
1979) depending on the liquidity of the underlying security. The issue is that as some stocks on the 
Belgian market are infrequently traded, their stock prices recorded at the end of a time period may 
include adjustments to news events occurring earlier in that period. Consequently, when a standard 
market model is used for those stocks, a problem of non-synchronous trading arises due to a mismatch 
between the return of these stocks and the return of the market index. To address this problem, the 
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aggregated coefficients method of Dimson (1979) includes lagged, leading and contemporaneous beta 
coefficients in order to provide unbiased beta estimates for thinly traded securities. Following a 
suggestion by Friederich et al. (2002), we apply the Dimson-adjustment to stocks with the highest 
number of daily zero returns. More specifically, firms are first sorted in ascending order based on the 
number of daily zero returns during the estimation and event window. Next, the ordinary market 
model is applied to firms belonging to the first three quartiles (with the lowest number of zero return 
days), while the Dimson-adjusted model is used to calculate betas for firms in the bottom quartile 
(with the highest number of zero return days). Applying the adjustment to all stocks would lead to an 
overestimation of the betas of actively traded securities. Consistent with Buysschaert et al. (2004), we 
add one leading and three lagged coefficients to the market model for Belgian, thinly traded securities. 
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++=  Standard market model, (2) 
∑
+
−=
+ ++=
1
3k
jtkt,mjkjjt RR εβα  Dimson-adjusted market model, (3) 
where Rjt is the daily stock return for firm j on day t adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends and 
issues; Rmt and Rm,t+k are the daily value-weighed and dividend-adjusted returns of the market index on 
day t and day t+k respectively. Our benchmark index Rm is the Brussels All Shares Return Index.  
The abnormal return on a transaction in stock of firm j at day t, ARjt, is then calculated as follows:  
mtjjjtjt RˆˆRAR βα −−=
 
Standard market model, (4) 
∑
+
−=
+−−=
1
3:
,
ˆ
ˆ
k
ktmjjjtjt RRAR βα  Dimson-adjusted market model, (5) 
where jαˆ  and jβˆ are estimated by means of an OLS regression over an estimation window of 160 
trading days, going from day -160 to day -1. Since our results are reported for a pooled sample 
including both purchases and sales, the abnormal returns for insider sales are multiplied by minus one. 
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Insiders profit when securities outperform the market after a buy transaction and when stocks 
underperform the market after a sales transaction.  
Finally, to calculate the cumulative abnormal return, the abnormal returns from day 0 to day 20 are 
summed: 
∑
+
=
=
20
0t
jt)20,0(ij ARCAR , (6) 
where CARij(0,20) represents the cumulative abnormal return over 21 trading days for a particular event i 
of firm j.7 The event-window of 21 trading days is justified by the general failure of previous studies to 
report significant abnormal returns over shorter event-windows (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Del 
Brio et al., 2002). That is, shorter time periods seem unable to reflect the informational benefits of 
insiders. On the other hand, choosing a longer event-window could increase noise from other 
corporate events influencing stock prices. 
To empirically investigate whether more stringent insider trading restrictions reduce the profitability 
of insider trading, we estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which are clustered at firm-level (Rogers, 1993): 
ijjj1)20,0(ij IndexStringencyCAR εωα +++= γx , (7) 
with:  
CARij(0,20) = the cumulative abnormal return over 21 trading days for a particular event i of firm j. 
StringencyIndexj = the company-specific stringency index of firm j. This index is based on the content 
of the Dealing Codes operative in 2010.  
x = a vector of control variables. Based on prior research (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 
1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Del Brio and Perote, 2007; Betzer and Theissen, 2009; Chang and 
Corbitt, 2012), we included the following control variables: TradeSize equal to the eurovalue of the 
net transactions divided by the market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year 
                                                     
7
 Obviously, a particular firm can have more than one insider trading event during the sample period. 
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expressed in percentage, FirmSize equal to the log of the market capitalization of the company at the 
beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros, MarketToBook equal to the ratio of the 
market value of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year 
expressed in percentage, Leverage equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year 
expressed in percentage, Sale which is a dummy variable equal to one for net sale transactions and 
zero otherwise, OwnershipConc which is equal to the percentage ownership held by the largest 
shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year, Cross-listing which is a dummy variable equal one if a 
company is cross-listed on a foreign stock exchange in a particular year and zero otherwise and, 
finally, two year dummies which capture changes in a company’s environment, like changes in the 
institutional environment and the general condition of the economy (Year2011 and Year2012).  
 
4.6. Results  
4.6.1. Descriptive statistics on the stringency index and its determinants 
The final sample of 109 companies consists of 101 companies who have drawn up a Dealing Code in 
which corporate insider trading restrictions are formulated and 8 companies which do not impose any 
restrictions at all. In Appendix 4.A., each restriction documented by the FSMA is listed, accompanied 
by the number of firms that adopt the restriction. First, the table in Appendix 4.A. shows that most 
companies adopt black-out periods around the announcement of annual and interim financial results. 
Usually, trading by insiders is restricted for a period of at least one month before the announcement of 
these results. With regard to black-out periods around the announcement of other important events, the 
table shows that fewer companies adopt this restriction. In particular, about half of the companies 
comply with this recommendation. Regarding the appointment of a compliance officer, the displayed 
frequencies indicate that 93 companies or 85% of the sample follow this recommendation. With 
respect to the notification of transactions, 24 companies (i.e. 22%) do not require any notification at 
all. If notification is required, most companies ask their insiders to inform them about their 
transactions before and after the execution. A clearance mechanism which requires insiders to ask 
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permission to trade is adopted by a minority of companies. Comparable results are found for 
restrictions on short-term trading. However, if a restriction is formulated, most companies prohibit the 
reselling or repurchasing of shares for a period as long as six months. Finally, restrictions on option 
trading and short selling are least adopted. Merely 5 companies prohibit short selling, while 17 
companies forbid insiders to trade options. In conclusion, this discussion indicates that there is a 
substantial variation in the compliance with insider trading restrictions as well as the strictness of the 
adopted policies.  
Some additional descriptive statistics on the stringency index and its determinants are presented in 
Table 4.1. This table indicates that the mean (median) standardized stringency index is equal to 4.11 
(4.14). The standard deviation is equal to 1.96. Furthermore, the table shows that none of the sample 
companies has adopted the most stringent policy for all insider trading restrictions as the maximum 
value of the stringency index is equal to 7.67. Regarding the explanatory variables, Table 4.1. 
indicates that the average company size is equal to 12.34 million euros. The median being 12.19 
million euros. The smallest company in the sample has a market capitalization of 8.09 million euros, 
while the largest has a market capitalization of 17.87 million euros. On average, 32.67% of a 
company’s total assets is property, plant and equipment, while the median is equal to 18.02%. 
Companies also have an average growth in net sales of 21.51%, representing a company’s growth 
opportunities. The mean (median) debt-to-asset ratio is 24.55% (23.39%). Table 4.1. furthermore 
indicates that 6% of the sample companies is cross-listed in the U.S. or U.K. The largest shareholder 
on average has an ownership stake of 33.99%, the median being 30.07%. The median (mean) number 
of board members is equal to 8 (8.78). With respect to the composition of the board, Table 4.1. 
indicates that, on average, 40.71% of the board members are independent, while the median is equal to 
40%. Similarly, there is a high representation of non-executive directors as the mean (median) 
proportion is equal to 77.59% (83.33%). The functions of CEO and chairman of the board are also 
split by the majority of companies (87%). An internal audit function has been put into place in 57% of 
the sample companies. Finally, Table 4.1. shows that 31% of our sample companies are classified as 
financial companies by the ICB classification system.  
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Table 4.1.  Descriptive statistics on the stringency index and its determinants 
  Mean Median Std. Dev.   Min Q1 Q3 Max 
Dependent variable 
StringencyIndex 4.11 4.14 1.96 0.00 3.10 5.33 7.67 
Explanatory variables 
FirmSize 12.34 12.19 1.75 8.09 11.26 13.26 17.87 
AssetTangibility 32.67 18.02 32.18 0.00 6.45 47.66 99.13 
GrowthOpportunities 21.51 -4.11 162.67 -99.98 -19.60 9.33 1,385.81 
Leverage 24.56 23.39 18.34 0.00 7.74 37.37 73.62 
Cross-listing 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OwnershipConc 33.99 30.07 19.21 0.29 18.25 50.00 90.84 
BoardSize 2.13 2.08 0.34 1.10 1.95 2.30 3.14 
IndepDirectors 40.71 40.00 13.77 11.11 33.33 50.00 83.33 
NonExecDirectors 77.59 83.33 17.00 0.00 70.00 88.89 100.00 
CEODuality 0.87 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
InternalAudit 0.57 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Control variable  
Financial 0.31 0.00 0.47   0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics on the stringency index and its determinants (N=109). StringencyIndex represents the standardized 
company-specific stringency index. FirmSize is equal to the natural log of the market capitalization of the company at the beginning 
of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. AssetTangibility is equal to net property,plant and equipment scaled by total assets 
at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. GrowhtOpportunities is equal to the previous year's growth in net sales 
expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. 
Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if a company cross-listed on a U.S. or U.K. stock exchange in 2010 and zero 
otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
BoardSize is equal to the natural log of the number of board members. IndepDirectors is equal to the percentage of the number of 
independent directors. NonExecDirectors is equal to the number of non-executive directors. CEODuality is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the functions of CEO and chairman of the board are executed by a different person and zero otherwise. InternalAudit is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a company has established an internal audit function and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a company is a financial company according to the ICB classification and zero otherwise.  
 
4.6.2. Determinants of the stringency of insider trading policies  
Table 4.2. shows Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients between the stringency index and 
potential firm-level determinants of the stringency of insider trading restrictions. The univariate 
analyses show that, although the correlations on the explanatory variables generally have the expected 
signs, the stringency index is only significantly related to the dummy variables representing CEO 
duality and financial companies for the Spearman correlations and to the number of independent board 
members and CEO duality for Pearson correlations. Companies thus seem to adopt more stringent 
insider trading policies when the CEO does not serve as chairman of the board, when more 
independent directors are sitting on the board and when they are non-financial companies.  
  
Table 4.2.  Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients 
  
Stringency 
Index 
Firm 
Size 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Growth 
Opp. Leverage 
Cross- 
listing 
Ownership 
Conc 
Board 
Size 
Indep 
Directors 
NonExec 
Directors 
CEO 
Duality 
Internal 
Audit  Financial 
               
StringencyIndex 
 
 
0.07 
 
0.08 
 
0.06 
 
0.15 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.11 
 
0.19 * 0.10 
 
0.23 * 0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
FirmSize 0.02 
 
 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.12 
 
0.10 
 
0.14 
 
-0.03 
 
0.57 * 0.02 
 
0.20 * 0.18 
 
0.29 * 0.05 
 
AssetTangibility 0.10 
 
-0.07 
 
 
 
0.06 
 
0.50 * -0.07 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.17 
 
0.01 
 
0.11 
 
0.05 
 
0.25 * 
GrowthOpp. 0.13 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
-0.02 
 
0.17 
 
0.09 
 
0.05 
 
-0.14 
 
0.21 * 
Leverage 0.12 
 
0.07 
 
0.45 * 0.09 
 
 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.01 
 
0.30 * 0.02 
 
0.18 
 
0.21 * 0.19 
 
0.22 * 
Cross-listing 0.00 
 
0.10 
 
-0.06 
 
0.13 
 
-0.20 * 
 
 
-0.14 
 
0.04 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.03 * -0.08 
 
OwnershipConc 0.00 
 
-0.09 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
-0.15 
 
 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.13 
 
BoardSize 0.12 
 
0.47 * 0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.32 * 0.05 
 
-0.08 
 
 
 
-0.18 
 
0.46 * 0.15 
 
0.37 * 0.00 
 
IndepDirectors 0.14 
 
0.01 
 
0.12 
 
0.07 
 
0.05 
 
0.11 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.15 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
0.26 * 
-0.12 
 
-0.01 
 
NonExecDirectors 0.03 
 
0.25 * 0.01 
 
0.21 * 0.19 * 0.15 
 
-0.10 
 
0.50 * 0.03 
 
 
 
0.24 * 0.15 
 
-0.06 
 
CEODuality 0.21 * 0.20 * 0.08 
 
-0.05 
 
0.21 * -0.03 
 
-0.08 
 
0.17 
 
0.26 * 0.23 * 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
InternalAudit 0.18 
 
0.28 * 0.15 
 
-0.06 
 
0.19 * -0.03 
 
-0.14 
 
0.37 * -0.16 
 
0.23 * 0.05 
  
-0.17 
 
Financial -0.22 * 0.07   0.03   0.19   0.22 * -0.08   -0.12   0.03   0.03   -0.03   0.02   0.02       
Notes: Spearman (below diagnoal) and Pearson (above diagonal) correlations (N=109). StringencyIndex represents the standardized company-specific stringency index (N=109). FirmSize is equal to the 
natural log of the market capitalization of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. AssetTangibility is equal to net property,plant and equipment scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. GrowhtOpportunities is equal to the previous year's growth in net sales expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the 
beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if a company cross-listed on a U.S. or U.K. stock exchange in 2010 and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc 
is equal to the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year. BoardSize is equal to the natural log of the number of board members. IndepDirectors is equal to the 
percentage of independent directors on the board. NonExecDirectors is equal to the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. CEODuality is a dummy variable equal to one if the functions of 
CEO and chairman of the board are executed by a different person and zero otherwise. InternalAudit is a dummy variable equal to one if a company has established an internal audit function and zero 
otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable equal to one if a company is a financial company according to the ICB classification and zero otherwise. * denotes two-tailed significance at the 0.05 level.  
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In Table 4.3. regression results on the determinants of the company-specific stringency index are 
reported. We use an OLS regression and also check the robustness of our results using a Tobit 
regression as the stringency index is a censored variable with a minimum value of zero and a 
maximum value of nine. We do not expect any multicollinearity problems as the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF’s) are well below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006).81In 
addition, Pearson correlations between the stringency index and the explanatory variables are below 
the 0.7-limit suggested by Kervin (1992).  
Results using both estimation methods are comparable, as shown by models 1 and 2. In particular, 
both models in Table 4.3. support hypothesis 3 and confirm that companies with more growth 
opportunities adopt more stringent insider trading policies. This finding confirms the results of 
previous studies which argue that companies with more growth opportunities are often in need of 
external financing and will therefore improve their governance in an attempt to raise capital at more 
favorable terms (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004).  
With regard to the influence of a company’s governance structure, Table 4.3. shows that the 
limitations imposed on trading by company insiders are more stringent in companies where a larger 
proportion of the board members are independent directors (hypothesis 8). Accordingly, this findings 
confirms the result of prior studies that board independence is crucial to ascertain that management 
and board activities are monitored effectively (Chen and Jaggi, 2000).  
Furthermore, the control variable for financial companies indicates that insider trading policies in 
these companies are significantly less stringent compared to non-financial companies. Probably this is 
due to the fact that Belgian financial companies already have to comply with an additional and more 
stringent set of legal requirements and requirements imposed by external bodies like the FSMA. 
Accordingly, the need to impose further additional restrictions is probably lower in financial 
companies.  
 
                                                     
81Variance Inflation Factors are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 4.3.  Regression results on determinants of policy stringency 
  Expected 
sign 
Model 1: OLS regression   Model 2: Tobit regression 
Variables Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e. 
         
FirmSize + -0.019 
 
0.16 0.014 
 
0.17 
AssetTangibility - 0.001 
 
0.01 0.001 
 
0.01 
GrowthOpportunities + 0.001 * 0.00 0.001 * 0.00 
Leverage + 0.012 
 
0.01 0.013 
 
0.01 
Cross-listing + -0.249 
 
0.87 -0.363 
 
0.94 
OwnershipConc ? -0.002 
 
0.01 -0.002 
 
0.01 
BoardSize - 0.393 
 
0.91 0.363 
 
0.96 
IndepDirectors + 0.023 * 0.01 0.026 ** 0.02 
NonExecDirectors + -0.004 
 
0.02 -0.005 
 
0.02 
CEODuality + 0.921 
 
0.74 0.946 
 
0.77 
InternalAudit + 0.453 
 
0.43 0.479 
 
0.44 
Financial ? -0.818 * 0.42 -0.846 * 0.45 
Constant ? 1.815 
 
1.64 1.316 1.73 
        
 
Observations 109 Observations 109 
 
R² 
 
0.14 Log Likelihood -220.50 
 
R² adj. 
 
0.04 Pseudo R² 0.04 
 
F-stat. 
 
1.92 F-stat. 1.86 
  
  P-value   0.04 
  
P-value   0.05 
Notes: OLS and Tobit regression results on the determinants of the company-specific stringency index (N=109). StringencyIndex 
represents the standardized company-specific stringency index. FirmSize is equal to the natural log of the market capitalization of the 
company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. AssetTangibility is equal to net property, plant and 
equipment scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. GrowhtOpportunities is equal to the previous year's growth in net 
sales. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Cross-listing is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a company cross-listed on a U.S. or U.K. stock exchange. OwnershipConc is equal to the percentage 
ownership of the largest shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year. BoardSize is equal to the natural log of the number of board 
members. IndepDirectors is equal to the percentage of independent directors on the board. NonExecDirectors is equal to the 
percentage of non-executive directors. CEODuality is a dummy variable equal to one if the functions of CEO and chairman of the 
board are executed by a different person and zero otherwise. InternalAudit is a dummy variable equal to one if a company has 
established an internal audit function and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable equal to one if a company is a financial 
company according to the ICB classification and zero otherwise. Significance levels are two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" 
and one-tailed otherwise, with *** < 0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
 
4.6.3. Effect of policy stringency on insider trading profitability  
In order to investigate whether more stringent insider trading policies are indeed effective in restricting 
insiders to benefit from their privileged access to information, we regress the cumulative abnormal 
return of insider trades on the company-specific stringency index. In addition, we include several 
control variables which have been shown to affect the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal returns. OLS 
regression results in Table 4.4. (Model 1) show a negative coefficient on the stringency index. The 
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coefficient is however not significant and no support for hypothesis 12 is thus found.91Consequently, 
our results seem to indicate that the efforts of companies to more strictly monitor their insiders do not 
result in lower abnormal gains on insider trading.  
Regarding the control variables, our results are consistent with prior insider trading studies. In 
particular, Table 4.4. shows that abnormal returns are lower in larger companies. Previous studies 
argue that information asymmetry is lower in large companies as they are followed by more financial 
analysts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Barth et al., 2001) and have more media coverage (Fang and 
Peress, 2009). Furthermore, sales transactions by Belgian insiders are more profitable than purchases. 
Due to the highly concentrated ownership structure in Belgian companies (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002), insiders probably refrain from selling shares for fear of losing corporate 
control. They will only sell when they have strong negative beliefs about the company perspectives. 
Finally, we included year-dummies to capture changes in a company’s environment, like changes in 
the institutional environment and in the general condition of the economy.  
 A potential issue when investigating the relationship between the abnormal returns gained by 
corporate insiders and the strictness of the policies that companies impose on their insiders may be the 
direction of causality. As previously argued, more stringent insider trading restrictions may reduce 
abnormal trading gains. However, the magnitude of insiders’ abnormal gains may in its turn also 
prompt companies to adjust the stringency level of their restrictions. To address this potential 
endogeneity problem, we re-estimate the relation between insider trading returns and the stringency 
index by means of a two stage least squares regression (2SLS). The first stage corresponds to 
equation (1) in which we define the determinants of the company-specific stringency index. The 
predicted values of the stringency index are then used in the second stage which corresponds to 
equation (7) and investigates the impact of the stringency level on insiders’ abnormal returns.  
 
                                                     
91Similar regression results are found when abnormal returns are estimated solely using the standard market model and when 
an estimation window of 250 trading days is used for the estimation of jαˆ and jˆβ  (see equations 4 and 5). 
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Results using two stage least squares are reported in Model 2 of Table 4.4. and are consistent with the 
results based on OLS. The Hansen (1982) J test supports the hypothesis that the proposed instruments 
are valid instruments (p-value : 0.56). In order to test whether the stringency index is endogenous, we 
use the Wooldrigde (1995) robust score test since we have used robust standard errors clustered at 
firm-level. This test is however strongly insignificant (p-value: 0.67) and the null hypothesis of the 
stringency index being exogenous cannot be rejected. As a consequence, preference is given to the 
OLS estimation which is the most efficient estimator in absence of endogeneity.  
 
Table 4.4.  Regression results on the effect of policy stringency on insider trading profitability 
  Expected 
sign 
  Model 1: OLS regression   Model 2: 2SLS regression 
Variables   Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e. 
Stringency - -0.079 0.24 -0.183 0.38 
TradeSize + -1.542 0.70 -1.574 0.70 
FirmSize - -0.597 ** 0.33 -0.616 ** 0.34 
MarketToBook ? 0.110 0.14 0.099 0.13 
Leverage - 0.044 0.02 0.046 0.02 
Sale + 1.994 ** 1.00 2.023 ** 0.97 
OwnershipConc ? -0.005 0.03 -0.002 0.03 
Cross-listing - -0.083 1.28 -0.006 1.34 
Year2011 ? 2.117 ** 1.00 2.134 ** 1.00 
Year2012 ? -1.649 1.48 -1.639 1.46 
Constant ? 2.084 1.97 2.454 2.49 
Observations 379 Observations 379 
R² 0.05 R² 0.05 
R² adj. 0.02 R² adj. 0.02 
F-stat. 3.58  χ² -stat.  35.73 
      P-value   0.00   P-value   0.00 
Notes: OLS and 2SLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=379). Abnormal returns for net sales 
transactions are multiplied by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return measured using a 
standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. StringencyIndex represents 
standardized company-specific stringency index. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market 
value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market 
capitalization of the company expressed in millions of euros at the beginning of the fiscal year. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of 
the market capitalization of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in 
percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy 
variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the ownership of the largest 
shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if a company cross-listed on at least 
one foreign stock exchange in a particular year and zero otherwise. Year2011 is a dummy variable equal to one for transactions 
executed during fiscal year 2011 and zero otherwise. Year2012 is a dummy variable equal to one for transactions executed during 
fiscal year 2012 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are 
two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and one-tailed otherwise, with ***<0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
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Finally, in an additional analysis we examine whether the diminishing effect of the stringency level of 
insider trading policies on insiders’ abnormal returns differs between small and large companies. For 
smaller companies it may be more difficult to ensure a strong enforcement of their policies due to 
resource constraints (Roulstone, 2003). To examine this proposition, we estimate the interaction effect 
between our stringency index and a dummy variable equal to one for the smallest companies in our 
sample. Results are reported in Table 4.5. and confirm that the lack of efficiency of the insider trading 
policies is especially outspoken in smaller companies.  
 
Table 4.5.  Regression results on the differential effect of policy stringency on insider trading 
profitability in small companies 
  Expected 
sign 
  Model 3: OLS regression   Model 4: 2SLS regression 
Variables   Coef.   s.e.   Coef.   s.e. 
          
Stringency - -0.159 
 
0.26 -0.214 
 
0.38 
TradeSize + -1.698 
 
0.76 -1.718 
 
0.76 
FirmSize - -0.266 
 
0.39 -0.269 
 
0.39 
MarketToBook ? 0.123 
 
0.14 0.118 
 
0.13 
Leverage - 0.041 
 
0.02 0.042 
 
0.02 
Sale + 1.886 ** 0.95 1.899 ** 0.92 
OwnershipConc ? -0.011 
 
0.03 -0.010 
 
0.03 
Cross-listing - -0.422 
 
1.29 -0.389 
 
1.33 
Year2011 ? 2.291 ** 0.97 2.303 ** 0.96 
Year2012 ? -1.324 
 
1.34 -1.313 
 
1.32 
Small*Stringency + 0.529 ** 0.27 
 
0.539 ** 0.25 
Constant ? 0.399 
 
2.34 0.559 
 
2.81 
 
Observations Observations 
R² 379 R² 379 
R² adj. 0.06 R² adj. 0.06 
F-stat. 0.03  χ² -stat.  0.03 
      P-value   3.53   P-value   40.01 
Notes: OLS and 2SLS regression results for a pooled sample of net purchases and sales (N=379). Abnormal returns for net sales 
transactions are multiplied by minus one. CARij(0,20) is equal to the event-specific cumulative abnormal return measured using a 
standard market model or a Dimson-adjusted market model depending on the number of zero returns. StringencyIndex represents 
standardized company-specific stringency index. TradeSize is equal to the eurovalue of the net transactions divided by the market 
value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market 
capitalization of the company expressed in millions of euros at the beginning of the fiscal year. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of 
the market capitalization of the company divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in 
percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Sale is a dummy 
variable equal to one for net sale transactions and zero otherwise. OwnershipConc is equal to the ownership of the largest 
shareholder at the beginning of the fiscal year. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if a company cross-listed on at least 
one foreign stock exchange in a particular year and zero otherwise. Year2011 is a dummy variable equal to one for transactions 
executed during fiscal year 2011 and zero otherwise. Year2012 is a dummy variable equal to one for transactions executed during 
fiscal year 2012 and zero otherwise. Small is a dummy variable equal to one for companies belonging to the 25-percentile. Standard 
errors are adjusted for firm-clustering and heteroskedasticity. Significance levels are two-tailed when "Expected sign" is a "?" and 
one-tailed otherwise, with ***<0.01,** < 0.05, * < 0.10.  
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4.7. Conclusion  
This paper focused on the restrictions that companies impose on insider trading in addition to the legal 
requirements. In particular, we based our inquiry on a study of the insider trading restrictions 
formulated in the corporate governance codes of Belgian listed companies. This study revealed that 
self-regulation of corporate governance practices led to significant differences in the stringency of the 
restrictions that companies impose on their insiders. Using this insight, this study examines whether 
company characteristics explain differences in the stringency level. Our results indicate that more 
stringent policies are adopted by companies with more growth opportunities and in companies that 
cross-list on stock markets with more rigorous governance systems. Furthermore, the strictness of the 
policies also seems to depend on the governance structures that are put in place. A higher 
representation of independent directors who are likely to act in the interest of minority groups instead 
of executives both has a positive impact on the stringency of insider trading policies. 
In the second part of our paper, we question the effectiveness of the stringency of the trading 
restrictions and test whether transactions in companies with more stringent restrictions render lower 
abnormal returns to insiders. Our results, however, indicate that the stringency level of trading 
restrictions does not influence the magnitude of the abnormal returns gained by insiders. This lack of 
efficiency is especially outspoken in smaller companies. 
Our research results may be of interest to policy makers as they provide evidence that companies make 
use of the self-regulation principle by adjusting their insider trading policies to their own contracting 
environment. Nonetheless, our result seem to indicate that this is no guarantee for success. Further 
research is however necessary to determine whether trading restrictions are not effective because 
companies have not chosen the optimal policy or because the policies are not strongly enforced.  
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4.9. Appendix 4.A. 
Insider Trading Restrictions and the Different Policies Adopted by Companies 
Restrictions and policies Assigned 
score 
  Number of firms 
adopting the policy 
  
     
 1. Black-out periods around the announcement of annual 
financial results  
  
 
 a. no black-out period  0 
 
11 
 b. black-out period but not specified 1 
 
5 
 c. black-out period 1 week before publication of annual 
financial results  2 
 
0 
 d. black-out period 15 days before publication of annual 
financial results  3 
 
4 
 e. black-out period 1 month before publication of annual 
financial results  4 
 
46 
 f. black-out period 1.5 months before publication of annual 
financial results  5 
 
4 
 g. black-out period 2 months before publication of annual 
financial results  6 
 
23 
 h.  black-out period starts when the annual financial 
statements are closed 7 
 
16 
   
   2. Black-out periods around the announcement of interim 
financial results  
   
 a. no black-out period  0 
 
11 
 b. black-out period but not specified 1 
 
6 
 c. black-out period 1 week before publication of interim 
financial results  2 
 
1 
 d. black-out period 15 days before publication of interim 
financial results  3 
 
7 
 e. black-out period 1 month before publication of interim 
financial results  4 
 
62 
 f. black-out period 1.5 months before publication of interim 
financial results  5 
 
3 
 g. black-out period 2 months before publication of interim 
financial results  6 
 
4 
 h.  black-out period starts when the interim financial 
statements are closed 7 
 
15 
   
   3. Additional black-out periods around the announcement of 
other important events 
   
 a. no 0 
 
55 
 b.  yes  1 
 
54 
   
   4. Appointment of a compliance officer  
   
 a. no 0 
 
16 
 b.  yes 1 
 
93 
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Restrictions and policies Assigned 
score 
 
Number of firms 
adopting policy 
 
   5. Notification of transactions  
   
 a. no notification 0 
 
24 
 b. notification after transaction was executed 1 
 
8 
 c. notification before transaction is executed 2 
 
24 
 d. notification before and after executing transaction 3 
 
53 
   
   6. Clearance - mechanism 
   
 a. no clearance or advise required before transaction may 
be executed  0 
 
63 
 b.  clearance or advise required before transaction may be 
executed  1  46 
   
   7. Restriction on short-term trading 
   
 a. no restriction  0 
 
61 
 b. short-term trading is advised against  1 
 
7 
 c. prohibition on short-term trading : term not defined  2 
 
12 
 d. prohibition on short-term trading : term of 1 month 3 
 
2 
 e. prohibition on short-term trading : term of 3 months 4 
 
3 
 f. prohibition on short-term trading : term of 6 months 5 
 
24 
   
   8. Restriction on trading of options 
   
 a. no restrictions 0 
 
92 
 b.  prohibition to trade options 1 
 
17 
   
   9. Restrictions on short selling  
   
 a. no restrictions 0 
 
104 
 b. prohibition to engage in short selling 1 
 
5 
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CHAPTER 5:  
CONCLUSION  
 
The goal of this dissertation was to provide insight into the trading activity of insiders of Belgian listed 
companies and the gains they earned through these transactions. In particular, it examines how 
insiders’ trading profits were affected by the occurrence of the financial crisis. Furthermore, it also 
studies the relationship between the magnitude of insider trading profits and the quality of company 
communication. Finally, it offers insight into determinants of company specific corporate governance 
policies on insider trading and the effectiveness of these policies in preventing unfair enrichment by 
insiders.  
In this final chapter, I will summarize and highlight the main findings of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the academic contributions and policy implications. This conclusion ends 
with a discussion of limitations and potential avenues for future research.  
 
5.1. Main findings  
This dissertation analyzed insider trading in Belgium and more specifically the profitability thereof. 
The first paper focused on whether the profitability of insider trading was affected by the occurrence 
of the financial crisis, whereas the second and third paper focused on how the quality of a company’s 
corporate governance practices may contribute to the reduction of insider trading profitability. In 
particular, the second paper examined whether higher-quality reporting by companies enhances the 
level-playing field and consequently adds to the prevention of unfair enrichment by insiders. The third 
paper studied how companies themselves may add to the limitation of insider trading profits by 
imposing additional restriction on insider trading outside current legislation.  
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The first dissertation paper focused on whether insiders were able to earn higher abnormal gains 
during the recent financial crisis. Such a financial crisis creates a chaotic financial environment in 
which investors react more nervously to news and experience more difficulties in ascertaining the 
fundamental value of companies. This then raises the question whether this uncertain investment 
environment enlarged the opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational benefits or whether 
the current legislation was able to prevent this. The Belgian stock market provided an interesting 
environment to test this proposition as it was especially vulnerable to the financial crisis given the 
importance of financial institutions on the Belgian market. Our research results showed that, while 
Belgian insiders were generally able to earn excess returns, the magnitude of their abnormal profits 
was substantially higher during the years of the financial crisis. Consequently, our findings indicated 
that the highly uncertain and volatile stock markets exacerbated the information asymmetry between 
insiders and other market participants and created additional opportunities for insiders to gain excess 
returns. In addition, given that the financial crisis originally harmed bank and insurance companies the 
most, we also addressed the question whether insiders of these companies proportionally benefited 
more than other insiders. However, we did not find evidence supporting this proposition.  
The second dissertation paper examined whether high-quality corporate communication contributes to 
reducing insider trading profitability and information asymmetry. Information is regarded as high-
quality if it is precise, transparent, timely and relevant (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). In this paper, we 
proxied the quality of corporate communication using disclosure scores that were assigned by 
financial analysts and fund managers who are familiar with the peculiarities and demands of the 
companies’ investor community. One of the advantages of using these scores is that they are more 
objective than researcher-assigned scores. Consistent with expectations, we found that high-quality 
communication limits the profitability of insider trading. Moreover, we reported evidence on the 
communication channels that contribute most to the reduction of information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders and the resulting insider trading gains. In particular, we documented that, 
although disclosures in mandatory annual reports have some impact, voluntary disclosure channels, 
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such as investor relation programs and press releases, are the most effective channels to reduce 
information asymmetry.  
The third paper focused on the restrictions that companies impose on insider trading in addition to 
legal requirements. We based our inquiry on a study by the Financial Services and Markets Authority 
(FSMA) of the insider trading policies formulated in the corporate governance codes of Belgian listed 
companies. This study revealed that the self-regulation principle, which is typical of corporate 
governance practices, led to significant differences in the stringency of the restrictions that companies 
impose on their insiders. Using this insight, we examined whether company characteristics explain 
differences in the stringency level. Research results indicated that more stringent policies are adopted 
by companies with more growth opportunities. These companies are often in need of external 
financing and improve their governance practices in an attempt to raise capital at more favorable 
terms. Furthermore, the strictness of the policies also seemed to depend on the governance structures 
that are put in place as a higher level of board independence also resulted in more stringent restrictions 
on trading by insiders. In particular, a higher representation of independent directors who are likely to 
act in the interest of minority groups instead of executives has a positive impact on the stringency of 
insider trading policies. In the second part of the paper, we questioned the effectiveness of the 
stringency of the trading restrictions and tested whether transactions in companies with more stringent 
restrictions render lower abnormal returns to insiders. Our results, however, indicated that the 
stringency level of trading restrictions does not influence the magnitude of the abnormal returns 
gained by insiders. This lack of efficiency is especially outspoken in smaller companies.  
 
5.2. Academic contributions  
This dissertation contributes to several streams of literature. The main contributions of this dissertation 
are situated in the insider trading literature. A first, general contribution of this dissertation is that it 
adds to the emerging literature on insider trading in Europe. Early studies investigating insider trading 
mainly focused on the U.S. stock market (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986; Lin and 
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Howe, 1990; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003). However, given the differences in the 
business and institutional context between U.S., Asian and European companies (La Porta et al., 1997; 
La Porta et al., 1998), results of these studies are not necessarily generalizable to other stock markets. 
Studies by Beny (1999) and Cheuk et al. (2006) have, for example, found that the level of law 
enforcement and the development of stock markets are important determinants of insider trading 
profitability. As a consequence, academics later also shifted their focus towards emerging Asian stock 
markets, while European markets were largely left uncovered. Examples of Asian studies are Chiang 
et al. (2004) (Taiwan), Wong et al. (2010) (Malaysia) and Cheuk et al. (2006) (Hong Kong). Research 
on European markets was lagging behind until recently as insider trading studies are generally based 
on databases of transactions reported to a supervisory authority. These reported transactions provide 
an abundance of data on the trading behavior of insiders. In the U.S., insiders have been obliged to 
report their trading activity to the SEC since 1934. A similar reporting duty was only imposed in 
Europe since 2003 by the introduction of the European Directive on insider trading and market 
manipulation (Directive 2003/6/EC). Studies on European stock markets have been performed for 
Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), Spain (Del Brio et al., 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 
2005), the U.K. (Gregory et al., 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), Italy (Bajo and Petracci, 2006) and the 
Netherlands (Degryse et al., 2009). To the best of my knowledge, no prior studies have focused on the 
Belgian stock market. Further expanding the research on European stock markets may however 
provide valuable insights as institutional differences may also be prevalent between European 
countries (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998).  
A second contribution to the insider trading literature is the improvement of insight into the potential 
drivers of insider trading profitability. While ample evidence exists on the effect of trade and company 
characteristics like transaction size, trading intensity, company size and market-to-book and debt-to-
equity ratios, knowledge on the effects of economy-wide or country-specific characteristics and of 
corporate governance related characteristics is limited. Aiming to address this gap, the first paper 
studied the effect of the financial crisis, the second paper examined the impact of corporate 
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communication quality and finally, the third paper explored the effect of company-specific insider 
trading restrictions.  
Regarding potential economy-wide or country-specific determinants, prior studies have explored how 
insider trading profits are affected by differences in the institutional environment such as the level of 
law enforcement (e.g. Beny, 1999; Wisniewski and Bohl, 2005), investor protection (Fidrmuc et al., 
2011) and stock market characteristics, i.e. emerging versus developed stock markets (e.g. 
Bhattacharya et al., 2000; Cheuk et al., 2006). No prior studies have however provided evidence on 
whether the occurrence of a financial crisis enlarges the opportunities of insiders to exploit their 
informational benefits. Results of our inquiry identified crisis periods as an important additional driver 
of insider trading profitability. 
Given the large emphasis of researchers and practitioners on the importance of good corporate 
governance in managing the information asymmetry problem, also insider trading research started to 
consider corporate governance related variables. Accordingly, studies have looked into the effect of 
ownership concentration (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Del Brio and Perote, 2007; Betzer and Theissen, 
2009), type of controlling shareholder (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), board composition (Chang et al., 
2005) and executive compensation (Zhang et al., 2005). Nevertheless, while it is generally 
acknowledged that comprehensive, transparent and timely disclosures are essential elements of good 
corporate governance (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Mitton, 2002; Mallin, 2002; OECD, 2004; Patel 
and Dallas, 2002), no prior study has, to the best of our knowledge, thoroughly investigated the effect 
of the quality of corporate disclosures on insider trading returns. In the second dissertation paper, we 
examined this relation by relating professional analyst disclosure scores to the profitability of insider 
trading. Analysts are regarded as the primary and most influential users of corporate communication 
as they communicate with companies on a daily basis (e.g. Schipper, 1991; Hirst et al., 1995; Revsine 
et al., 2004; IASB, 2005). This puts them in a privileged position to objectively evaluate the quality of 
corporate disclosures. Hence, we believe that the analyst disclosure scores provide a more direct and 
objective measure of corporate communication quality compared to previously used measures such as 
voluntary adoption of international reporting standards (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), news coverage 
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(Frankel and Li, 2004) and value relevance (Frankel and Li, 2004). In addition, the analyst disclosure 
scores include an individual assessment of the quality of annual reports, press releases, websites and 
investor relation activities. This allowed us to assess whether the effect of the quality of 
communication differs across alternative communication channels. Furthermore, a general advantage 
of using an externally-developed disclosure rating is that these do not involve judgment by the 
researcher(s) in question. This facilitates the verification of research results and the application of the 
rating in other research designs (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Researchers also only have access to 
published information and lack knowledge of disclosures distributed through unpublished channels 
like analyst meetings and conference calls (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
In the third paper of this dissertation, we again focused on the importance of good corporate 
governance by examining the effectiveness of company-specific insider trading policies. These 
policies are restrictions on insider trading imposed by companies and fall within the scope of corporate 
governance mechanisms. The policies include the requirement of ex ante approval of insiders’ 
transactions, restrictions on option trading, on short selling, on short-term trading and on trading 
around news announcements. Prior research on the effectiveness of these policies is limited. To the 
best of our knowledge only three papers have addresses this issue (Bettis et al., 2000; Jagolinzer et al., 
2011; Petracci, 2011). In addition, no prior study has considered the combined impact of all insider 
trading policies imposed by companies. Different policies may however complement each other or 
may be used as substitutes (Jagolinzer et al., 2011). Accordingly, not taking into account the joint 
impact of all policies may give a biased view on the effectiveness of the trading policies. We therefore 
constructed a stringency index which took the strictness of all company-imposed policies into account.  
Next to contributing to the insider trading literature, this dissertation also adds to other streams of 
literature. First, the financial crisis-study contributes to the literature on the efficiency of stock markets 
during financial crises. Prior studies by Cheong et al. (2007) and Lim et al. (2008) focused on Asian 
stock markets during the 1997 financial crisis and found evidence of increased inefficiency. We 
confirmed and generalized their findings by evaluating the efficiency of the highly developed Belgian 
stock market during another financial crisis.  
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Second, the paper on corporate disclosure quality contributes to the academic literature on the relation 
between disclosure quality and information asymmetry by using insider trading profitability as a proxy 
for information asymmetry rather than, for example, bid-ask spreads or the probability of informed 
trading. The use of this proxy is well-established in the empirical literature (e.g. Frankel and Li, 2004; 
Chang et al., 2005) and supported by theoretical work (Kyle, 1985). Furthermore, the majority of prior 
disclosure studies is based on U.S. data (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Re-examining the 
disclosure - information asymmetry relation for a sample of Belgian listed companies may thus 
provide valuable new insights as the Belgian institutional setting differs from the U.S. Furthermore, 
we were also the first to investigate the disclosure - information asymmetry relation in a French civil 
law country using disclosure scores assigned by professional financial analysts and which rate the 
quality of different communication channels. 
Finally, the third paper has multiple contributions to the corporate governance literature. First, we add 
to this literature investigating firm-level differences in corporate governance practices. Based on the 
seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998), prior research on corporate governance has primarily focused 
on how institutional differences provoke a different approach towards corporate governance at 
country-level (e.g. Doidge et al., 2007). Nonetheless, as prior studies have shown, corporate 
governance practices also differ substantially between companies located within the same country (e.g. 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006). Research into the firm characteristics that motivate 
companies to invest in higher-quality corporate governance is however rather limited (e.g. Klapper 
and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies 
have specifically analyzed how company characteristics affect corporate insider trading policies 
(Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Petracci, 2011). We expand this line of research in two ways. On the one 
hand, we do not focus on a single aspect of corporate restrictions like black-out periods or ex ante 
approval of insider trades. Instead, we consider the full set of policies that a company imposes on its 
insiders. In addition, in contrast to previous studies which are mere compliance studies and only 
consider whether a policy was adopted or not, we also take into account the stringency of the adopted 
policy. As the policies on insider trading are part of corporate governance practices, companies have 
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the freedom to choose the practices they believe are best for them. The “comply or explain” principle 
which is typical of corporate governance recommendations implies that (national) corporate 
governance codes broadly formulate some guidelines and that companies customize the elaboration to 
their specific characteristics and environment. Consequently, it can be expected that companies exhibit 
substantial differences in the restrictions they impose on their insiders. Finally, our study also 
contributes to the literature examining the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. A company 
which chooses to improve its corporate governance practices intends to mitigate agency problems and 
commits itself to act in the best interest of its stakeholders. If governance practices are effective and 
stakeholders acknowledge a company’s efforts, this should be reflected in higher market valuation 
(Goncharov et al., 2006), better operating performance (Gompers et al., 2003) and easier access to 
external capital (Klapper and Love, 2004). Obviously, with regard to insider trading policies, we 
expect a direct impact on insiders’ behavior and the magnitude of their trading profits.  
 
5.3. Practical implications  
The findings presented in the three studies also have several practical implications.  
First, this dissertation study confirmed the general finding of previous studies that insider trading is 
profitable. Results of the first paper even indicated that the occurrence of the financial crisis enlarged 
the opportunities of insiders to exploit their informational benefit and led to a further deterioration of 
the financial market efficiency. This result provides valuable insight to regulators with respect to the 
effectiveness of the current legislation. As a result of the financial crisis, initiatives for regulatory 
reforms have already been taken at the national as well as international level. In Belgium, the 
legislation on the imposition of administrative fines has for example been altered in order to increase 
the efficiency of the procedure and enlarged the dissuasive effect of administrative sanctions (FSMA, 
2012). At the level of the European Union, a new European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
was established in 2011 to help coordinate the supervision of financial markets across member states 
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(European Commission, 2009).1 One of the most important shortcomings in financial supervision 
exposed by the financial crisis was that national supervision models have been lagging behind 
financial globalization and failed to adequately deal with the integrated and interconnected nature of 
European financial markets. The European Union has therefore constructed a European System of 
Financial Supervision which comprises three European supervisory authorities, i.e. the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Accordingly, the European Commission 
intends to integrate supervision in order to ensure a level-playing field. Furthermore, regulators are 
currently transforming the existing European directive on market abuse into a European regulation 
(European Commission, 2011a). Given that regulations prescribed by the European Union are directly 
applicable in member states and no translation into national legislation is needed as with European 
directives, the European Commission hopes to increase the effectiveness of the market abuse 
legislation. In particular, an evaluation of the current 2003 Directive has indicated that the numerous 
options left to member states have led to an incoherent approach towards market abuse and the 
undermining of the effectiveness of the directive. The new regulation will, amongst other things, 
increase the power of competent authorities like the FSMA by giving them the permission to access 
private premises and seize documents when necessary and by allowing them to acquire data on 
telephone and data traffic. Furthermore, the concept of “inside information” will be more broadly 
defined such that the prohibition against insider trading may apply even if the information is not 
precise enough for the issuer to be under the obligation to disclose it. Examples of such information 
provided by the European Commission include: the state of contract negotiations, terms provisionally 
agreed in contract negotiations, the possibility of the placement of financial instruments, conditions 
under which financial instruments will be marketed, or provisional terms for the placement of 
financial instruments. Under the new regulation it will also be clarified that transactions whereby the 
manager pledges or lends his shares also have to be reported to a competent authority and made 
                                                     
1
 The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has officially been established by European Regulation No 
1095/2010 and is operative since 1 January 2011.   
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publicly available.2 Finally, a new directive on the enforcement of criminal sanctions in case of market 
abuse is also being formulated at the level of the European Union (European Commission, 2011b). 
Currently, insiders abuse differences in national legislation by speculating on where it would be most 
advantageous to commit certain crimes.  
The results of the second paper on disclosure quality may also be of interest to regulators for the 
findings generally underlined the importance of high-quality communication as an instrument to 
prevent information inequities and unfair enrichment by privileged insiders. Interestingly, however, 
our results showed that whereas regulators primarily focus on annual reports and backward-looking 
financial statements information, this communication channel is not the most effective in reducing the 
level of information asymmetry. By contrast, investor relation activities, which are used to 
communicate timely and forward-looking information on a voluntary basis, appeared to be most 
effective. We believe that this finding is relevant for regulators and may shed new light on the 
discussion concerning the shift towards more or less regulation of markets. 
Finally, the third paper on corporate governance policy may be of interest to policy makers as it 
provided evidence that companies make use of the self-regulation principle by adjusting their insider 
trading policies to their own contracting environment. Nonetheless, our result seemed to indicate that 
this is no guarantee for success as the insider trading policies did not seem effective in reducing 
insiders’ trading profits. Further research is however necessary to determine whether trading 
restrictions are not effective because companies have not chosen the optimal policy or because the 
policies are not strongly enforced.  
 
5.4. Limitations and avenues for future research  
The final section sets out to discuss the main limitations of this doctoral research and suggest some 
avenues for future research.  
                                                     
2
 A full overview of the regulatory reforms included in the new Market Abuse Regulation is provided on the website of the 
European Union http://ec.europe.eu.  
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First, an overall limitation of this research is that we used a sample of reported insider transactions. 
Although, insiders are obliged to report all transactions, they may still refrain from reporting for fear 
of criminal or administrative prosecutions. However, on the other hand, the FSMA also monitors 
whether insiders report their transactions and has the authority to impose administrative sanctions in 
case of non-reporting. Still, transactions are not ex post added by the FSMA to the database if they 
detect unreported transactions. Obviously, non-reporting by insiders is more likely when transactions 
are based on inside information. Nonetheless, we were still able to provide evidence that insiders reap 
higher trading profits compared to the average investor. In addition, other insider trading studies are 
faced with the same limitation as the vast majority of studies is based on a sample of reported insider 
transactions (e.g. Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Bajo and 
Petracci, 2006; Cheuk et al., 2006). 
A second, general limitation of this research is the restriction of our sample to Belgian listed 
companies. The Belgian stock market is a rather small stock market. As a consequence, our sample of 
reported insider trades is smaller than in most other studies, especially compared to studies focusing 
on the U.S. stock market. However, we believe that the external validity of our research is warranted 
as the Belgian institutional environment bears a strong resemblance to the environment of other 
continental European countries with a French-based civil law system. According to La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998), the Belgium legal and institutional environment is similar to the French, Dutch, Spanish, 
Italian and Portuguese environment. Consequently, we may assume that the results of our inquiry are, 
to some extent, generalizable to these economies. 
A third limitation of our research is the significant reduction of our sample due to the application of 
several filter criteria which were consistently used throughout the three papers. Although these criteria 
are in line with the insider trading literature, they led to an extensive reduction in the number of 
observations. Especially the application of non-contaminated event windows reduced our sample size 
considerably. In addition, concerns may be raised that the application of the filters may have led to 
sample selection issues. We checked the representability of our samples by comparing several firm 
characteristics of the companies included in the samples with the population of companies in the 
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insider trading database.3 Results of this comparison are included in Appendix 5.A. and show that, 
despite the application of these filters, the firm characteristics of the population companies and sample 
companies are highly comparable. Only in the second paper, the smallest companies appear to have 
been dropped from the sample. Probably this can be explained by the fact that companies need to 
qualify for screening by the Belgian Association of Financial Analysts (BVFA) in order to be retained 
in the sample. However, in order to qualify for screening, companies have to be followed by a 
financial analyst which could explain why smaller listed companies are not represented in this sample. 
Related to this observation, there is also a higher proportion of cross-listed companies included in the 
second study, probably because larger companies are more likely to cross-list on a foreign stock 
exchange. Other firm characteristics are comparable for the sample used in second paper and the 
population of insider trades in 2009. Furthermore, we also compared the distribution of the number of 
transactions, the number of shares trades and the transaction value on company-level 
(Appendix 5.B.).4 In sum, the comparison indicates that the relative proportions are generally 
comparable between the population and the samples used in the different papers. Finally, we also 
checked the robustness of our regression analyses if no adjustment for non-contaminated event 
windows is applied. In general, results are similar to our original analyses.  
Fourth, the disclosure scores of the Belgian Association of Financial Analysts (BVFA) used in the 
second paper are only awarded to a subsample of Belgian listed companies. Annually, the BVFA 
approximately rates 50 listed companies. Although the use of this disclosure score consequently limits 
our sample, we believe that our sample is still representable for the Belgian stock market as the BVFA 
score, unlike other analysts’ scores, does not only rate the communication quality of large companies 
but also from small companies. In 2007, for example, the sample of screened companies consisted of 
18 members of the Belgian blue-chip index (i.e. Bel20-index), 18 mid caps and 13 small caps. The 
comparison of the firm characteristics in Appendix 5.A. confirms that, although the smallest 
companies were dropped from our sample, smaller companies are still represented. Furthermore, the 
use of analyst disclosure scores is well-established in prior literature and has several advantages over 
                                                     
3
 As each sample-year consists of a different set of companies, we compared the last full-year subsample included in each 
paper with the population of insider trades in the respective year.  
4
 Distributions were compared before netting transactions within the same company on the same day.  
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researcher-developed scores. First, externally-developed disclosure ratings do not involve judgment by 
the researcher(s) in question. This facilitates the verification of research results and the application of 
the rating in other research designs (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Furthermore, unlike researchers, 
analysts also have access to unpublished and sometimes informal information disclosed during analyst 
meetings and conference calls (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Analysts are also regarded as the primary 
and most influential users of corporate communication as they communicate with companies on a 
daily basis (e.g. Schipper, 1991; Hirst et al., 1995; Revsine et al., 2004; IASB, 2005). This gives them 
the expertise and experience to objectively evaluate the quality of corporate disclosures. 
A final limitation of this dissertation is that we do not have insight into the underlying mechanisms 
and decision-making processes within companies. This limitation especially applies to the second 
paper on disclosure quality and the third paper on corporate insider trading policies. Consequently, 
further research using interviews or case-study evidence is necessary to ameliorate insight into these 
processes. Regarding the third paper, these studies may also help to explain the lack of effectiveness of 
the insider trading policies. On the one hand, these policies may be merely used as window-dressing to 
find favor with outside investors without being thoroughly enforced. On the other hand, companies 
may also have failed to adopt the optimal policy given their contracting environment.  
Another interesting avenue for future research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the different policies 
separately. From regulators’ point of view, evidence on which policies are most effective in reducing 
insider trading profitability may provide valuable insight into the usefulness of transforming these 
policies into legislation. A study by Betzer and Theissen (2009), for example, provided evidence that 
introducing trading bans around earnings announcements would significantly decrease insiders’ 
trading profits in Germany. The FSMA database on insider trading policies put at our disposal is 
however much broader and provides an overview of all policies imposed by companies. As such it 
may be interesting to compare the effectiveness of the different policies.  
Finally, it may also be interesting to evaluate the efficiency of the Belgian stock market in the post-
financial crisis period. When our study on the impact of the financial crisis on insider trading 
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profitability was conducted, we did not have sufficient data to address this question. However, in the 
wake of the financial crisis several regulatory reforms have already taken place or will take place in 
the future (see supra). An interesting question is then whether the adapted legislation is able to address 
the shortcomings of the prior legislation. Accordingly, lower or even insignificant insider trading 
profits should found in the post-crisis period.  
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5.6. Appendix 5.A. 
Table 5.1.  Respresentability of the samples used in papers 1 and 2 
Population (subsample 2009) 
  N Mean s.d. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
          
FirmSize 75 5.11 2.05 0.24 3.79 5.07 6.41 10.17 
MarketToBook 78 1.58 3.07 0.20 0.60 0.99 1.48 26.28 
Leverage 76 23.25 19.29 0.00 4.68 20.69 34.52 76.64 
OwnershipConc 74 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Cross-listing 72 0.63 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Paper 1 : Financial crisis (subsample 2009) 
  N Mean s.d. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
          
FirmSize 54 5.27 1.89 1.41 4.08 5.16 6.40 10.19 
MarketToBook 54 1.35 1.36 0.20 0.60 1.00 1.52 7.84 
Leverage 54 22.30 20.25 0.00 4.10 17.84 31.50 76.64 
OwnershipConc 54 0.33 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Cross-listing 50 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Paper 2 : Communication quality (subsample 2009) 
  N Mean s.d. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
          
FirmSize 27 6.12 1.76 3.61 4.74 5.48 7.20 10.19 
MarketToBook 27 1.59 1.80 0.31 0.56 0.98 1.52 7.84 
Leverage 27 25.15 19.79 0.00 7.60 25.27 40.63 76.64 
OwnershipConc 26 0.23 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Cross-listing 27 0.81 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: Descriptive statistics on company-level. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of company j at the beginning of 
fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of company j divided by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio of company j 
at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Ownership is a dummy variable equal to one if company j has a 
concentrated ownership structure and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if company j is cross-listed on a 
foreign stock exchange in 2010. 
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Table 5.2.  Respresentability of the sample used in paper 3 
Population (subsample 2011) 
  N Mean s.d. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
          
FirmSize 78 5.95 1.84 1.81 4.79 5.80 6.98 11.13 
MarketToBook 78 1.79 2.09 0.11 0.94 1.20 1.91 15.23 
Leverage 79 24.62 19.09 0.00 8.93 23.42 39.52 78.35 
OwnershipConc 79 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Cross-listing 79 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Paper 3 : Corporate policies (subsample 2011) 
  N Mean s.d. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
          
FirmSize 58 6.20 1.77 1.88 5.10 5.88 7.04 11.13 
MarketToBook 58 1.65 1.88 0.31 0.73 1.08 1.76 10.09 
Leverage 58 22.26 17.31 0.00 8.93 21.55 29.49 78.35 
OwnershipConc 58 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Cross-listing 58 0.62 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                    
Notes: Descriptive statistics on company-level. FirmSize is equal to the log of the market value of company j at the beginning of 
fiscal year expressed in millions of euros. MarketToBook is equal to the ratio of the market value of company j divided by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Leverage is equal to the debt-to-asset ratio of company j 
at the beginning of the fiscal year expressed in percentage. Ownership is a dummy variable equal to one if company j has a 
concentrated ownership structure and zero otherwise. Cross-listing is a dummy variable equal to one if company j is cross-listed on a 
foreign stock exchange in 2011. 
 
 
 
5.7. Appendix 5.B. 
  
 Table 5.3.  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of transactions) 
ISIN Company name    Population 
 
Paper 1: 
Financial crisis  
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality  
Paper 3 : 
Corporate policies 
BE0003888089 4Energy 12 0.18% 2 0.21% 3 0.64% 
BE0003793107 AB InBev 251 3.86% 37 3.88% 32 6.31% 10 2.15% 
BE0003877942 Ablynx 27 0.42% 5 0.52% 4 0.86% 
BE0003696102 Accentis 4 0.06% 1 0.10% 2 0.43% 
BE0003764785 Ackermans & van Haaren 26 0.40% 3 0.31% 3 0.59% 5 1.07% 
BE0003851681 Aedifica 9 0.14% 
BE0974264930 Ageas 59 0.91% 1 0.20% 
BE0003755692 Agfa-Gevaert 40 0.62% 17 1.78% 17 3.35% 2 0.43% 
BE0003868859 Alfacam 24 0.37% 2 0.43% 
BE0003874915 Arseus 68 1.05% 3 0.31% 3 0.59% 8 1.72% 
BE0161426185 Artwork Systems Group NV 3 0.05% 
BE0003856730 Ascensio 6 0.09% 
BE0003837540 Atenor 82 1.26% 10 1.05% 2 0.39% 4 0.86% 
BE0003787042 Auximines 48 0.74% 7 0.73% 4 0.86% 
BE0003008019 BNB-NBB 5 0.08% 1 0.10% 
BE0003892123 BSB 19 0.29% 
BE0003870871 Banimmo 68 1.05% 7 0.73% 3 0.64% 
BE0003790079 Barco 44 0.68% 12 1.26% 12 2.37% 2 0.43% 
BE0003678894 Befimmo 43 0.66% 10 1.05% 12 2.37% 1 0.21% 
BE0974258874 Bekaert 274 4.22% 37 3.88% 37 7.30% 15 3.22% 
BE0003810273 Belgacom 59 0.91% 6 0.63% 5 0.99% 9 1.93% 
BE0020575115 Belreca 32 0.49% 10 1.05% 4 0.86% 
BE0003723377 Beluga 105 1.62% 22 2.31% 
BE0003592038 Bois Sauvage 298 4.59% 17 1.78% 5 0.99% 9 1.93% 
BE0003697118 Brantano 17 0.26% 
BE0003792091 Brederode 162 2.49% 26 2.73% 8 1.72% 
BE0003817344 CMB 53 0.82% 12 1.26% 12 2.37% 8 1.72% 
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Table 5.3. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of transactions) 
ISIN Company name    Population 
 
Paper 1: 
Financial crisis  
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality  
Paper 3 : 
Corporate policies 
BE0003845626 CNP-NPM 80 1.23% 
BE0003825420 Campine 38 0.58% 7 0.73% 1 0.21% 
BE0003304061 Cimescaut 9 0.14% 7 0.73% 
BE0003519270 CoBrHa 29 0.45% 
BE0003593044 Cofinimmo 6 0.09% 5 0.52% 5 0.99% 
BE0160342011 Coil 1 0.02% 
BE0974256852 Colruyt 55 0.85% 15 1.57% 15 2.96% 15 3.22% 
BE0003786036 Connect Group 43 0.66% 1 0.10% 
BE0003819365 Cumerio 46 0.71% 8 0.84% 5 0.99% 
BE0974259880 D'Ieteren 104 1.60% 8 0.84% 8 1.58% 14 3.00% 
BE0003789063 Deceuninck 56 0.86% 13 1.36% 11 2.17% 2 0.43% 
BE0003624351 Deficom Group 111 1.71% 17 1.78% 
BE0003562700 Delhaize 138 2.12% 11 1.15% 11 2.17% 5 1.07% 
BE0003821387 Devgen 88 1.35% 17 1.78% 5 0.99% 9 1.93% 
BE0003796134 Dexia 125 1.92% 23 2.41% 23 4.54% 
BE0003776904 Dolmen 30 0.46% 5 0.52% 
BE0003762763 Duvel Moortgat 55 0.85% 11 1.15% 5 0.99% 10 2.15% 
BE0003820371 EVS Broadcast 81 1.25% 23 2.41% 14 2.76% 15 3.22% 
BE0003871887 Ecodis 5 0.08% 
BE0974266950 Econocom 142 2.19% 13 1.36% 21 4.51% 
BE0003822393 Elia 3 0.05% 
BE0003843605 Emakina 27 0.42% 
BE0045646560 Epiq 6 0.09% 1 0.10% 
BE0003816338 Euronav 39 0.60% 20 2.10% 4 0.79% 3 0.64% 
BE0003840577 Evadix 38 0.58% 
BE0003808251 Exmar 45 0.69% 16 1.68% 12 2.37% 6 1.29% 
BE0003823409 Financière de Tubize 24 0.37% 6 0.63% 
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 Table 5.3. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of transactions) 
ISIN Company name    Population 
 
Paper 1: 
Financial crisis  
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality  
Paper 3 : 
Corporate policies 
BE0003215143 Floridienne 86 1.32% 15 1.57% 13 2.79% 
BE0974265945 Fluxys 3 0.05% 
BE0003752665 Fountain Industries 1 0.02% 
BE0003797140 GBL 70 1.08% 7 0.73% 7 1.38% 6 1.29% 
BE0003699130 GIMV 21 0.32% 7 0.73% 7 1.38% 9 1.93% 
BE0003818359 Galapagos 53 0.82% 16 1.68% 8 1.72% 
FR0004152221 Global Graphics 78 1.20% 
BE0003700144 Hamon & Cie 2 0.03% 
BE0003766806 IBA 78 1.20% 15 1.57% 10 1.97% 4 0.86% 
BE0003756708 IRIS 6 0.09% 1 0.21% 
BE0003689032 Ibt 41 0.63% 13 1.36% 
BE0132053365 Icos 3 0.05% 1 0.10% 1 0.20% 
BE0003599108 Immobel 3 0.05% 3 0.31% 
BE0160220738 Innogenetics 4 0.06% 
BE0003746600 Intervest Offices 61 0.94% 4 0.42% 
BE0003754687 Intervest Retail 1 0.02% 1 0.10% 
BE0003858751 Jensen Group 1 0.02% 1 0.21% 
BE0003565737 KBC 221 3.40% 30 3.15% 30 5.92% 10 2.15% 
BE0003867844 KBC Ancora 5 0.08% 2 0.21% 1 0.21% 
BE0003880979 Keyware Technologies 108 1.66% 12 1.26% 11 2.36% 
BE0003722361 Kinepolis 32 0.49% 7 0.73% 7 1.38% 5 1.07% 
BE0003604155 Lotus Bakeries 44 0.68% 5 0.52% 1 0.20% 3 0.64% 
BE0165385973 Melexis 2 0.03% 1 0.10% 1 0.20% 
BE0003859767 Metris 31 0.48% 5 0.52% 4 0.79% 
BE0003731453 Miko 15 0.23% 6 0.63% 2 0.43% 
BE0003761757 Mitiska 34 0.52% 4 0.42% 
BE0003735496 Mobistar 10 0.15% 4 0.42% 4 0.79% 
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Table 5.3. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of transactions) 
ISIN Company name    Population 
 
Paper 1: 
Financial crisis  
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality  
Paper 3 : 
Corporate policies 
BE0003853703 Montea 5 0.08% 
BE0974003262 Movetis 9 0.14% 
BE0003359610 Nord-Sumatra 5 0.08% 
BE0003876936 Nyrstar 59 0.91% 11 1.15% 11 2.17% 14 3.00% 
BE0003785020 Omega Pharma 66 1.02% 10 1.05% 10 1.97% 2 0.43% 
BE0003844611 Oncomethylome 9 0.14% 5 0.52% 1 0.21% 
BE0003836534 Option 22 0.34% 11 1.15% 11 2.17% 1 0.21% 
BE0003771855 Parc Paradisio 10 0.15% 3 0.31% 
BE0003807246 Picanol 61 0.94% 5 0.52% 13 2.79% 
BE0003765790 Pinguin 25 0.38% 6 0.63% 1 0.21% 
BE0003620318 Place Saint Gudule 1 0.02% 
BE0974255847 Polygone International 5 0.08% 
BE0003854719 Porthus 32 0.49% 
BE0003748622 Punch International 88 1.35% 18 1.89% 7 1.50% 
BE0003855724 Punch Telematix 32 0.49% 6 0.63% 
BE0003730448 Quest for Growth 89 1.37% 24 2.52% 24 4.73% 4 0.86% 
BE0003662732 Quick 3 0.05% 
BE0003815322 RHJ International 19 0.29% 2 0.21% 4 0.86% 
BE0003899193 Real 10 0.15% 
BE0003899193 Realdolmen 26 0.40% 4 0.86% 
BE0003656676 Recticel 53 0.82% 7 0.73% 7 1.38% 8 1.72% 
BE0946620946 Rentabiliweb Group 13 0.20% 
BE0003707214 Resilux 12 0.18% 2 0.21% 2 0.39% 1 0.21% 
BE0003720340 Retail Estates 7 0.11% 7 0.73% 
BE0003741551 Roularta 68 1.05% 20 2.10% 14 2.76% 3 0.64% 
BE0003625366 Sapec 3 0.05% 1 0.10% 
BE0003900207 Sica Invest 23 0.35% 
BE0003898187 Sipef 77 1.19% 4 0.42% 4 0.79% 11 2.36% 181
 
 Table 5.3. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of transactions) 
ISIN Company name    Population 
 
Paper 1: 
Financial crisis  
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality  
Paper 3 : 
Corporate policies 
BE0003500080 Socfin 1 0.02% 
BE0003717312 Sofina 46 0.71% 11 1.15% 1 0.20% 6 1.29% 
BE0003545531 Solvac 15 0.23% 6 0.63% 
BE0003470755 Solvay 190 2.92% 25 2.62% 25 4.93% 13 2.79% 
BE0003463685 Sucraf 7 0.11% 
BE0003773877 Systemat 5 0.08% 2 0.21% 
BE0003826436 Telenet 254 3.91% 27 2.83% 23 4.54% 24 5.15% 
BE0003573814 Ter Beke 45 0.69% 6 0.63% 3 0.64% 
BE0003555639 Tessenderlo 41 0.63% 9 0.94% 9 1.78% 1 0.21% 
BE0974263924 Texaf 14 0.22% 
BE0003895159 Thenergo 1 0.02% 
BE0003804219 Think-Media 47 0.72% 15 1.57% 
BE0003846632 Thrombogenics 40 0.62% 6 0.63% 5 0.99% 3 0.64% 
BE0003864817 Tigenix 30 0.46% 7 0.73% 4 0.86% 
BE0003869865 Transics 1 0.02% 
BE0003739530 UCB 32 0.49% 7 0.73% 7 1.38% 10 2.15% 
BE0003884047 Umicore 217 3.34% 7 0.73% 13 2.56% 26 5.58% 
BE0003064574 Unibra 97 1.49% 23 2.41% 
BE0003878957 VGP 25 0.38% 
BE0003749638 VPK 7 0.11% 3 0.31% 1 0.20% 2 0.43% 
BE0003839561 Van de Velde 74 1.14% 4 0.42% 4 0.79% 14 3.00% 
BE0003882025 Vision IT Group 109 1.68% 
BE0003763779 WDP 46 0.71% 12 1.26% 2 0.43% 
BE0003724383 Warehouses Estates Belgium 21 0.32% 4 0.42% 1 0.21% 
BE0003806230 Zenitel 11 0.17% 1 0.10% 3 0.64% 
BE0003827442 Zetes 13 0.20% 6 0.63% 5 0.99% 2 0.43% 
              
Total 6497 100% 953 100% 507 100% 466 100% 
182
 
         
 
Table 5.4.  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of securities traded) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 :  
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003888089 4Energy 19,941 0.00% 9,227 0.03% 11,777 0.08% 
BE0003793107 AB InBev 72,394,378 11.23% 12,576,205 45.18% 12,421,627 58.70% 2,294,042 15.41% 
BE0003877942 Ablynx 1,096,996 0.17% 16,630 0.06% 43,000 0.29% 
BE0003696102 Accentis 8,238,400 1.28% 113,400 0.41% 5,113,400 34.35% 
BE0003764785 Ackermans & van Haaren 158,000 0.02% 9,000 0.03% 9,000 0.04% 30,800 0.21% 
BE0003851681 Aedifica 1,152 0.00% 
BE0974264930 Ageas 9,863,028 1.53% 80,000 0.38% 
BE0003755692 Agfa-Gevaert 614,948 0.10% 159,125 0.57% 159,125 0.75% 20,000 0.13% 
BE0003868859 Alfacam 1,147,462 0.18% 2,281 0.02% 
BE0003874915 Arseus 10,048,324 1.56% 21,014 0.08% 21,014 0.10% 74,537 0.50% 
BE0161426185 Artwork Systems Group NV 13,074,483 2.03% 
BE0003856730 Ascensio 247,117 0.04% 
BE0003837540 Atenor 2,015,076 0.31% 26,099 0.09% 525 0.00% 1,844 0.01% 
BE0003787042 Auximines 22,122 0.00% 832 0.00% 1,151 0.01% 
BE0003008019 BNB-NBB 50 0.00% 4 0.00% 
BE0003892123 BSB 119,792 0.02% 
BE0003870871 Banimmo 744,435 0.12% 54,980 0.20% 58,741 0.39% 
BE0003790079 Barco 63,128 0.01% 9,260 0.03% 9,260 0.04% 5,250 0.04% 
BE0003678894 Befimmo 11,112 0.00% 2,806 0.01% 3,618 0.02% 18 0.00% 
BE0974258874 Bekaert 482,997 0.07% 31,328 0.11% 31,328 0.15% 63,237 0.42% 
BE0003810273 Belgacom 3,076,856 0.48% 103,450 0.37% 77,450 0.37% 197,613 1.33% 
BE0020575115 Belreca 120,878 0.02% 328 0.00% 4,286 0.03% 
BE0003723377 Beluga 1,431,641 0.22% 16,954 0.06% 
BE0003592038 Bois Sauvage 394,171 0.06% 8,100 0.03% 414 0.00% 1,599 0.01% 
BE0003697118 Brantano 121,395 0.02% 
BE0003792091 Brederode 1,750,440 0.27% 259,046 0.93% 137,923 0.93% 
BE0003817344 CMB 1,901,519 0.30% 373,498 1.34% 373,498 1.77% 223,207 1.50% 
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 Table 5.4. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of securities traded) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 :  
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003845626 CNP-NPM 3,752,631 0.58% 
BE0003825420 Campine 26,876 0.00% 5,603 0.02% 351 0.00% 
BE0003304061 Cimescaut 158 0.00% 122 0.00% 
BE0003519270 CoBrHa 668 0.00% 
BE0003593044 Cofinimmo 2,895 0.00% 2,795 0.01% 2,795 0.01% 
BE0160342011 Coil 88,196 0.01% 
BE0974256852 Colruyt 61,911 0.01% 6,977 0.03% 6,977 0.03% 24,007 0.16% 
BE0003786036 Connect Group 5,963,057 0.93% 1,366 0.00% 
BE0003819365 Cumerio 853,500 0.13% 109,000 0.39% 76,500 0.36% 
BE0974259880 D'Ieteren 8,363,080 1.30% 2,800 0.01% 2,800 0.01% 2,423,510 16.28% 
BE0003789063 Deceuninck 4,563,818 0.71% 22,252 0.08% 19,717 0.09% 95,000 0.64% 
BE0003624351 Deficom Group 86,006 0.01% 13,410 0.05% 
BE0003562700 Delhaize 1,023,128 0.16% 106,529 0.38% 106,529 0.50% 11,534 0.08% 
BE0003821387 Devgen 2,187,675 0.34% 101,174 0.36% 8,001 0.04% 95,148 0.64% 
BE0003796134 Dexia 204,243,678 31.69% 1,501,792 5.39% 1,501,792 7.10% 
BE0003776904 Dolmen 156,702 0.02% 21,615 0.08% 
BE0003762763 Duvel Moortgat 58,368 0.01% 7,620 0.03% 1,916 0.01% 2,552 0.02% 
BE0003820371 EVS Broadcast 2,764,627 0.43% 390,073 1.40% 375,073 1.77% 448,838 3.02% 
BE0003871887 Ecodis 4,334,987 0.67% 
BE0974266950 Econocom 4,691,064 0.73% 557,583 2.00% 521,573 3.50% 
BE0003822393 Elia 10,000 0.00% 
BE0003843605 Emakina 804,528 0.12% 
BE0045646560 Epiq 30,546 0.00% 3,957 0.01% 
BE0003816338 Euronav 1,065,607 0.17% 524,814 1.89% 159,200 0.75% 19,003 0.13% 
BE0003840577 Evadix 24,387 0.00% 
BE0003808251 Exmar 1,398,130 0.22% 256,230 0.92% 200,082 0.95% 309,159 2.08% 
BE0003823409 Financière de Tubize 695,900 0.11% 104,204 0.37% 
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Table 5.4. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of securities traded) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 :  
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003215143 Floridienne 952,449 0.15% 126,337 0.45% 3,202 0.02% 
BE0974265945 Fluxys 210 0.00% 
BE0003752665 Fountain Industries 44,400 0.01% 
BE0003797140 GBL 9,860,925 1.53% 534,254 1.92% 534,254 2.52% 14,000 0.09% 
BE0003699130 GIMV 45,505 0.01% 26,025 0.09% 26,025 0.12% 7,060 0.05% 
BE0003818359 Galapagos 551,291 0.09% 56,290 0.20% 27,475 0.18% 
FR0004152221 Global Graphics 467,464 0.07% 
BE0003700144 Hamon & Cie 1,534,512 0.24% 
BE0003766806 IBA 5,817,734 0.90% 255,900 0.92% 25,400 0.12% 8,840 0.06% 
BE0003756708 IRIS 114,000 0.02% 1,000 0.01% 
BE0003689032 Ibt 5,322,976 0.83% 147,033 0.53% 
BE0132053365 Icos 16,254 0.00% 3,500 0.01% 3,500 0.02% 
BE0003599108 Immobel 2,035 0.00% 2,035 0.01% 
BE0160220738 Innogenetics 5,707,200 0.89% 
BE0003746600 Intervest Offices 496,281 0.08% 36,807 0.13% 
BE0003754687 Intervest Retail 300 0.00% 300 0.00% 
BE0003858751 Jensen Group 100,000 0.02% 100,000 0.67% 
BE0003565737 KBC 3,989,491 0.62% 363,957 1.31% 363,957 1.72% 91,950 0.62% 
BE0003867844 KBC Ancora 6,540 0.00% 2,040 0.01% 2,000 0.01% 
BE0003880979 Keyware Technologies 39,921,931 6.19% 509,053 1.83% 200,077 1.34% 
BE0003722361 Kinepolis 639,702 0.10% 213,480 0.77% 213,480 1.01% 69,897 0.47% 
BE0003604155 Lotus Bakeries 29,538 0.00% 5,450 0.02% 1,500 0.01% 555 0.00% 
BE0165385973 Melexis 45,366 0.01% 17,699 0.06% 17,699 0.08% 
BE0003859767 Metris 767,051 0.12% 241,688 0.87% 232,388 1.10% 
BE0003731453 Miko 3,800 0.00% 1,250 0.00% 350 0.00% 
BE0003761757 Mitiska 1,350,123 0.21% 211,089 0.76% 
BE0003735496 Mobistar 31,882,171 4.95% 66,556 0.24% 66,556 0.31% 
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 Table 5.4. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of securities traded) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 :  
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003853703 Montea 2,000 0.00% 
BE0974003262 Movetis 1,027,409 0.16% 
BE0003359610 Nord-Sumatra 105,539 0.02% 
BE0003876936 Nyrstar 2,225,807 0.35% 396,653 1.42% 396,653 1.87% 322,253 2.16% 
BE0003785020 Omega Pharma 491,085 0.08% 727,713 2.61% 727,713 3.44% 410 0.00% 
BE0003844611 Oncomethylome 143,221 0.02% 24,280 0.09% 2,066 0.01% 
BE0003836534 Option 821,394 0.13% 120,394 0.43% 120,394 0.57% 25,000 0.17% 
BE0003771855 Parc Paradisio 136,243 0.02% 7,019 0.03% 
BE0003807246 Picanol 280,475 0.04% 46,033 0.17% 69,487 0.47% 
BE0003765790 Pinguin 2,474,523 0.38% 126,909 0.46% 1,451 0.01% 
BE0003620318 Place Saint Gudule 70 0.00% 
BE0974255847 Polygone International 1,051,276 0.16% 
BE0003854719 Porthus 603,879 0.09% 
BE0003748622 Punch International 2,425,798 0.38% 111,898 0.40% 223,502 1.50% 
BE0003855724 Punch Telematix 94,247 0.01% 16,330 0.06% 
BE0003730448 Quest for Growth 451,176 0.07% 69,374 0.25% 69,374 0.33% 19,442 0.13% 
BE0003662732 Quick 2,400 0.00% 
BE0003815322 RHJ International 3,754,971 0.58% 38,000 0.14% 63,784 0.43% 
BE0003899193 Real 1,025,000 0.16% 
BE0003899193 Realdolmen 1,546,241 0.24% 7,671 0.05% 
BE0003656676 Recticel 2,359,557 0.37% 453,360 1.63% 453,360 2.14% 26,200 0.18% 
BE0946620946 Rentabiliweb Group 1,422,988 0.22% 
BE0003707214 Resilux 2,960 0.00% 660 0.00% 660 0.00% 100 0.00% 
BE0003720340 Retail Estates 92,653 0.01% 92,653 0.33% 
BE0003741551 Roularta 217,686 0.03% 145,553 0.52% 141,224 0.67% 5,000 0.03% 
BE0003625366 Sapec 7,110 0.00% 1,100 0.00% 
BE0003900207 Sica Invest 28,942 0.00% 
BE0003898187 Sipef 49,828 0.01% 2,806 0.01% 2,806 0.01% 6,106 0.04% 
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Table 5.4. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (number of securities traded) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 :  
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003500080 Socfin 25,540 0.00% 
BE0003717312 Sofina 299,374 0.05% 44,809 0.16% 1,000 0.00% 19,309 0.13% 
BE0003545531 Solvac 21,503 0.00% 2,506 0.01% 
BE0003470755 Solvay 885,754 0.14% 146,090 0.52% 146,090 0.69% 89,603 0.60% 
BE0003463685 Sucraf 7,631 0.00% 
BE0003773877 Systemat 31,000 0.00% 11,000 0.04% 
BE0003826436 Telenet 113,872,364 17.67% 1,246,719 4.48% 1,202,797 5.68% 165,100 1.11% 
BE0003573814 Ter Beke 155,928 0.02% 2,098 0.01% 2,250 0.02% 
BE0003555639 Tessenderlo 84,417 0.01% 7,520 0.03% 7,520 0.04% 1,000 0.01% 
BE0974263924 Texaf 37,377 0.01% 
BE0003895159 Thenergo 10,000 0.00% 
BE0003804219 Think-Media 220,341 0.03% 29,590 0.11% 
BE0003846632 Thrombogenics 1,110,550 0.17% 35,100 0.13% 34,350 0.16% 31,000 0.21% 
BE0003864817 Tigenix 1,505,014 0.23% 159,470 0.57% 246,350 1.65% 
BE0003869865 Transics 187,753 0.03% 
BE0003739530 UCB 1,929,610 0.30% 521,356 1.87% 521,356 2.46% 63,265 0.42% 
BE0003884047 Umicore 2,167,070 0.34% 165,000 0.59% 178,600 0.84% 453,128 3.04% 
BE0003064574 Unibra 1,439,144 0.22% 8,588 0.03% 
BE0003878957 VGP 1,734,276 0.27% 
BE0003749638 VPK 60,304 0.01% 2,366 0.01% 2,016 0.01% 28,954 0.19% 
BE0003839561 Van de Velde 651,250 0.10% 4,450 0.02% 4,450 0.02% 22,535 0.15% 
BE0003882025 Vision IT Group 4,463,491 0.69% 
BE0003763779 WDP 929,416 0.14% 114,214 0.41% 1,666 0.01% 
BE0003724383 Warehouses Estates Belgium 169,394 0.03% 2,341 0.01% 1,431 0.01% 
BE0003806230 Zenitel 3,443,118 0.53% 2,580,759 9.27% 225,069 1.51% 
BE0003827442 Zetes 138,065 0.02% 22,105 0.08% 17,105 0.08% 977 0.01% 
 
Total 644,505,375 100% 27,838,761 100% 21,160,468 100% 14,885,896 100% 
187
 
 Table 5.5.  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (transaction value) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003888089 4Energy € 90,074 0.00% € 46,125 0.01% € 52,636 0.02% 
BE0003793107 AB InBev € 2,093,978,271 19.10% € 463,359,513 56.69% € 456,730,058 62.64% € 95,338,550 30.32% 
BE0003877942 Ablynx € 7,538,675 0.07% € 94,388 0.01% € 189,075 0.06% 
BE0003696102 Accentis € 168,170 0.00% € 5,670 0.00% € 105,670 0.03% 
BE0003764785 Ackermans & van Haaren € 5,975,585 0.05% € 631,525 0.08% € 631,525 0.09% € 1,867,556 0.59% 
BE0003851681 Aedifica € 41,254 0.00% 
BE0974264930 Ageas € 19,413,454 0.18% € 712,000 0.10% 
BE0003755692 Agfa-Gevaert € 5,250,270 0.05% € 1,889,492 0.23% € 1,889,492 0.26% € 68,100 0.02% 
BE0003868859 Alfacam € 6,981,773 0.06% € 11,735 0.00% 
BE0003874915 Arseus € 93,456,180 0.85% € 163,994 0.02% € 163,994 0.02% € 803,517 0.26% 
BE0161426185 Artwork Systems Group NV € 150,356,552 1.37% 
BE0003856730 Ascensio € 11,728,292 0.11% 
BE0003837540 Atenor € 70,841,733 0.65% € 795,274 0.10% € 21,120 0.00% € 64,235 0.02% 
BE0003787042 Auximines € 18,096,790 0.17% € 612,712 0.07% € 628,269 0.20% 
BE0003008019 BNB-NBB € 162,504 0.00% € 12,100 0.00% 
BE0003892123 BSB € 1,217,915 0.01% 
BE0003870871 Banimmo € 12,299,639 0.11% € 954,538 0.12% € 712,677 0.23% 
BE0003790079 Barco € 3,455,562 0.03% € 563,026 0.07% € 563,026 0.08% € 251,807 0.08% 
BE0003678894 Befimmo € 450,772 0.00% € 199,570 0.02% € 241,147 0.03% € 891 0.00% 
BE0974258874 Bekaert € 30,996,482 0.28% € 3,010,281 0.37% € 3,010,281 0.41% € 4,522,399 1.44% 
BE0003810273 Belgacom € 43,864,521 0.40% € 3,144,835 0.38% € 2,300,381 0.32% € 4,953,284 1.58% 
BE0020575115 Belreca € 10,530,423 0.10% € 23,794 0.00% € 358,370 0.11% 
BE0003723377 Beluga € 5,384,984 0.05% € 110,678 0.01% 
BE0003592038 Bois Sauvage € 113,274,693 1.03% € 2,891,848 0.35% € 118,378 0.02% € 316,308 0.10% 
BE0003697118 Brantano € 3,981,108 0.04% 
BE0003792091 Brederode € 35,527,433 0.32% € 4,816,272 0.59% € 2,392,493 0.76% 
BE0003817344 CMB € 55,746,027 0.51% € 11,996,945 1.47% € 11,996,945 1.65% € 4,941,724 1.57% 
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Table 5.5. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (transaction value) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003845626 CNP-NPM € 131,139,243 1.20% 
BE0003825420 Campine € 738,235 0.01% € 159,296 0.02% € 10,206 0.00% 
BE0003304061 Cimescaut € 179,941 0.00% € 143,381 0.02% 
BE0003519270 CoBrHa € 987,753 0.01% 
BE0003593044 Cofinimmo € 393,009 0.00% € 377,707 0.05% € 377,707 0.05% 
BE0160342011 Coil € 321,033 0.00% 
BE0974256852 Colruyt € 5,764,270 0.05% € 1,186,463 0.15% € 1,186,463 0.16% € 1,247,614 0.40% 
BE0003786036 Connect Group € 23,649,508 0.22% € 7,007 0.00% 
BE0003819365 Cumerio € 15,610,731 0.14% € 2,294,609 0.28% € 1,310,816 0.18% 
BE0974259880 D'Ieteren € 443,515,523 4.05% € 789,432 0.10% € 789,432 0.11% € 117,278,868 37.30% 
BE0003789063 Deceuninck € 88,619,434 0.81% € 392,043 0.05% € 338,872 0.05% € 133,826 0.04% 
BE0003624351 Deficom Group € 754,009 0.01% € 120,930 0.01% 
BE0003562700 Delhaize € 46,733,230 0.43% € 7,187,822 0.88% € 7,187,822 0.99% € 615,847 0.20% 
BE0003821387 Devgen € 19,213,909 0.18% € 1,853,850 0.23% € 72,891 0.01% € 461,942 0.15% 
BE0003796134 Dexia € 684,354,926 6.24% € 23,986,006 2.93% € 23,986,006 3.29% 
BE0003776904 Dolmen € 608,854 0.01% € 328,440 0.04% 
BE0003762763 Duvel Moortgat € 2,802,993 0.03% € 329,222 0.04% € 72,138 0.01% € 168,524 0.05% 
BE0003820371 EVS Broadcast € 121,845,191 1.11% € 21,170,323 2.59% € 20,604,255 2.83% € 19,750,564 6.28% 
BE0003871887 Ecodis € 20,870,284 0.19% 
BE0974266950 Econocom € 45,796,446 0.42% € 5,848,893 0.72% € 5,746,664 1.83% 
BE0003822393 Elia € 275,786 0.00% 
BE0003843605 Emakina € 7,261,645 0.07% 
BE0045646560 Epiq € 61,390 0.00% € 7,914 0.00% 
BE0003816338 Euronav € 22,884,357 0.21% € 11,365,073 1.39% € 3,103,491 0.43% € 147,289 0.05% 
BE0003840577 Evadix € 289,085 0.00% 
BE0003808251 Exmar € 20,054,638 0.18% € 3,394,984 0.42% € 2,139,928 0.29% € 1,865,884 0.59% 
BE0003823409 Financière de Tubize € 19,357,077 0.18% € 3,089,576 0.38% 
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 Table 5.5. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (transaction value) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003215143 Floridienne € 93,146,518 0.85% € 11,533,895 1.41% € 383,860 0.12% 
BE0974265945 Fluxys € 504,597 0.00% 
BE0003752665 Fountain Industries € 702,963 0.01% 
BE0003797140 GBL € 805,874,563 7.35% € 41,967,475 5.13% € 41,967,475 5.76% € 778,489 0.25% 
BE0003699130 GIMV € 1,795,181 0.02% € 1,015,850 0.12% € 1,015,850 0.14% € 267,623 0.09% 
BE0003818359 Galapagos € 2,682,475 0.02% € 428,527 0.05% € 271,249 0.09% 
FR0004152221 Global Graphics € 2,883,987 0.03% 
BE0003700144 Hamon & Cie € 44,590,804 0.41% 
BE0003766806 IBA € 111,506,381 1.02% € 5,331,798 0.65% € 268,914 0.04% € 72,636 0.02% 
BE0003756708 IRIS € 6,902,220 0.06% € 36,650 0.01% 
BE0003689032 Ibt € 4,166,524 0.04% € 808,199 0.10% 
BE0132053365 Icos € 151,211 0.00% € 106,144 0.01% € 106,144 0.01% 
BE0003599108 Immobel € 69,740 0.00% € 69,740 0.01% 
BE0160220738 Innogenetics € 40,096,410 0.37% 
BE0003746600 Intervest Offices € 14,463,849 0.13% € 1,075,696 0.13% 
BE0003754687 Intervest Retail € 9,525 0.00% € 9,525 0.00% 
BE0003858751 Jensen Group € 880,000 0.01% € 880,000 0.28% 
BE0003565737 KBC € 207,599,125 1.89% € 12,098,350 1.48% € 12,098,350 1.66% € 1,908,590 0.61% 
BE0003867844 KBC Ancora € 155,568 0.00% € 119,660 0.01% € 24,858 0.01% 
BE0003880979 Keyware Technologies € 15,206,138 0.14% € 858,901 0.11% € 302,545 0.10% 
BE0003722361 Kinepolis € 30,743,283 0.28% € 9,622,405 1.18% € 9,622,405 1.32% € 3,714,348 1.18% 
BE0003604155 Lotus Bakeries € 4,434,193 0.04% € 1,102,870 0.13% € 378,900 0.05% € 240,024 0.08% 
BE0165385973 Melexis € 648,138 0.01% € 249,733 0.03% € 249,733 0.03% 
BE0003859767 Metris € 8,294,542 0.08% € 3,129,385 0.38% € 3,079,165 0.42% 
BE0003731453 Miko € 182,230 0.00% € 67,032 0.01% € 18,438 0.01% 
BE0003761757 Mitiska € 17,592,919 0.16% € 2,646,164 0.32% 
BE0003735496 Mobistar € 1,631,251,498 14.88% € 3,782,598 0.46% € 3,782,598 0.52% 
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Table 5.5. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (transaction value) 
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003853703 Montea € 63,902 0.00% 
BE0974003262 Movetis € 11,456,954 0.10% 
BE0003359610 Nord-Sumatra € 58,118,755 0.53% 
BE0003876936 Nyrstar € 17,408,980 0.16% € 2,894,651 0.35% € 2,894,651 0.40% € 2,879,346 0.92% 
BE0003785020 Omega Pharma € 16,733,972 0.15% € 36,713,588 4.49% € 36,713,588 5.04% € 13,463 0.00% 
BE0003844611 Oncomethylome € 1,395,880 0.01% € 250,143 0.03% € 8,853 0.00% 
BE0003836534 Option € 1,280,624 0.01% € 433,473 0.05% € 433,473 0.06% € 17,250 0.01% 
BE0003771855 Parc Paradisio € 2,381,085 0.02% € 116,099 0.01% 
BE0003807246 Picanol € 2,180,801 0.02% € 252,307 0.03% € 541,962 0.17% 
BE0003765790 Pinguin € 34,339,652 0.31% € 2,002,113 0.24% € 11,608 0.00% 
BE0003620318 Place Saint Gudule € 9,870 0.00% 
BE0974255847 Polygone International € 1,470,256 0.01% 
BE0003854719 Porthus € 6,514,585 0.06% 
BE0003748622 Punch International € 7,973,148 0.07% € 1,173,612 0.14% € 743,597 0.24% 
BE0003855724 Punch Telematix € 210,492 0.00% € 33,701 0.00% 
BE0003730448 Quest for Growth € 3,419,073 0.03% € 491,751 0.06% € 491,751 0.07% € 92,691 0.03% 
BE0003662732 Quick € 79,020 0.00% 
BE0003815322 RHJ International € 16,573,614 0.15% € 251,040 0.03% € 420,648 0.13% 
BE0003899193 Real € 241,505 0.00% 
BE0003899193 Realdolmen € 936,305 0.01% € 112,034 0.04% 
BE0003656676 Recticel € 18,965,909 0.17% € 4,447,215 0.54% € 4,447,215 0.61% € 125,680 0.04% 
BE0946620946 Rentabiliweb Group € 9,693,454 0.09% 
BE0003707214 Resilux € 89,558 0.00% € 20,656 0.00% € 20,656 0.00% € 5,145 0.00% 
BE0003720340 Retail Estates € 3,811,030 0.03% € 3,811,030 0.47% 
BE0003741551 Roularta € 7,153,848 0.07% € 5,426,995 0.66% € 5,187,072 0.71% € 106,953 0.03% 
BE0003625366 Sapec € 730,483 0.01% € 116,040 0.01% 
BE0003900207 Sica Invest € 219,496 0.00% 
BE0003898187 Sipef € 9,248,736 0.08% € 128,322 0.02% € 128,322 0.02% € 334,752 0.11% 
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 Table 5.5. (Continued)  Comparison of population and samples used in papers (transaction value)
ISIN Company name    Population   Paper 1:  Financial crisis   
Paper 2 : 
Communication quality   
Paper 3 :  
Corporate policies 
BE0003500080 Socfin € 9,960,600 0.09% 
BE0003717312 Sofina € 18,571,073 0.17% € 3,276,058 0.40% € 84,958 0.01% € 1,307,927 0.42% 
BE0003545531 Solvac € 2,524,855 0.02% € 282,234 0.03% 
BE0003470755 Solvay € 78,352,577 0.71% € 14,701,371 1.80% € 14,701,371 2.02% € 8,729,080 2.78% 
BE0003463685 Sucraf € 55,679 0.00% 
BE0003773877 Systemat € 112,058 0.00% € 49,658 0.01% 
BE0003826436 Telenet € 2,570,738,352 23.45% € 18,836,140 2.30% € 18,118,875 2.49% € 4,602,463 1.46% 
BE0003573814 Ter Beke € 8,724,121 0.08% € 102,180 0.01% € 117,472 0.04% 
BE0003555639 Tessenderlo € 2,943,771 0.03% € 247,374 0.03% € 247,374 0.03% € 23,220 0.01% 
BE0974263924 Texaf € 8,555,839 0.08% 
BE0003895159 Thenergo € 10,780 0.00% 
BE0003804219 Think-Media € 917,574 0.01% € 120,482 0.01% 
BE0003846632 Thrombogenics € 6,973,857 0.06% € 497,822 0.06% € 490,922 0.07% € 538,470 0.17% 
BE0003864817 Tigenix € 4,245,352 0.04% € 554,033 0.07% € 504,624 0.16% 
BE0003869865 Transics € 3,191,801 0.03% 
BE0003739530 UCB € 80,128,842 0.73% € 25,766,242 3.15% € 25,766,242 3.53% € 1,904,316 0.61% 
BE0003884047 Umicore € 63,126,361 0.58% € 4,534,022 0.55% € 6,721,297 0.92% € 15,478,103 4.92% 
BE0003064574 Unibra € 162,085,766 1.48% € 1,134,256 0.14% 
BE0003878957 VGP € 30,493,031 0.28% 
BE0003749638 VPK € 1,753,202 0.02% € 61,002 0.01% € 50,904 0.01% € 832,106 0.26% 
BE0003839561 Van de Velde € 21,746,204 0.20% € 135,415 0.02% € 135,415 0.02% € 872,401 0.28% 
BE0003882025 Vision IT Group € 33,242,740 0.30% 
BE0003763779 WDP € 33,249,047 0.30% € 5,019,264 0.61% € 56,192 0.02% 
BE0003724383 Warehouses Estates Belgium € 2,454,085 0.02% € 88,705 0.01% € 64,395 0.02% 
BE0003806230 Zenitel € 9,282,802 0.08% € 7,484,201 0.92% € 79,460 0.03% 
BE0003827442 Zetes € 3,486,940 0.03% € 477,561 0.06% € 352,311 0.05% € 16,158 0.01% 
  Total   € 10,961,054,514 100.00%   € 817,310,253 100%   € 729,104,101 100%   € 314,446,199 100% 
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